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The debate over how to regulate sex work in Canada has long occupied courts, 
governments, policymakers, sex workers and activists. In the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court decision in Bedford v Canada and the enactment of the constitutionally suspect 
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, this thesis examines municipal 
law’s potential role in regulating brothels. Municipalities already grant licenses to adult 
service providers, the licensing of brothels is a natural extension of their powers. The 
current licensing regimes are in need of reform, both for adult services and before any 
attempts to license brothels. This thesis uses New Zealand as an example of an effective 
licensing regime. By treating the sex trade akin to other industries and respecting the 
expertise of those who work in it, there are minimal disruptions in communities and safer 
working conditions for employees. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 From the day that dominatrix Terri-Jean Bedford first cracked her whip on the 
steps of a Toronto courthouse, Canadians were engrossed by the debate about how sex 
work should be regulated in this country. The sale of sex between consenting adults was 
not a criminal offence.1 Bedford, along with co-applicants Valerie Scott and Amy 
Lebovitch challenged three Criminal Code provisions that made it illegal to sell sex 
safely.2 Their victory at the Supreme Court of Canada could have prompted the beginning 
of decriminalized sex work in Canada and the ability for municipalities to develop 
licensing bylaws which explicitly regulate sex work. The concept is neither new nor 
startling. As this this thesis will detail, a wealth of research supports the decriminalization 
of voluntary adult sex work, coupled with regulation of the industry. New Zealand 
provides a suitable model for success. The introduction of Bill C-36 signaled that the 
Federal Government was not prepared to allow that to happen.3 
 A future challenge to the new criminal law, however, could again open the door to 
the possibility of decriminalized sex work. The term decriminalization typically means 
the repeal of all criminal law provisions - “so that it is no longer a prohibited act”.4 It is 
somewhat of a misnomer when used in regard to sex work. While voluntary adult sex 
work could easily be removed from the Criminal Code, some regulatory laws would need 
1 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, 3 SCR 1101 at para 1 [Bedford] See also paras 5, 
61, 87, 89.  
2 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c) [Criminal Code]. 
3 Tonda MacCharles, “Peter MacKay rules out legalization, municipal regulation of prostitution”, Toronto 
Star (20 January 2014), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/01/20/peter_mackay_rules_out_legalization_municipal_regula
tion_of_prostitution.html> accessed 20 January 2014 [MacCharles]. These comments were made to the 
media months prior to the introduction of Bill C-36 on June 4, 2014: Protection of Communities and 
Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25 (assented to 6 November 2014) [C-36].  
to adapt to ensure sex workers have access to the same rights and protections as other 
workers. For example, in New Zealand, decriminalization meant the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act was extended to encompass the sex trade.5 As a result, the Department 
of Labour developed a comprehensive occupational health and safety guide designed to 
provide clarity to the “duties, rights and responsibilities” of those in the industry.6  
It also means leaving criminal laws in place that restrict the sex trade to adults and 
prevent coercion or exploitation. This is the definition of decriminalization that will 
inform the discussion that follows. As Maggie MacNeil explains, there is no such thing as 
pure decriminalization:  
neither [New Zealand nor New South Wales] has 
absolute  decriminalization because both have one or 
two laws that don’t apply to other industries 
(prohibiting those under 18 from working, for 
example), but the number of such special restrictions is 
so small as to make no practical difference for the vast 
majority of sex workers.7 
 
Even if a challenge to the new law were successful, the criminal law would remain 
necessary, just in a different capacity.  This thesis will argue that decriminalization, and 
allowing municipal regulation is a preferred model to continued criminalization.    
4 Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, 6th ed, sub verbo “decriminalize.” 
5 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (NZ) 1992/96; New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of 
the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: 
Ministry of Justice, 2008) online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-
regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-law-review-committee/publications/plrc-report> accessed 30 January 
2014 at 4.2.1 [PLRC Report]. 
6 Ibid; New Zealand, Department of Labour, Occupational Safety and Health Service, A Guide to 
Occupational Health and Safety in the New Zealand Sex Industry (Wellington: Department of Labour, 
2004) online: <http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/information-guidance/all-guidance-items/sex-
industry-a-guide-to-occupational-health-and-safety-in-the-new-zealand/sexindustry.pdf>. 
7 Maggie MacNeil, “Responses to Weitzer, Post, and Wagner: Don’t Be Swayed by Exaggerated Claims”, 
The Conversation (11 December 2013), online: <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/12/11/maggie-
mcneill/responses-weitzer-post-wagner-dont-be-swayed-exaggerated-claims> accessed 9 February 2015. 
While research clearly indicates the many benefits of decriminalizing sex work, 
including enhanced safety8, better health9 and the extension of labour rights to benefit sex 
workers10, the Federal Government has enacted new criminal law provisions that aim to 
eliminate the sex trade.11 As these provisions moved through Parliament, there were calls 
for them to be referred to the Supreme Court for an opinion on their constitutionality.12 
Others pointed to constitutional weaknesses that could become part of a future court 
8  Bedford, supra note 1 at para 63; Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald, & Cheryl Brunton, The Impact of the 
Prostitution Reform Act on the Health and Safety Practices of Sex Workers (Christchurch: University of 
Otago, 2007) online: <http://www.otago.ac.nz/christchurch/otago018607.pdf> at 133-4.  
9 Global Commission on HIV, HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights & Health (New York: UNDP, HIV/AIDS 
Group, 2012) online: <http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report> accessed 9 February 2015 at 
45 [HIV & the Law]; Kate Shannon et al, “Global epidemiology of HIV among female sex workers: 
influence of structural determinants” (2014) The Lancet, online: < 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)60931-4/abstract> accessed 9 February 
2015. 
10 Emily van der Meulen, “When Sex is Work: Organizing for Labour Rights and Protections” (2012) 69 
Labour/Le Travail 147 at 152 [van der Meulen]. 
11 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 41st  Parl, 2nd Sess, No 101 (11 June 2014) at 1700 
(Hon. Peter MacKay).  
12 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 
41st  Parl, 2nd  Sess, No 44 (15 July 2014) Hon. Françoise Boivin (Gatineau, NDP) at 09:30 and Hon. Sean 
Casey (Charlottetown, Lib.) at 09:35, online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6689198&Language=E&Mode=1&Par
l=41&Ses=2> accessed 9 February 2015; British Columbia, City of Vancouver & Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority, Position Paper on: 
Bill C-36 the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act” (Ottawa: City of Vancouver and 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2014 [Vancouver Brief].  
13 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Brief to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
challenge.13 Despite the fact that decriminalization, if it can be achieved, is still years 
away, it is important to examine the implications now so that a potential transition from 
the criminal law to municipal governance of the sex trade occurs smoothly.     
This chapter will set the stage for a discussion of the next steps. Bedford was the 
spark that reignited the debate about sex work regulation in Canada and detailing the 
decision of the Supreme Court provides valuable context.14 The decision of the Court also 
provides a lens through which to view the legislative response found in Bill C-36. The 
provisions became law on December 6, 2014, before the Court’s declaration of invalidity 
came into effect, with the result that there was no lapse in the criminal law governing sex 
work.15 This chapter will also discuss the work position and detail the implications that 
flow from that view. For many, it is difficult to think of sex work as a job. Parent and 
Bruckert put forward the proposition that: “We suffer from tunnel vision in two senses: 
on the one hand, we do not see the sexualized dimension in other jobs; on the other hand 
13 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Brief to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs regarding Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act 
(Ottawa: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2014), online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/Briefs/C-36/C-36_brief_Cdn_HIV-AIDS_E.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2014; Providing Alternatives Counselling & Education (PACE) Society, Briefing 
Note Bill C-36: An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the SCC decision in AG Canada v 
Bedford, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/Briefs/C-36/SM_C-
36_brief_PACE_Society_E.pdf> accessed 17 September 2014; Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 15 (9 September 
2014) (Katrina Pacey), online: < http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/15ev-51557-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014 [Pacey]; Canada, 
Parliament, Senate,  Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd 
Sess, Issue 16 (17 September 2014) (Alan Young), online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/16ev-51569-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014 [Young]; National 
Criminal Justice Section and Municipal Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association, Bill C-36, 
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2014), online: 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/14-57-eng.pdf> accessed 9 February 2015 [CBA Brief]  
14 The Criminal provisions were previously subject to Supreme Court scrutiny in the Prostitution Reference 
(Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1 (1)(C) of the Criminal Code (Man.) [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 77 CR (3d) 1). In 
that instance the Court held that the bawdyhouse and communicating provisions were constitutional.    
15 C-36, supra note 3 ; Bedford, supra note 1 at 169.   
we see sex work only through the prism of sexuality”.16 The work position looks beyond 
the sexualized nature of the job to better examine the labour involved.17  The work 
position demonstrates the commonalities that sex work has with other professions thus 
making it easier to think critically about the advantages of using regulatory laws instead 
of criminal prohibitions. These three items are critical for understanding the current state 
of the law, the potential problems with the federal response, and why the debate over how 
to best regulate sex work in Canada will continue. The synopsis of the case and the 
Federal Government’s response are provided for context of the legal and political 
environments in which these decisions are being made. The work position will provide a 
means of moving the conversation forward in light of the potential failings in the new 
criminal provisions.18    
BEDFORD V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
 In Bedford, the Supreme Court struck down three Criminal Code provisions under 
section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19 Although dangerous, selling sex was 
legal until the enactment of Bill C-36.20 The Court in Bedford concluded that the 
prohibitions on bawdy-houses, living on the avails and communicating for the purposes 
of prostitution, prevented sex workers “from taking steps to protect themselves from the 
16 Colette Parent & Chris Bruckert, “The Current Debate on Sex Work” in Colette Parent et al, eds, Sex 
Work: Rethinking the Job, Respecting the Workers (Toronto: UBC Press, 2013) 9 at 24 [Parent & 
Bruckert].   
17 Ibid.  
18 See note 13. 
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11, s 7: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
20 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 1; See also Ibid at paras 5, 60, 61, 87, 89. 
risks” of violence.21 The Attorney General had argued that it was not the law but the 
choice to engage in sex work that caused the harms but the Court rejected this premise for 
three reasons.  
First, the Court concluded that the most marginalized workers face “financial 
desperation, drug addictions, mental illness, or compulsion from pimps, [and] they often 
have little choice”.22 Second, those who choose to sell sex are engaging in a legal 
activity.23 Third, the Court reiterated that the application was not launched to compel the 
government to make sex work safer; it was to “strike down legislative provisions that 
aggravate the risk of disease, violence and death”.24 
 The bawdy-house provision made it an offence to sell sex from a “fixed indoor 
location”.25 The Court noted that sex work was limited to “street prostitution and out-
calls – where the prostitute goes out and meets the client at a designated location, such as 
the client’s home”.26 The Court agreed with the application judge’s determination that 
“indoor work is far less dangerous than street prostitution” and that “out-call work is not 
as safe as in-call work”.27 Writing for the Court, McLachlin CJC determined the bawdy-
house provision denied sex workers the ability to protect themselves in three ways: first, 
by preventing sex work from occurring in a “fixed indoor location”  - the prohibitions on 
hiring staff compounded this insecurity; second, by making health services harder to 
access and; third, by denying access to safe house brothels.28 When the effects of the 
provision were balanced against the purpose of preventing “community harms in the 
21 Ibid at para 60; See also Ibid at para 18. 
22 Ibid at para 86. 
23 Ibid at para 87. 
24 Ibid at para 88. 
25 Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 210; Bedford, supra note 1 at para 64. 
26 Ibid at paras 5, 62. 
27 Ibid at para 63. 
nature of nuisance”29, the Court held that “the negative impact of the bawdy-house 
provision on the applicants security of the person is grossly disproportionate”.30 The 
Court found the provision prohibiting living on the avails was overbroad because in 
addition to capturing exploitive relationships, it also prevented sex workers from 
remunerating others who could help protect them against violence and exploitation.31 The 
law prohibited sex workers from hiring receptionists, drivers or bodyguards who could 
make their work safer. Even the “judicial restrictions” developed in Shaw32 and Grilo33, 
which added exclusions for those providing goods and services, and for those living with 
sex workers, were insufficient. The Court also rejected the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
reading in of “in circumstances of exploitation” as an appropriate solution.34 McLachlin 
CJC wrote that narrowing the provision was problematic because it may “create 
evidentiary difficulties” leading some to escape culpability for exploitation.35    
The prohibition on communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution 
“significantly increased the risks” of street based sex work.36 The Court concurred with 
the application judge that “face to face communication is an essential tool in enhancing 
street prostitutes’ safety” and that the provision displaced and dispersed sex workers into 
more isolated areas, further increasing the danger of the trade.37 The objective of the 
communicating provision was to “prevent the nuisances that street prostitution can 
28 Ibid at para 64. 
29 Ibid at para 131. 
30 Ibid at para 134; Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2012) at 149. Due to the fact that a finding of gross disproportionality 
is a high standard to meet, the Supreme Court had yet to overturn a law on this basis under s. 7 prior to 
Bedford. 
31 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 66. 
32 Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] UKHL 1, [1962] AC 220 (HL).  
33 R v Grilo (1991) 2 OR (3d) 514, 64 CCC (3d) 53.  
34 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 143. 
35 Ibid. 
cause”.38 The Court held that the increased risk to sex workers was grossly 
disproportionate to the goal of preventing “neighbourhood disruption”.39       
Individually, and as a regime, these provisions created an environment in which 
sex work became more dangerous because the laws denied workers the ability to take 
safety precautions. The Court recognized that “[t]he regulation of prostitution is a 
complex and delicate matter. It will be for Parliament, should it choose to do so, to devise 
a new approach, reflecting different elements of the existing regime”.40 The Court 
granted the Federal Government one year to enact new legislation before the declaration 
of invalidity took effect.41 
Ultimately, Parliament could have chosen not to draft new legislation. The effect 
of such a decision would have allowed for municipal regulation as brothels. The Federal 
Government indicated almost immediately that they would introduce new criminal 
legislation so that consensual adult sex work would not become decriminalized.42 The 
Supreme Court was clear new legislation would need to be carefully drafted to ensure 
that the objectives and the effects did not violate the Charter rights of sex workers.43 
Unfortunately, the new provisions were rushed through Parliament and the Senate with 
36 Ibid at para 71. 
37 Ibid at paras 69-70. 
38 Ibid at para 147. 
39 Ibid at 146, 159.  
40 Ibid at para 165. 
41 Ibid at para 169. 
42 Canada, Department of Justice, Statement by the Minister of Justice Regarding the Supreme Court of 




thStrtVl=2&crtr.page=6&crtr.yrndVl=2015&crtr.dyndVl=31> accessed 20 December 2014. 
43 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 5. 
little meaningful consultation resulting in a new criminal regime that largely replicates 
the harms of its predecessor.44  
THE PROTECTION OF COMMUNITIES AND EXPLOITED PERSONS ACT 
 
The Court gave the Federal Government one year to draft new legislation. 45 One 
month later, Justice Minister Peter MacKay stated that new criminal legislation 
controlling sex work would be introduced.46 This was one of the earliest indications from 
the government that municipal regulation was not under consideration. On February 1st, 
the Minister announced that the new bill was already being drafted,47 despite the fact that 
a month-long, public consultation did not commence until February 17th.48    
Bill C-36, entitled the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act was 
introduced on June 4, 2014, and for the first time in Canadian history, a move had been 
made to criminalize sex work.49  The new legislation aims to “denounce and prohibit 
44 The legislative process is fully documented on the Parliament of Canada website including evidence 
presented: Canada, Parliament, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, Bill C-36, online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Bill=C36&Parl=41&Ses=2>. 
45 Ibid at para 169. 
46 The Canadian Press, “New prostitution bill expected 'well before' deadline, Peter MacKay says”, CBC 
News (1 February 2014), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-prostitution-bill-expected-well-
before-deadline-peter-mackay-says-1.2520073?cmp=rss>. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Canada, Department of Justice, Public input to inform government’s response to Supreme Court of 




yrndVl=2015&crtr.dyndVl=31> accessed 9 February 2015. In March, the Justice Minister indicated that all 
suggestions were being considered despite having said a month earlier that the law was already being 
drafted. See John Ivison, “Flawed report could be basis for Tories’ new prostitution law”, National Post (20 
March 2014), online: 
<http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com%2F2014%2F03%2F20%
2Fjohn-ivison-flawed-report-could-be-basis-for-tories-new-prostitution-law>. 
49 Young, supra note 11; CBA Brief, supra note 11; Susana Mas, “Prostitution bill would make it illegal to 
buy, sell sex in public”, CBC News (4 June 2014), online: < http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/prostitution-
bill-would-make-it-illegal-to-buy-sell-sex-in-public-1.2664683>. 
demand for prostitution”.50 This is counter to the findings of the three major government-
commissioned reports which concluded: “repression, far from doing away with 
prostitution, creates conditions that interfere with this objective by pushing the most 
vulnerable people to sell sexual services under ever-riskier conditions”.51  
 Instead of allowing sex workers the ability to protect themselves, the preamble of 
the Act reduces sex workers to victims by labeling the sex trade as “inherently” 
exploitative and violent, and by labeling “prostitution” as an affront to “human dignity” 
that ought to be discouraged.52 Patrice Corriveau, a criminology professor at the 
University of Ottawa, describes this type of regulation as “paternalistic and 
infantilizing”.53 The Act goes on to introduce criminal prohibitions for the purchasing of 
sexual services54, advertising sexual services55 and to recriminalize communication in 
public places.56 Canada’s new law classifies sex workers as “victims of sexual 
exploitation” while also anticipating that sex workers will “report incidents of violence” 
50 Canada, Department of Justice, Technical Paper: Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in 
response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Bedford and to make 
consequential amendments to other Acts (Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act) (Ottawa; 
Department of Justice, 2014) online: < http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/protect/protect.pdf> 
accessed 15 December 2014 [DOJ Technical Paper].  
51 Patrice Corriveau, “Regulating Sex Work” in Colette Parent et al, eds, Sex Work: Rethinking the Job, 
Respecting the Workers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 39 [Corriveau]. The three reports are: Canada, 
Department of Justice, Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Volume 2 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985); Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group on Prostitution,  
Report and recommendations in respect of legislation, policy and practices concerning prostitution related 
activities (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1998); Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, 
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The Challenge of Change: A Study of Canada’s 
Criminal Prostitution Laws (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2006) [Challenge of 
Change].  
52 C-36, supra note 3, at preamble. 
53 Corriveau, supra note 51 at 39.  
54 C-36, supra note 3, s 286.1. 
55 Ibid at s 286.4. 
56 Ibid at s 213 (1.1). 
or exit the sex trade entirely.57 While the (purported) intent is new, the problems created 
by the provisions remain the same.  
 Even before Bill C-36 became law, questions were being raised about the 
constitutionality of the new provisions it introduced.58 A full constitutional analysis is 
beyond the scope of this project. However, I will briefly draw attention to some of the 
arguments that are being made about the constitutionality of the new criminal regime to 
underscore why it is important consider the municipal regulation of sex work, even in the 
face of new criminal provisions. This section will highlight the issues raised by the 
provisions prohibiting receiving sexual services for consideration and communicating. It 
will also examine the difficulties that may be created for municipalities that license adult 
service providers in the face of the commercial enterprise clause in s.286.2 (5)(e).59 The 
intense questioning of the Federal Government’s response to Bedford indicates that the 
conversation about how to regulate sex work in Canada has not yet concluded.   
CRIMINALIZING CLIENTS  
 The sale of sex by consenting adults remains legal, but receiving sexual services 
for consideration is now prohibited.60 This type of asymmetrical criminalization was first 
introduced in Sweden in 1999 in the Sex Purchase Act.61 Both the Swedish government, 
57 Ibid at Preamble. 
58 See note 13. 
59 C-36, supra note 3 at s 286.2(5)(e). 
60 Ibid at s 286.1 
61 Sex Purchase Act, Sweden 1999. (Government offices of Sweden, Legislation on the Purchase of Sexual 
Services, Last updated January 5, 2015, online: <www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4096/a/119861> accessed 9 
February 2015 [Sex Purchase Act Summary].  
and now the Canadian government cited the objective of ending demand for sexual 
services in support of asymmetrical criminalization.62  
 The Bedford Court was clear that the safest way to sell sex was from a fixed 
indoor location.63 While the Department of Justice has stated that sex workers will not be 
precluded from working from fixed indoor locations64, the reality is that prohibitions on 
purchasing and advertising will make this incredibly difficult.65 While the new legislative 
objectives propose “to protect human dignity and the equality of all Canadians by 
discouraging prostitution”66, Bedford lawyer Alan Young and the Canadian Bar 
Association have raised questions of gross disproportionality, overbreadth and 
arbitrariness.67 Although Young concedes that it will take time to amass the necessary 
evidence on the effects of the provision, he asserted that: “[t]he law has to achieve its 
goal. Well, if we find out in five years that everyone’s been pushed out to the street 
because the johns won’t come indoors, then it’s an arbitrary law that undercuts its very 
purpose”.68 
While the evidence will take time to gather, an evidentiary basis for the harms of 
criminalizing the clients of sex workers is already growing. The UN Commission on HIV 
62 C-36, supra note 3 at preamble; Sex Purchase Act Summary, supra note 58; DOJ Technical Paper, supra 
note 47.  
63 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 63; Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General) 2010 ONSC 4264, 102 OR (3d) 
321 at para 300. 
64 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 15 (9 September 2014) (Nathalie 
Levan), online: < http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/15ev-51557-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014 [Levan].  
65 Sandra Ka Hon Chu et al, Reckless Endangerment: Q & A on Bill C-36, Protection of Communities and 
Exploited Persons Act” (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 2014), online: < 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/pages/737/attachments/original/1415296321/BILLC36_i
nfo_english-Amendments.pdf?1415296321 > at 10 [Reckless Endangerment]; Pacey, supra note 11; CBA 
Brief, supra note 13 at 10.  
66 C-36, supra note 3 at preamble. 
67 Young, supra note 13; CBA Brief, supra note 11 at 14. 
68 Young, supra note 13. 
and the Law found that the adoption of the Swedish law, both in Sweden and elsewhere 
“has resulted in grave consequences for the workers”.69 Their report details the harms of 
criminalization:  
police harassment and violence push sex work 
underground, where it is harder to negotiate safer 
conditions and consistent condom use, […] rape and 
assault are difficult to report, […] sexual violence 
heightens exposure to HIV, […] and working in the 
informal sector reduces sex workers’ access to 
education and housing, thus increasing their 
dependence on others, including pimps.70   
 
The research of Sandra Ka Hon Chu and Rebecca Glass found client-targeted policing 
creates similar harms to sex workers being criminalized by provisions prohibiting 
communicating.71 Under the new law, communicating remains largely prohibited as well 
and is examined in detail below. Should these harms become reality in the wake of 
Canada’s decision to criminalize the clients of sex workers, the Supreme Court could be 
required to once again weigh in.  
COMMUNICATING  
The new communicating provision found in s. 213(1.1) raises issues similar to the 
ones that caused the Bedford Court to strike down its predecessor.72 Beyond a new 
legislative intent, the new provision is different in that it explicitly targets sex workers 
(and potentially third parties) by prohibiting communication “for the purpose of offering 
or providing sexual services” and that it limits the prohibited communication to “a public 
69 HIV & the Law, supra note 9 at 36: “Since its enactment in 1999, the law has not improved—indeed, it 
has worsened—the lives of sex workers”. The commission found that rather than reduce sex work, it has 
been driven underground where the risk of violence is greater. They also criticize the law for redirecting 
money from social work to policing.  
70 Ibid at 39. 
71 Sandra Ka Hon Chu & Rebecca Glass, “Sex Work Law Reform in Canada”, (2013) 51 Alb L Rev at 119. 
place, or in any place open to public view, that is next to a school ground, playground or 
daycare centre”.73 Communication by clients for obtaining sexual services, regardless of 
location, remains prohibited but is now captured under s. 286.1(1).74 While the words 
have changed, the effects remain the same: “the law on communicating would not be 
substantially different from what the law was before Bedford in its impact on sex 
workers’ right of prosecution for communicating with their clients”.75 The Canadian Bar 
Association found that “this section seems to suffer from arbitrariness and gross 
disproportionality”.76  
 While the government asserted that the goal was to immunize sex workers from 
prosecution77, the revised communicating provisions shows that they can still be charged 
with an offence. Pivot Executive director, Katrina Pacey, who also acted as an intervener 
in Bedford, told the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs that 
maintaining the communicating law “will continue to displace marginalized street-based 
workers to dangerous locations, give them little time to negotiate or screen clients and 
will place them at odds with the police”.78 The Bedford Court could not have articulated 
the importance of screening more clearly than when McLachlin CJC wrote: “if screening 
could have prevented one woman from jumping into Robert Pickton’s car, the severity of 
the harmful effects is established”.79 While the law does not technically prohibit sex 
72 C-36, supra note 3 at s 213(1.1); Bedford, supra note 1 at 159; CBA Brief, supra note 13 at 10. 
73 C-36, supra note 3 at s 213(1.1); Reckless Endangerment, supra note 65 at 4. 
74 C-36, supra note 3 at s 286.1(1). 
75 Reckless Endangerment, supra note 65 at 4. 
76 CBA Brief, supra note 13 at 11.  
77 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st 
Parl, 2nd Sess, No 15 (9 September 2014) (Hon. Peter MacKay), online 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/15ev-51557-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014. 
78 Pacey, supra note 13. 
79 Bedford, supra note 1 at 158. 
workers from screening their clients, the criminalization of clients will impact how and 
where they interact. As Young told the Senate committee, “sex workers will once again 
be forced to work in most dangerous of forums, on the streets”.80 
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE – CONSIDERATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL LAW 
 The living on the avails provision struck down in Bedford has been replaced by a 
prohibition on “receiving a material benefit”.81 The intent of the Court, in striking down 
the previous provision, was that sex workers should not be precluded from hiring those 
who could make their work safer.82 The material benefit provision makes a number of 
exceptions, including those in “legitimate living arrangements”83, those who benefit as a 
result of a “legal or moral obligation”84 (ie. dependents), those who provide goods or 
services to the public on the same conditions85 (ie. a landlord or an accountant), and those 
who provide services specifically for sex workers, so long as they have in no way 
encouraged the provision of sexual services from which the material benefit is derived.86 
This permits sex workers to hire security, drivers and receptionists, so long as they are 
paid proportionately for their services.87 However, there is no guidance as to how 
remuneration will be determined to be proportionate, which means compliance is difficult 
to conclude, and ultimately left to the courts.   
80 Young, supra note 13. 
81 C-36, supra note 3, s 279.02. 
82 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 142. 
83 C-36, supra note 3 at s 286.2(4)(a). 
84 Ibid at s 286.2(4)(b). 
85 Ibid at s 286.2(4)(c). 
86 Ibid at s 286.2(4)(d). 
87 Ibid. 
 The potential issue for municipalities is that the provision introduces a prohibition 
on receiving a material benefit in the context of a “commercial enterprise”.88 A definition 
of what constitutes a commercial enterprise is not provided.89 Instead, the Department of 
Justice states: “Courts would likely take into account considerations such as the number 
of persons involved, the duration of the activities and the level of organization 
surrounding the activities”.90  While explicitly stating that this section is not intended to 
criminalize the earnings of sex workers working “independently or cooperatively”, it 
leaves it to the courts to determine if the nuances of the organization of their work, 
“including informal ones” rises to the level of a commercial enterprise.91 The new 
material benefit provision, as part of a larger regime, aims to prevent the 
“institutionalization of prostitution through commercial enterprises, such as strip clubs, 
massage parlours and escort agencies in which prostitution takes place”.92 This could 
have serious impacts on businesses that are already operating and licensed by 
municipalities. 
 The Canadian Bar Association submitted that the material benefit clauses are 
likely unconstitutional because they: “undermine the ability of prostitutes to work 
indoors; prohibit prostitutes from benefiting from non-exploitive relationships which are 
vital to ensuring their safety, and prohibit prostitutes from taking advantage of the 
benefits associated with organized forms of prostitution”.93  While the bawdy-house 
88 Ibid at s 286.2 (5)(e). 




93 CBA Brief, supra note 13 at 15. 
provision no longer exists, sex workers are left without the ability to operate in any 
organized manner for fear of criminal charges, even when no exploitation occurs.94  
 While the title of the Act indicates that communities are a priority, no consultation 
with cities occurred during the creation of the provisions.95 The City of Vancouver 
explicitly asked the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights to consult with municipalities, as well as provincial health authorities.96 In 
response to the passing of the bill, Vancouver issued a statement indicating that their 
priority continues to be the “health and safety of sex workers and the communities that 
they live and work [in]”.97 The statement makes it clear that the city will not be 
abandoning previous commitments to harm reduction strategies.98   
The CBA found that the new criminal provisions throw municipal licensing and 
zoning of adult services into “uncertainty”.99 The CBA is of the opinion that cities should 
have been given the opportunity to discuss the new law before it was passed because 
“municipalities have jurisdiction over zoning and business licensing, and an important 
role in mitigating neighbourhood impacts through effective law enforcement”.100 The 
new criminal law regime, with all of its uncertainties creates an environment where 
lawyers will have trouble providing “clear legal advice, which is damaging to municipal 
governments and the communities they serve”.101  
The passing of Bill C-36 is already raising concerns in Edmonton where a task 
94 Ibid at 15. 
95 Ibid at 19; British Columbia, City of Vancouver, Our response to the passing of Bill C-36 (Vancouver: 
City of Vancouver, 2014) online: <http://vancouver.ca/news-calendar/city-response-to-passing-of-bill-c-
36.aspx> accessed 12 November 2014 [Vancouver Statement]. 
96 Vancouver Brief, supra note 12 at 3. 
97 Vancouver Statement, supra note 95. 
98 Ibid. 
99 CBA Brief, supra note 13 at 18-19. 
100 Ibid at 19. 
force has been studying the city’s massage parlours.102 Councilor and task force member, 
Scott McKeen said: “[w]hile the task force may make recommendations to improve the 
safety of sex trade workers, the new laws might tie the city’s hands”.103 The city was 
prepared to commit almost $300,000 to make the recommendations of the task force a 
reality but that contribution is being reconsidered because of the new laws.104 One body 
rub parlour owner and practitioner stated that plans to implement measures such as fire 
plans, and industry-exit programs should still go ahead.105 The task force will have to 
carefully tailor their recommendations so that they do not run afoul of the new laws but 
still enhance the safety of workers. They may also have to move quickly to ensure that 
the funds to implement the plans are still available.   
Just as was the case with the former provisions, the new laws are intended to work 
in tandem, but now the intent is to suppress the demand for paid sex.106 Even if this is a 
laudable goal, it is likely unachievable:    
Three consensuses already exist: first, on the need 
to better protect female sex workers; second, on the  
failure of the laws in force to do away with 
“prostitution” and third, on the fact that the current 
laws essentially harm female sex workers.107  
 
101 Ibid at 18. 
102 Leah Holoiday “Not a good time to fund recommendations from city’s body rub parlour task force: 





105 Ibid; A Body rub is defined under the Toronto Licensing bylaw as: “Includes the kneading, 
manipulating, rubbing, massaging, touching, or stimulating, by any means, of a person's body or part 
thereof but does not include medical or therapeutic treatment given by a person otherwise duly qualified, 
licensed or registered so to do under the laws of the Province of Ontario”. Toronto Municipal Code, C 545, 
Licensing, § 545-1.  
106 Department of Justice Technical Paper, supra note 50. 
107 Corriveau, supra note 51 at 51.  
It is a summation of how the debate on regulating sex work finds there is much to debate 
but little consensus. Despite the change in the law, this statement remains accurate. There 
are two main positions in the debate over sex work regulation, created from a multitude 
of groups and individuals who all take their position for different reasons. On one side, 
there is the group which seeks to prohibit prostitution through criminal law. On the other, 
a group which seeks a repeal of the criminal laws and extension of protections under 
existing labour, human rights and business frameworks.  This thesis advocates for the 
latter. Laws, regulations, bylaws and policies, created in conjunction with sex workers are 
the most effective solution available. By considering the municipal response now, cities 
can best adapt to the changing legal landscapes. The best course of action is to develop a 
clear understanding of the impacts of municipal bylaws on sex workers and how the 
situation can be achieved. Given the chorus of voices who believe the regime is as 
unconstitutional as the one struck down by the Court, there is every indication that 
another constitutional challenge will be mounted. 
THE WORK POSITION 
 
This discussion will frame sex work as work, and use the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court, along with other resources, to provide direction for municipal lawmakers 
who may not be comfortable or informed about the realities of sex work. Sex workers are 
asking that their occupation be permitted to abide by the same labour regulations as any 
other industry.108  While lawmakers may not understand the nuances of the sex trade, 
they do understand how to regulate businesses. Both municipalities and sex workers have 
specific expertise and if sex work is viewed as work then the conversation that results 
could easily move towards how best to create a municipal licensing regime for 
decriminalized brothels. Moving beyond morality and opinion is required if this is to 
occur and this section will set out the importance of recognizing the work in sex work.   
Looking past the associated stigma and treating sex work like any other job 
allows the trade to be examined in a different light. When sex work is viewed as work, 
the voices of the workers can be heard because the focus shifts from sex to work.109 As 
Jeffery and MacDonald posit: 
[b]y understanding sex work as a resistant form of  
labour rather than simply as a survival mechanism,  
we both see the lives of sex workers more clearly  
from their perspective and make room for a politics  
that includes them as agents of change rather than  
objects of intervention.110 
 
Sex workers speak in terms of work, not in terms of criminal behavior and municipalities  
 
should respect this stance.  
.    
 
Classifying sex work as a crime is a matter of opinion. Removing it from the 
Criminal Code does not mean leaving the industry lawless; it means imposing a different 
set of rules. Using heavy-handed criminal prohibitions to control the sex trade only 
creates more problems than it solves. As Brock explains, a crime-centric approach has 
been repeatedly proven as ineffective:  
legislators, the courts, and the police cannot make 
prostitution disappear. All that can be done is to create 
new patterns of enforcement that ultimately accomplish 
108 van der Meulen, supra note 10 at 153. 
109 Parent & Bruckert, supra note 16 at 24..  
110 Leslie Ann Jeffery & Gayle MacDonald, Sex Workers in the Maritimes Talk Back (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2006) at 20.  
little except to make life more difficult for sex 
workers.111 
 
Decriminalizing voluntary adult sex work and allowing municipal licensing for brothels 
ends the ineffectual criminalization. Framing sex work as work allows for a more focused 
discussion as to how the bylaws should be written.  
Sex workers do not all speak with the same voice: “[s]ome state that they enjoy 
their work; others consider it a lesser evil or describe it as a very difficult experience”.112 
This is simply because “there is no such thing as a representative sex worker”.113 As 
Emily van der Meulen states: “Over simplistic anti-prostitution analyses that advocate for 
the eradication of the sex industry thus tend to ignore the complex and multi-faceted 
organization of labour within the sex industry as well as sex worker’ diverse experiences 
working within it”.114 Whether a person sells sexual services for a lifetime, as an on-
again, off-again job, or as a temporary solution, sex workers express opinions about their 
work just like any other employee talks about work.115 Setting aside the stigma and 
morality often associated with sex allows sex work to be examined as a job. 
   Just as sex workers vary, so do the working conditions. Street based sex workers 
are the most prevalent image associated with sex work. In reality, street-based work only 
encompasses approximately twenty percent of the industry.116 Street-based workers are 
merely more visible, while the majority of the industry is unseen. Parent and Bruckert use 
labour theory to examine sex work separately from the associated stigma: “[l]abour 
111 Deborah R. Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: The Social Regulation of Sexual Labour, 2d ed 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 147 [Brock]. 
112 Ibid at 24-5. 
113 Celine Bisette, “What does a 'representative' sex worker look like?”, rabble.ca (13 May 2014), online: < 
http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/views-expressed/2014/05/what-does-representative-sex-worker-look>.  
114 van der Meulen, supra note 10 at 152. 
115 Parent & Bruckert, supra note 16 at 25.  
116 Challenge of Change, supra note 51 at A(1).  
theory enables us to step outside of the traditional criminological analysis of deviance in 
order to examine these jobs as jobs”.117 They found that working for a third party, as a 
sex worker is similar to “many other service-sector workers”.118 Sex workers who work 
for a third party are “managed like employees”. Like employees they are expected to 
comply with scheduling, perform duties related to the business and adhere to the rules set 
by management.119 In return, management may provide advertising, security, drivers and 
reception. By looking through the labour lens where sex is removed from the equation, it 
is clear that working for a third party in a massage parlour is not that different from a 
hairdresser who works for a third party. Both would convey stories about clients they 
liked or disliked, shifts they preferred, co-workers they liked or disliked, as well as 
complaints and advantages of the employer.  
There are expectations of service, knowledge and skill in both jobs: “[l]ike 
waitresses, hair stylists, and sales clerks, sex workers have to be sociable, patient, 
courteous, polite and capable of dealing with a variety of people”.120 Sex workers have a 
host of other skills that would add up to an impressive resume – “money management, 
communication and listening, conflict resolution, marketing and business administration, 
assertiveness, and creativity” – but their skills are devalued because of the nature of their 
work.121 Sex workers also must possess specific skills that relate to their work and these 
may vary depending on which facet of the industry they work in. For example, an 
independent escort may develop web design and social media skills to attract clients, 
117 Bruckert & Parent, supra note 16 at 58 Emphasis in original.  
118 Ibid at 59. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid at 61. 
121 Ibid. 
where a worker employed by an agency may not need to. Even when highly skilled, sex 
workers often have difficulty transferring these skills to other occupations.122 
The labour lens allows for sex work to be treated and regulated like other 
businesses.  Sex workers state: “[c]onceptualizing sex work as a form of sexual labour 
could lead to a social context where sex industry establishments are more likely to abide 
by labour legislation”.123 In fact, this is supported by the comparison of “social control” 
and “neutral” licensing models in Chapters 3 and 4.124 The language shift that occurs 
when sex work is considered labour gives sex workers greater legitimacy because there is 
a forum for dealing with occupational health and safety issues, like safer sex and 
violence.125 Instead of being “blinded by moralism”126, the labour position “is based on a 
recognition of the need for broad social rights for all”.127   
The main advantage in working for a third party is that not everyone is capable of 
or interested in being an entrepreneur.128 While it may be difficult for many people to put 
themselves in the shoes of a sex worker, everyone – sex workers included – could name 
at least one job they would never want to do. Classing a profession as undesirable is not a 
sufficient reason for devaluing it.    
122 Frederique Chabot, ed, The Toolbox: What works for sex workers (Ottawa, Prostitutes of 
Ottawa/Gatineau Work, Educate & Resist, 2012)  
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(2007) Murdoch University eLaw Journal 269, online: <http://apo.org.au/node/2539> at 270 [Crofts & 
Summerfield]. 
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128 Ibid at 60; For more on independent escorts see Leah McLaren, “The Secret Life of a Bay Street 
Hooker”, Toronto Life Magazine (8 December 2010), online: < 
http://www.torontolife.com/informer/features/2010/12/08/the-secret-life-of-a-bay-street-
hooker/?page=all#tlb_multipage_anchor_1>.  
FROM THE CRIMINAL CODE TO THE MUNICIPAL CODE 
The criminal law is “the most powerful tool at Parliament’s disposal”.129 
However, Binnie J. also reminds us that the criminal law is a “blunt instrument”.130 The 
Criminal Code is not the best tool available for regulating sex work.131 The main 
argument this thesis will advance is that the proper place for regulating brothels is at the 
municipal level because municipalities are already licensing businesses that provide adult 
services and because they are in the best position to adopt local solutions. This is not to 
suggest that the current licensing regimes for other adult services should be replicated 
and applied to license brothels. They merely represent a starting point. 
The Constitution Act, 1867, places municipalities under provincial jurisdiction.132 
This limits the authority of municipalities to the powers that are “expressly delegated in 
provincial legislation”133 and places strict parameters on what actions cities are permitted 
to take. Chapter 2 will explore the limits of municipal authority and how cities are using 
their authority to license adult services such as escort services and massage parlours. This 
discussion will also highlight how cities license adult workers and then turn a blind eye to 
the difficulties that workers face by being caught between the legitimacy of municipal 
licensing and having their work prohibited by the Criminal Code. This chapter will argue 
that municipal licensing is the best option for decriminalized brothels but that the current 
licensing regimes will not be adequate.   
129 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, 1 
SCR 76 at para 60. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Pacey, supra note 13.  
132 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 s 92 (28). 
133 Felix Hoehn, Municipalities and Canadian Law: Defining the Authority of Local Governments 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1996).  
After establishing that municipalities have the requisite authority and experience 
to regulate brothels, the discussion will turn to the best practices for doing so. Chapter 3 
will explore the benefits and drawbacks of the current licensing regimes for adult 
businesses. While workers have said that holding a license increases the legitimacy of 
their employment to allow them the benefits of verifiable employment 134, offers 
improved health and safety135 and has contributed to programming for adult workers136, 
these benefits come at a significant cost. Workers cite onerous conditions for obtaining a 
license137, privacy concerns138 and the expense as drawbacks to licensing.139 The 
effectiveness of licensing regimes is also impacted by the goals it seeks to achieve.140 The 
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of Canadian licensing regimes will be 
undertaken with a view to the “social control” model of licensing.  The social control 
model demonstrates that a license to operate does not necessarily equate with approval.141 
This adds depth to the discussion by showing how the approach to licensing can replicate 
the conditions of criminalization, thus negating potential benefits.   
134 Jacqueline Lewis & Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale, “Licensing Sex Work: Public Policy and Women’s 
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137 Emily van der Meulen and Mariana Valverde, “Beyond the Criminal Code: Municipal Licensing and 
Zoning Bylaws” in Emily van der Meulen, Elya M. Durisin & Victoria Love, eds, Selling Sex: Experience, 
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139 van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note137; John Lowman, Submission to the Subcommittee on 
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In chapter four, I will discuss how consideration of the experience of 
decriminalization in New Zealand can advance our understanding of both municipally 
controlled brothels and decriminalized sex work. With the passing of the Prostitution 
Reform Act (PRA) in 2003, New Zealand became the first country in the world to 
decriminalize voluntary adult sex work both indoors and out.142 This chapter will begin 
with a brief overview of the New Zealand Act to establish how Territorial Authorities 
became responsible for the regulation of brothels.  It will then examine the types of 
licensing bylaws that they have enacted. Research, including the Report of the 
Prostitution Law Reform Committee143, as well as reports of the experiences of workers 
will highlight how municipalities have been successful in incorporating brothels into 
municipal regimes with a view to benefiting sex workers. In contrast to the “social 
control” model which underlies Canada’s licensing regimes, New Zealand has adopted a 
“neutral” stance to licensing.144  Consideration of the New Zealand model will assist in 
developing the guiding principles that should be considered when creating a licensing 
regime. 
Using current Canadian licensing regimes for adult service businesses as a 
starting point and drawing from research conducted with sex workers, the Bedford 
decision, and from New Zealand, this thesis will provide municipal lawmakers with the 
guidance necessary to develop fair and effective licensing bylaws. Chapter five offers 
municipalities a basic framework to avoid the problems that exist in the current municipal 
regimes licensing adult work, and to ensure that workers benefit from licensing. Although 
the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act is now law, the speculation 
142 Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/28 [PRA]. 
143 PLRC Report, supra note 5 at at 6.1.1.  
around the constitutionality of the new provisions shows the need for municipal 
lawmakers to be prepared to address decriminalized sex work.145 This thesis proposes 
recommendations regarding: reasonable fees, exemptions from licensing, ensuring those 
with past convictions for prostitution related offences are not precluded from obtaining 
licenses, protection of the privacy of workers, and consultation with those in the industry 
to create the details of licensing regimes. Consultation is critical as “[s]ex workers are in 
the best position to describe what it is like to work and live under the current social and 
legal framework” and to recommend the ways in which circumstances should be 
improved.146 In addition, to attain maximum benefits to workers and compliance with the 
licensing regime, these recommendations should be undertaken in conjunction with a 
“neutral” stance on licensing.147    
CONCLUSION  
 The debate over how sex work should be regulated remains unsettled. With the 
striking down of the former provisions and the questionable constitutionality of the 
provisions designed to replace them, there is ample room for a discussion of alternative 
measures. This paper presents municipal regulation as the solution to balance the interests 
of both sex workers and communities. The chapters that follow will establish that 
municipalities have the requisite authority, the experience in creating licensing regimes 
and that benefits can flow to both cities and sex workers if the regimes are developed in 
consultation with workers. The guidance from sex workers who sell sex in criminalized 
144 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 124 at 270.  
145 C-36, supra note 3. 
and decriminalized countries lends considerable insight into what licensing regimes need 
to address so that sex workers can work safely and reap the benefits those in all other 
occupations take for granted.  
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<http://www.pivotlegal.org/sites/pivotlegal.org/files/voicesfordignity.pdf> at 12.  
147 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 124 at 270.  




Evidence has repeatedly shown that the safest way to sell sex is from a “fixed 
indoor location”.1 The Bedford decision affirmed that laws aimed at maintaining orderly 
streets cannot do so at the expense of the health, safety and security of sex workers.2 This 
must be taken into consideration when constructing municipal regimes to license sex 
work.3 The new legislation introduced by the Federal Government in response to Bedford 
leaves little room for decriminalized brothels but it remains to be seen if this legislation 
will withstand constitutional scrutiny.4  
In this chapter, I advance the proposition that municipal governments are in the 
best position to regulate decriminalized brothels using licensing regimes because cities 
are already licensing adult businesses that are closely aligned with the sex trade.5 To set 
up this discussion, I will provide an overview of municipal authority and the current 
1 Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General) 2010 ONSC 4264; 102 O.R. (3d) 321 (SC) at para 300; Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72; 3 SCR 1101 at para 63 [Bedford].  
2 Bedford, supra note 1 at para 148. 
3 Elaine Craig, “Sex Work By Law: Bedford’s Impact on Municipal Approaches to Regulating Sex Work” 
(2011) 16 Rev Const Stud 205 at 219. 
4 See Chapter 1, page 11 for discussion of Bill C-36. 
5 Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25 (asserted to 6 November 2014)  [C-
36]; Examples of Cities that license massage parlours, body rub parlours and escorts: City of Toronto, by-
law No 514-2002, Chapter 545, Licensing (20 June 2002) [Toronto Licensing Bylaw]; City of Vancouver, 
by-law No 4450, License By-Law (23 September 1969) [Vancouver Licensing Bylaw]; City of Calgary, by-
law No 48M2006, Dating and Escort Service Bylaw (17 October 2006) [Calgary Escort Bylaw]; City of 
Edmonton, by-law No 12452, Escort Licensing Bylaw; City of Windsor, by-law No 131-2011, Body-Rub 
Parlours (4 July 2011). Escorts, Massage and Body Rub Parlours are not the only adult businesses that are 
municipally licensed. For example, in Vancouver, licenses are also required for Dating Services (By-laws 
5283-1979; 6038-1986; 6646-1990) and Health Enhancement Centres (By-laws 6830-1991; 7052-1992).    
bylaws that license escort services and body rub parlours.6 After establishing how the 
adult services industry is licensed, the discussion will move to highlight how cities are 
already licensing sex work within the businesses that purport to be offering 
companionship and massage, and the complications that are caused for workers who are 
licensed municipally but criminalized under federal laws. This chapter will argue that 
instead of being forced to pretend that sex work is not occurring through these channels, 
cities should develop licensing regimes specifically for brothels to alleviate legal 
concerns, denial of adequate health and safety measures and to facilitate better 
relationships with enforcement officers, which represent the most frequent concerns of 
workers.7 
This chapter will highlight how cities have turned a blind eye to sex work that is 
occurring in municipally licensed adult service businesses,8 while at the same time 
drafting bylaws that appear to contemplate the exchange of sex for money.9 While 
licensed by cities, owners and workers in the adult industry are burdened by the federal 
criminal provisions on prostitution: workers struggle from a lack of information;10 they 
6 The licensing regimes presented are as they were prior to the passing of Bill C-36. The potential impacts 
of the new criminal provisions are not yet known but the potential impacts are highlighted in Chapter 1 at 
page 11. 
7 M. Laing, “Regulating adult work in Canada: the role of criminal and municipal code', in Johnson, P. & 
Dalton, D., eds, Policing Sex. (London: Routledge, 2012) 166-184, online: <http://www.academic-
freedom.ca/regulating_sex/docs/Regulating_adult_work_in_Canada.pdf> at 12-13,19, pagination to online 
version [Laing]; Pivot Legal Society, Beyond Decriminalization: Sex Work, Human Rights and a New 
Framework for Law Reform, (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 2006) online: 
<http://www.pivotlegal.org/beyond_decriminalization> at 46 [Beyond Decriminalization]; Jacqueline 
Lewis & Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale, “Licensing Sex Work: Public Policy and Women’s Lives” (2000) 26 
Can Pub Pol 439 at 443 [Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale].      
8 Laing, supra note 7 at 12-13, 19; Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 46; Lewis & Maticka-
Tyndale, supra note 7 at 443.      
9 John Lowman, Submission to the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws of the Standing Committee on 
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Ottawa: John Lowman, 1997) 
<http://184.70.147.70/lowman_prostitution/HTML/SCJHPE/Submission_to_the%20Subcommittee_on_Sol
icitation%20Laws_Brief.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2015 at Appendix A, page 14 [Lowman Submissions]. 
10 Laing, supra note 7 at 7; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 7 at 441. 
are confused that cities are allowed to profit from license fees while the criminal law (as 
it then was) prohibits living on the avails; and relationships with enforcement officers are 
strained.11 This chapter will underscore not only that municipalities are capable of 
licensing sex work, but also that licensing regimes could work more effectively with the 
repeal of the criminal provisions.         
THE LIMITS OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY 
 In 1839, Lord Durham advanced the argument that local governments were in the 
best position to serve local needs and that if municipalities were not recognized in the 
constitution as a formal level of government from the outset, other levels of government 
would never relinquish control.12 The Constitution Act, 1867 did not entrench 
municipalities as a separate order of government. Instead, municipalities were placed 
under provincial jurisdiction.13 This limits the authority of municipalities to the powers 
that are “expressly delegated in provincial legislation”.14 It places strict parameters on 
what actions cities are permitted to take, as they are powerless save for the authority 
granted by the province.  
11 Sex Trade Advocacy and Research, Safety, Security and the Well-Being of Sex Workers: A Report 
Submitted to the House of Commons Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws (SSLR) (Ottawa: Sex Trade 
Advocacy and Research, 2005), online:              
<http://web2.uwindsor.ca/courses/sociology/maticka/star/pdfs/safety_and_security_report_final_version.pd
f> at 20 [Safety, Security & Well-Being]; Laing, supra note 7 at 17.   
12 Parliamentary Information and Research Service Canada, Background Paper: Municipalities, The 
Constitution and the Canadian Federal System, by Michael Dewing, William R. Young & Erin Tolley, 
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament Canada, 2006) at 2.  
13 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 s 92 (28) [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
14 Felix Hoehn, Municipalities and Canadian Law: Defining the Authority of Local Governments 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1996) [Hoehn]; Stanley M. Makuch, Neil Craik, & Signe B. Leisk, 
Canadian Municipal and Planning Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 75 [Makuch et al].  
The actions of municipalities must also be Charter compliant.15 The Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this principle in R v Guignard stating: “[a]part from the legislative 
framework and the general principles of administrative law that apply to them, municipal 
powers must be exercised in accordance with the principles of the Charter, as must all 
government powers”.16 
Each province and territory sets the boundaries of municipal authority through 
delegating legislation.17 Municipalities have only the powers that are granted through 
legislation, usually in the form of a municipal act or a city charter.18 For example, the 
Nova Scotia Municipal Government Act confers “broad authority” to municipalities to: 
“provide good government; provide services, facilities and other things that, in the 
opinion of the council, are necessary or desirable for all or part of the municipality, and 
develop and maintain safe and viable communities”.19 Not unlike constitutions, municipal 
delegating legislation needs to be anticipatory because “the precise powers a municipality 
may require cannot be known in advance”.20 While the powers of municipalities have the 
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; Re McCutcheon and Toronto (City) et al. [1983] 41 OR (2d) 
652; 147 DLR (3d) 193 at 663.  
16 R v Guignard, 2002 SCC 14, 1 SCR 472 at para 17. 
17 Makuch et al, supra note 14 at 75; Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Assessment of the Municipal 
Acts of the Provinces and Territories, by Donald Lidstone (Vancouver: Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities, 2004) at 3 [Lidstone]. Lidstone notes that other pieces of legislation may impact 
municipalities: “Many financial and accountability provisions affecting local governments are found in 
other provincial and territorial statutes”.   
18 Makuch et al, supra note 14 at 75; In Nova Scotia, the Municipal Government Act, SNS 1998, c 18, 
governs municipalities outside of the Halifax Regional Municipality [NS Municipal Act]. The Halifax 
Regional Municipality derives its authority from a city charter: Halifax Regional Municipality Charter, 
SNS 2008, c 39. For more generally on the various municipal instruments, see Lidstone, supra note 17.   
19 NS Municipal Act, supra note 18, s 2. The Halifax Regional Charter uses almost identical language.  
20 Hoehn, supra note 14 at 2. 
ability to adapt as needs arise, cities must be cautious not to legislate in contradiction to 
provincial statutes or venture into powers granted to the Federal Government.21  
Although municipalities are limited by the “express authority doctrine”22, “the 
rule against delegation”23, and “provincial paramountcy”24, a gradual shift began in 
Greenbaum25 that would move municipalities from being considered merely 
“administrators of provincial authority”26 to acknowledging that municipal politicians are 
accountable to the electorate to represent local interests. Writing for the court in 
Greenbaum, Iacobucci J. determined that while it is important for courts to “be vigilant in 
ensuring that municipalities do not impinge upon the civil or common law rights of 
citizens in passing ultra vires by-laws”,27 where there is more than one possible 
interpretation of a by-law, it should be “read to fit within the parameters of the 
empowering provincial statute”.28 This balancing act recognizes the authority of 
municipalities who are governed by elected officials but ensures that they do not act 
outside of their jurisdiction.  
21 Ibid; In Morrison v. Kingston (City) [1937] 4 DLR 740, [1938] OR 21, the Ontario Court of Appeal was 
tasked with interpreting s 259 of The Municipal Act (RSO 1927, c 233.) which gave municipalities the 
authority to legislate in matters “for the health, safety, morality and welfare of inhabitants”. The Court held: 
“[a] municipality can not set up a code of morality different from that established by The Criminal Code” 
[Morrison].    
22 Express Authority was defined by the Supreme Court in R v Greenbaum [1993] 1 SCR 674, 100 DLR 
(4th) 183 at para 22, where Iacobucci J. wrote: “Municipalities are entirely the creatures of provincial 
statutes. Accordingly, they can exercise only those powers which are explicitly conferred upon them by a 
provincial statute” [Greenbaum].  
23 Passutto Hotels (1984) Lt. v Red Deer (City), 2006 ABQB 641, 407 AR 83, at para 83: “[A]s a recipient 
of delegated authority itself, a municipality may not, in the absence of express authority in its enabling 
statute, further delegate its authority”. 
24 Multiple Access Ltd v McCutcheon, [1982] 2 SCR 161 at 171, 138 DLR (3d) 1 – “the constitutional 
doctrine of paramountcy operates so as to invalidate provincial legislation where it duplicates valid Federal 
legislation in such a way that the two provisions cannot live together and operate concurrently”.  
25 Greenbaum, supra note 22.  
26 Makuch et al, supra note 14 at 75. 
27 Greenbaum, supra note 22 at 26 
28 Ibid. 
When a court has determined that a municipality has acted within its delegated 
authority, their enactments are evaluated “upon a deferential standard”29, a long-standing 
principle that was first articulated in Kruse v. Johnson.30 In this case, a dispute over a 
bylaw prohibiting music in residential areas, Lord Russell stated:  
 A byelaw (sic) is not unreasonable merely because  
particular judges may think that it goes further than  
is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it  
is not accompanied by a qualification or exception  
which some judges may think ought to be there. Surely  
it is not too much to say that in matters which directly  
and mainly concern the people of the country, who 
have the right to choose whom they think best to 
represent them in their local government bodies, such  
representatives may be trusted to understand their own  
requirements better than judges.31  
 
The modern restatement of this principle is expressed in Shell Canada Products 
Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), where McLachlin J. (as she then was) writing in dissent, 
advocated for “a broader more deferential approach” when undertaking judicial review of 
municipal enactments.32 She stated:  
Barring clear demonstration that a municipal decision 
was beyond its powers, courts should not so hold. In 
cases where powers are not expressly conferred but 
may be implied, courts must be prepared to adopt the 
"benevolent construction" which this Court referred to 
in Greenbaum, and confer the powers by reasonable 
implication. Whatever rules of construction are applied, 
they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of  
municipal bodies as community representatives.33 
 
29 Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [2000] 1 SCR 342, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para 35.  
30 Kruse v Johnson, [1898] 2 QB 91 (Div Ct).  
31 Ibid at p 100. 
32 Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver (City) [1994] 1 SCR 231, 110 DLR (4th) 1, [Shell] at para 5.  
33 Ibid at para 19. 
Sopinka J., took a more narrow approach to resolve the issue in Shell.34 However, in 
Spraytech35, the Court was again asked to determine the appropriate standard of 
deference to municipal decision-making. The majority recognized the principle of 
“subsidiarity”. L’Heureux-Dubé J., explained the concept as:    
the proposition that law-making and  
implementation are often best achieved at a  
level of government that is not only effective,  
but also closest to the citizens affected and thus  
most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, 
and to population diversity”.36  
 
With this principle underlying the approach of the courts, it becomes clear that courts are 
hesitant to overturn municipal enactments that are within its legislative authority because 
they represent local interests.  
MORALITY IN BYLAWS – A CRIMINAL INTENT OR A LICENSING REGIME  
 
The waters become somewhat muddy when provisions that appear to be wading 
into federal powers appear in licensing regimes. While the courts have been clear that 
cities cannot directly combat sex work because it is a criminal law matter37, licensing 
schemes for adult industries often contain provisions and rules that, on their face, seem to 
34 Ibid at para 98, Sopinka J., writing for the Majority used the two-part approach set forward in The Law 
of Canadian Municipal Corporations: “a court should endeavour firstly to interpret it so that the powers 
sought to be exercised are in consonance with the purposes of the corporation. The provision at hand 
should be construed with reference to the object of the municipality: to render services to a group of 
persons in a locality with a view to advancing their health, welfare, safety and good government”.  
35 114957 Canada Ltd (Spraytech) v Hudson (Town) 2001 SCC 40, 200 DLR (4th) 419.  
36 Ibid at para 3. 
37 In Westendorp, [1983] 1 SCR 43, 144 DLR (3d) 259, the authority of the Calgary bylaw that prohibited 
“being on the streets for the purposes of prostitution” was challenged as being ultra vires and the Supreme 
Court agreed. The Court held: “[h]owever desirable it may be for the municipality to control or prohibit 
prostitution, there has been an overreaching in the present case which offends the division of legislative 
powers”.  The Supreme Court similarly dispatched the case of Goldwax v Montreal (City), [1984] 2 SCR 
525, 16 DLR (4th) 667. These decisions rendered street solicitation bylaws in several cities, including 
Vancouver, Niagara Falls, Regina and Halifax, of no force and effect because of their criminal law purpose.  
evoke morality. Within the confines of a licensing regime, issues that might otherwise be 
considered morality-based, such as provisions that prohibit nudity, become permissible.   
In Morrison,38 the court was clear that “matters of morality are generally dealt 
with by the Parliament of the Dominion”.39 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Westendorp 
confirmed that bylaws that aimed at “establishing or enforcing public morality” would be 
found ultra vires.40 Within the confines of a licensing regime, the courts have appeared to 
be more lenient when bylaws contain a “moral aspect”.41 In Re Try-San International 
Ltd., the owners of a body-rub parlour and a model studio challenged amendments made 
to the Vancouver licensing bylaw.42 They argued that the city was attempting to regulate 
morality by adding provisions to the by-law that restrict the hours of operation and 
prohibit body-rub attendants from working nude.43 The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
upheld the bylaw because they had not been presented with evidence indicating that 
morality was a factor in the changes to the licensing bylaw.44  
In McNeil, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between the Criminal Code 
and a provincial act that regulated business (in this instance, theatres): “one is directed to 
regulating a trade or business where the other is concerned with the definition and 
punishment of crime; and in the second place, one is preventive while the other is 
38 Morrsion, supra note 21. 
39 Ibid at 744; Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 226: “Because of the [F]ederal authority over 
crime, provinces are not permitted to regulate morality and public order”.  
40 Hoehn, supra note 14 at 12. 
41 Ibid at 13.  
42 Re Try-San International Ltd and Vancouver, (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 236 (BCCA), [1978] B.C.J. No. 
1188(QL) [Try-San]; Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 as amended by by-law 4957 (23 March 
1976) and by-law 4969 (27 April 1976).   
43 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 as amended by by-law 4957 (23 March 1976) and by-law 4969 
(27 April 1976) ss 7-8. 
penal”.45 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Rio Hotel using similar reasoning.46 
Dickson CJ. distinguished Rio Hotel from Westendorp and found no intrusion into federal 
domain.47 In concurring reasons, Estey J. wrote:  
[w]here the program is founded on a licensing system  
with regulations and conditions related to the provision  
of a licence, and where the province does not purport to 
establish an offence that is criminal in character, it is  
clearly constitutionally legitimate.48 
 
The courts have seemingly drawn a line in the sand that allows for the inclusion of 
restrictions that may be considered morality based so long as the objective is sufficiently 
tailored to facilitating a licensing regime and no conflict with federal law is created.  
CURRENT LICENSING BYLAWS REGULATING ADULT BUSINESSES  
 
 The authority to create business licensing regimes is under the jurisdiction of 
municipalities because the regimes are aimed at controlling business and not controlling 
prostitution.49 Each city creates its own licensing requirements which means that the 
licensing requirements can vary greatly by city and according to the sector of the adult 
44 Try-San, supra note 42 at para 25. In Cal Investments Ltd. (c.o.b. Scientific Massage) v Winnipeg (City) 
[1978] 84 DLR (3d) 699, [1978] 2 ACWS 88, similar provisions in a Winnipeg by-law were challenged 
with an identical result. The Court held: “In our view the City in enacting By-law No. 979/75 was doing no 
more than attempting to regulate the trade or business of massage parlours - something which the 
governing Act clearly empowered it to do”.  
45 Nova Scotia (Board of Censors) v McNeil, [1978] 2 SCR 662, 84 DLR (3d) 1 at 691; Siemens v 
Manitoba, 2000 MBQB 140, 151 Man.R. (2d) 49 was decided in a similar manner. The court held: It is 
accepted that the province cannot prohibit conduct for the simple purpose of combating public evil, or 
public morality. That is a criminal law purpose which falls under federal jurisdiction. But there is no such 
purpose to the VLT Act. The VLT Act, by way of local option, recognizes the input of the community as a 
means to legislate the operation of VLT's in the province. Although there is a prohibition in the VLT Act, 
the purpose of the prohibition is simply to regulate gaming. There is no evidence before me that there is 
any "public morality" aspect to this legislation.  
46 Rio Hotel v New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing Board) [1987] 2 SCR 59, 44 DLR (4th) 663.  
47 Ibid at 7.  
48 Ibid at 41. 
49 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group on Prostitution, Report and recommendations in respect of 
legislation, policy and practices concerning prostitution related activities (Ottawa: Department of Supply 
and Services, 1998) at (iv) - Authority to Regulate Prostitution [Working Group Report].  
industry that is being licensed. One city may require escorts to be licensed, while another 
may not. A recent study found that massage parlours are likely to be required to have a 
municipal license to operate.50 The study included 55 managers of sex industry 
businesses, of which 47% held a municipal license.51 A majority of those who were 
unlicensed were not required to have a license (64%), while others preferred operating 
without a license (22%) because of privacy.52 The piecemeal approach means that there is 
no universal licensing scheme and it falls to owners and workers to determine what 
license is needed and how to meet the conditions to acquire it.  
 Even though the current municipal licensing regulations are inconsistent, they 
demonstrate that municipalities have the authority and competence to create such regimes 
for adult service providers. The discussion that follows shows that while the current 
licensing regimes are imperfect, and their effectiveness is hampered by the criminal law, 
that municipalities, given the opportunity to openly discuss licensing brothels, could 
enact better licensing bylaws. This section will detail escort licensing in Vancouver and 
the licensing of body rub parlours in Toronto as examples of licensing bylaws.  
 With over 2.4 million residents, Vancouver is Canada’s third largest city.53 Sex 
work in Vancouver has been well documented from the opening of the first brothel in 
50 Cecilia Benoit, Chris Atchison et al, A ‘working paper’ prepared as background to Building on the 
Evidence: An International Symposium on the Sex Industry in Canada (Ottawa: Institute of Gender and 
Health, 2014), online: < 
http://www.understandingsexwork.com/sites/default/files/uploads/Team%20Grant%20Working%20Paper
%201%20CBenoit%20et%20al%20%20September%2018%202014.pdf> at 13 [Benoit et al].  
51 Ibid at 3,13.  
52 Ibid at 13. 
53 Statistics Canada, Population of census metropolitan areas (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014) < 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo05a-eng.htm> accessed 9 February 2015 
[Census]. 
1867.54 It is estimated that there are between 1500 and 2000 people working in 
Vancouver’s sex trade.55  Toronto is Canada’s largest city, and with a population fast 
approaching the three million mark, the fourth largest in North America.56 There are no 
reliable estimates on how many are working within the city’s sex trade but there seems to 
be no shortage of talk about the trade and how it should be managed.57 This allows for 
insight into both the object and the effect of the bylaws, which is critical for developing 
recommendations for future regulation.     
VANCOUVER’S SOCIAL ESCORTS 
 
 Just as with any other business, the operators of escort agencies in Vancouver are 
required to obtain a business license from the city.58 The Licensing bylaw59 covers all 
businesses in Vancouver but details the specific requirements for each type. A social 
escort is defined as: “any person who, for a fee or other form of payment, escorts or 
accompanies another person, but does not mean a person providing assistance to another 
person because of that person’s age or handicap”.60 A license for a social escort agency 
allows an operator to carry on “the business of providing, or offering to provide, the 
54 Susan Davis, “The Early Years of Vancouver” in Trina Ricketts et al, eds, The History of Sex Work 
(Vancouver: Simon Frasier University, 2007) online: < http://www.sfu.ca/content/dam/sfu/continuing-
studies/forms-docs/cep/History_SexWork_final.pdf> at 8.  
55 Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Vancouver sex workers improve their lives by being 
organized (Ottawa: Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2014) online: <http://www.ideas-
idees.ca/media/media-releases/vancouver-sex-workers-improve-their-lives-being-organized>. 
56 Census, supra note 53; Paul Moloney, “Toronto’s population overtakes Chicago”, Toronto Star (5 March 
2013) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2013/03/05/torontos_population_overtakes_chicago.html>. 
57 Sarah Fulford, “Editor’s Letter (February 2013): public sex, massage parlours and bawdy houses”, 
Toronto Life (21 January 2013) online: < http://www.torontolife.com/informer/features/2013/01/21/editors-
letter-sex-issue-february-2013/>. 
58 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5, as amended by by-law No 6367 (14 July 1988) as amended by 
by-law No 6466 (21 March 1989). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at s 1(b).  
services or the names of persons to act as escorts for other persons”.61 The bylaw sets out 
the requirements for applying for and maintaining a license, including: keeping the city 
informed of all names used for operations and advertising62, age requirements for those 
employed63, license requirements for employees64, and providing city staff with a detailed 
list of staff, and informing the city of any changes to the provided list within 24 hours.65  
Those seeking a license must apply in person and submit to a criminal record check.66 A 
license can be denied on the basis of the criminal record check and may prevent those 
with previous prostitution convictions from obtaining a license.67  
 In July 1988, Vancouver updated the social escort section of the licensing 
bylaw.68 The expanded section added the condition that “an operator, or a licensee or 
employee shall be present on the premises” during business hours.69 This effectively 
prohibits an escort from operating independently. The update also changed the record 
keeping requirements. The former bylaw compelled a written record of all inquiries for 
services, including the client’s name and address, as well as the name of the service 
provider and the event to be attended.70 The amendment required that the fee charged for 
the service also be recorded. Under the amended bylaw, business records must be 
61 Ibid at s 2. 
62 Ibid at s 24(1)(2). 
63 Ibid at s 24(3). 
64 Ibid at s 24(4). 
65 Ibid at s 24(1)(a)(b). 
66 Ibid at s 4(2); Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 37. 
67 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 at s 4(2); Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 37. 
68 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5, as amended by by-law no 6373 (14 July 1988). 
69 Ibid at s 24(5). 
70 Ibid at s 24(1)(c).  
produced for police review upon request.71 Fines and penalties greater than $1000 can be 
imposed for non-compliance.72 
 International Escort Services Inc. challenged the record keeping provision days 
after it came into force.73 They argued that the provision violated their right to 
unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Charter.74 In the alternative, 
International Escort Services contended that the provision was ultra vires for going 
beyond the authority to make bylaws granted by the Vancouver Charter.75 It was the 
Court’s finding that while the impugned provision did not rise to the level of search and 
seizure, the onerous record keeping requirements were beyond the scope of municipal 
authority.76 The city argued that they were merely “regulating”, a power conferred by s. 
271(1)(f), despite not being able to point to any specific bylaw or rule that would require 
the information.77 The Court held that “inspection must be directed toward ensuring 
compliance with some lawfully established requirement or standard”.78 As argued, the 
City was asking for carte blanche to gather information from the businesses they 
licensed, without being able to point to a specific purpose. Justice Lysyk could not accept 
71 Ibid at s 24(5)(c). 
72 Ibid at s 24(1)(c). 
73International Escort Services Inc v Vancouver (City), [1988] 55 DLR (4th) 194, 33 BCLR (2d) 202 
(BCSC) [International Escort Services].  
74 Charter, supra note 15 at s 8: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure”. 
75 Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55 [Vancouver Charter]; International Escort Services, supra note 73 
at 205. 
76 International Escort Services, supra note 73 at 205, 211. 
77 Vancouver Charter, supra note 75, s 271(1)(f): “for regulating every person required to be licensed under 
this Part, except to the extent that he is subject to regulation by some other Statute”.  
78 International Escort Services, supra note 73 at 209. 
that that “inspecting” should be construed so broadly and struck down the provision.79 
Vancouver amended the licensing bylaw to reflect the judgment.80 
 The licensing fee for a social escort service in Vancouver is $1180 per year (in 
addition to a $50.00 application fee which is applied to the cost of a license if the 
applicant is successful).81 The licensing fee is considerable when compared to the cost of 
licensing for other service providers. For example, a dating service can be licensed for 
$159 per year, while a beauty salon license costs $240 per year.82  
TORONTO’S BODY RUB PARLOURS 
 
 While Toronto does not require that escorts be licensed, a license is required for 
owners and operators of body rub parlours. The Toronto Licensing bylaw defines a body 
rub as including: 
the kneading, manipulating, rubbing, massaging, 
touching or stimulating, by any means, of a person’s 
body or part thereof but does not include medical or  
therapeutic treatment given by a person otherwise duly  
qualified, licensed or registered to do so under the laws  
of the Province of Ontario.83 
 
Much like the social escort licensing in Vancouver, a license is required of both operators  
 
and individual employees.84  
 
 The application process for an operator’s license is detailed and the requirements 
vary according to the corporate structure of the proposed enterprise.85 Like other potential 
79 Ibid at 210. 
80 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 as amended by by-law No 6373 (14 July 1988), as amended by 
by-law No 6466 (21 March 1989).  
81 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5, Schedule A.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Toronto Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 at 545-29. 
84 Ibid at s 328. 
85 Ibid. 
licensees, all the necessary forms, fees and photographs (one for the license, and one to 
be kept on file with the city) must be filed in person.86 Body Rub licenses require pre-
payment. The payment is applied to the cost of a license for a successful applicant or 
returned to an unsuccessful applicant.87  This provision applies solely to those seeking to 
operate a body rub parlour.88 Those applying for a license are also expected to provide a 
list of their anticipated employees.89 Operators and individuals also require medical 
clearance to obtain a license or for a renewal.90 The medical form is provided by the city 
and must be completed by a physician who certifies that the applicant is free from 
communicable diseases and is “medically fit to perform or receive body-rubs”.91 License 
applications are subject to review by both medical officials and the police, and other 
government agencies.92 The bodies that review the application are given the opportunity 
to include a report on the favourability or unfavourability of granting the license.93 In the 
case of a negative report, the applicant has a right to a hearing before the city’s licensing 
tribunal.94  
 The initial cost of a license to operate a body-rub parlour is $12,214.64.95 The 
annual renewal fee is $11,802.76.96 Each attendant in a body rub parlour must also obtain 
an initial license at a cost of $367.36, which is subject to an annual renewal cost of 
86 Ibid; Other Licensees that must file paperwork in person include tow truck drivers (s 73), holistic healers 
(s 159) and the operators of adult entertainment venues (s 363).  
87 Toronto Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 at 545-4. 
88 Ibid at 545-4 A(2). 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid at s 333. 
92 Ibid at s 334. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid . 
95 Ontario, City of Toronto, Business, Trades and Professions Licence and Permit Fees, online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=878415e205641410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD&vgnextchannel=b3467729050f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD > accessed 9 February 2014 
[Toronto – License Fees]. 
$258.70.97 Body Rub Parlours are also among the classes of businesses which require a 
Preliminary Property Review.98 The review is completed by Toronto’s building division 
and costs $215.17.99 This one time evaluation takes six to eight weeks to complete and 
potential operators must provide 2 copies of a survey or site plan as well as a floor plan 
(drawn to scale).100 The licensing of body rub parlours generates almost $1 million in 
revenue for the city each year.101 For the sake of comparison, the cost of a license for a 
business falling into the category of Personal Service Setting, which includes hair salons, 
tattoo parlours, and aesthetic services, is $331.37 for the initial license and can be 
renewed annually for $217.79.102  
 The Vancouver Social Escort licensing bylaw and the Toronto Body Rub 
provisions are examples of the regimes that cities have put in place to regulate adult-
oriented businesses. Although conditions vary by city, these illustrations assist in 
explaining why cities are the best source of regulation for decriminalized brothels. 
Changes would be necessary to design a new licensing regime to address the specific 
needs of sex workers. These licensing regimes represent a starting point, the details of 
which will be critiqued in Chapter 3.103 These licensing regimes also provide insight into 
how those involved in adult service businesses are affected and how changes to the 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ontario, City of Toronto, How to Apply for a Business or Trades Licence or Permit, online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=52dd9ec1e9013410VgnVCM10000071d60f89
RCRD&vgnextchannel=b3467729050f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD> accessed 9 February 2015. 
 Other Businesses that require the PPR are holistic centres, adult entertainment parlours, places of 
amusement, billiard halls, public garages, restaurants and entertainment establishments/nightclubs. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. The necessary documents to initiate a PPR are the expense of the business operator.  
101 CBC News, “Toronto collects nearly $1 million per year from body rub licences”, CBC News Toronto, 
(23 August 2013), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-collects-nearly-1m-per-year-
from-body-rub-licenses-1.1175120>.  
102 Toronto – License Fees, supra note 95.  
103 See Chapter 3 beginning at page 57. 
licensing schemes that acknowledge that sex is for sale, could make their work safer and 
more consistent with the occupational standards that apply to other professions. 
Criminalization currently prevents that from occurring, leaving workers caught between 
the federal and municipal regimes.  
TURNING A BLIND EYE 
 
 The strongest argument for allowing municipalities to license sex work in brothels 
is that they are already licensing sex work within other types of adult businesses. It is 
well known that behind the closed doors of many adult service businesses, there is more 
for sale than companionship.104 An escort interviewed for one study confirmed that cities 
are turning a blind eye to the real nature of adult businesses: “[t]his is ridiculous. How 
can anyone imagine that escort work is about anything but sex? How are we supposed to 
work?”105 The same study also found that police too, were well aware of the realities: 
“[e]scorting isn’t about prostitution…it is prostitution. But we can’t say that,” stated one 
officer.106 Elizabeth, or Roxy, as her clients know her, is a sex worker who operates out 
of a massage parlour in Edmonton. She described her appointments as beginning with a 
massage, but leading “to sexual services that both she and the client agree to”.107 She 
adds that, “[w]e offer anything from hand jobs, blow jobs to sex. Every girl offers 
different stuff”.108 Refusing to acknowledge the true nature of adult businesses “allows 
104 Benoit et al, supra note 50. 
105 Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 7 at 443. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Stephanie Dubois, “Massaging the Law”, Metro (15 April 2014) 12. 
108 Ibid. 
municipalities to control and profit from sex industry businesses while simultaneously 
maintaining the façade that they do not know what takes place inside them”.109 
As cities “maintain a veneer of ignorance”,110 they have also made strategic 
decisions to control sex work using bylaws, while the legitimacy of licensing remains 
tempered by the need for workers to remain covert to avoid attracting the scrutiny of the 
criminal law.111 For workers to truly be able to access the safety and security envisioned 
in the Bedford decision, it is imperative that the criminal law governing adult sex work be 
repealed to allow for municipal licensing that acknowledges sex is for sale. Given that 
cities are already tasked with licensing a variety of businesses, adding decriminalized 
brothels would be a natural extension of the licensing power they already have. This 
would also allow sex workers greater “control over their working conditions and the 
same rights and responsibilities as other political subjects and citizens”.112   
 Determining the best way to regulate the sex trade has been a struggle for 
municipal governments, committees and advocacy organizations.113 When the Fraser 
Committee released its final report in 1985, it recommended allowing sex work to occur 
in private homes and in “small-scale, non-residential commercial prostitution 
establishments”.114 Another bold recommendation of the committee was that: 
109 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 46. 
110 Emily van der Meulen & Mariana Valverde, “Beyond the Criminal Code: Municipal Licensing and 
Zoning Bylaws” in Emily van der Meulen, Elya M. Durisin & Victoria Love, eds, Selling Sex: Experience, 
Advocacy and Research on Sex Work in Canada (Toronto: UBC Press, 2013) 314 at 315 [Van der Meulen 
& Valverde]. 
111 Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 7 at 443. 
112 Deborah R. Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: The Social Regulation of Sexual Labour, 2d ed 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 148 [Brock]. 
113 See generally the Working Group Report, supra note 49; Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the 
Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Volume 2 (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985) 
[Fraser Report]. 
114 Fraser Report, supra note 113 at 538; James R. Robertson, Prostitution (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 
2003) online:: <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/822-e.htm#cthefrasertxt> at C 
Accessed 9 February 2015.  
“prostitution establishments be permitted to be licensed and operated in accordance with 
regulatory schemes established by a provincial or territorial legislature”.115 The 
committee recommended liberalizing the laws around sex work as they presently 
“operate in a way which victimizes and dehumanizes the prostitute”.116  While brothels 
remained prohibited by the Criminal Code and therefore unable to be licensed by 
municipalities, other adult businesses where sex is on offer covertly, are licensed. By 
emphasizing the legal aspects of the adult services provided and downplaying the fact 
that sex is for sale, some businesses are able to operate with the permission of cities. 
 The Federal Provincial Working Group on Prostitution, created in 1992 focused  
largely on youth involved in sex work and street prostitution.117 They noted the 
contradiction created by the municipal licensing provisions and suggested:  
since many municipalities already regulate indirectly 
what could be considered to be bawdy-houses, it would  
be preferable to drop the fiction and simply allow bawdy 
-houses to carry on business exempt from prosecution  
under the Criminal Code, but subject to regulation by 
the municipality. 118 
 
The consultations and research conducted by the Working Group found that complaints 
about massage parlours and escort agencies were infrequent and that “labour-intensive, 
costly” investigations were not justified by the insignificant penalties.119 They reported: 
“many feel that these non-enforcement practices ought to be formalized and that certain 
prostitution activities should be allowed by establishing zones of tolerance or limited 
115 Ibid at 538. 
116 Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, 
Summary (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985) at 34.  
117 Working Group Report, supra note 49. 
118 Ibid at s (iv) Authority to Regulate Prostitution. 
119 Ibid. 
legitimate bawdy-house operations”.120 The main justification behind the now 
unconstitutional bawdy-house provision was to “prevent community harms in the nature 
of nuisance”.121 It is evident that not only are municipalities turning a blind eye and 
licensing adult businesses where sex work is occurring, but that the concerns that bawdy-
houses create nuisance in the community are often put forward to those with moral 
objections to sex work.122   
 Beyond just turning a blind eye to sex being sold in massage parlours and escort 
services, Dr. John Lowman’s analysis of municipally licensed adult businesses noted 
specific provisions within the rules that show the sale of sex is already being 
contemplated by municipal bylaws, even in the face of criminal prohibitions.123 His 
examination of the Vancouver bylaws controlling adult businesses revealed that “the City 
is attempting to limit prostitution to two venues: body-rub parlours and escort 
services”.124 He cites the differences in conditions of licensing, advertising restrictions 
and fees as proving that the city is both aware that sex is being sold and that the bylaws 
were specifically crafted to restrict the sale of sex to these two venues.125 Regardless of 
whether municipalities are turning a blind eye or explicitly confining paid sex to specific 
places, it is evident that municipalities, or in the very least, Vancouver, is already 
regulating brothels, just under a different name. It is also not limited to Vancouver:  
Most Canadian cities currently license businesses that 
are similar, if not identical to Vancouver’s escort 
120 Ibid. 
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122 New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of 
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agencies, massage parlour services, health 
enhancement centres or steam baths and, in many 
cases, but not all, these types of businesses offer sexual 
services.126  
 
The use of a social control model to regulate demonstrates that municipalities have turned 
their minds to regulating sex work but in the most passive way possible: making the rules 
onerous and expensive to discourage but profiting when a business is able to comply. 
 
Lowman’s conclusion on Vancouver’s bylaws begins with the observation that 
only the operators of body-rub parlours and escort agencies are compelled to provide the 
names and addresses of their employees to the police.127 Toronto also requires all 
applicants for body-rub licenses to undergo a police check and that their names be 
submitted to the City (Municipal Licensing and Standards Division); however, the city 
does not license escorting.128 Lowman argues that Vancouver has made deliberate 
choices because the body-rub bylaw “does not expressly prohibit acts of prostitution”, 
while the bylaw governing health enhancement centres explicitly states that no one on the 
premises is permitted to “offer or engage in acts of prostitution”.129 For Lowman, the 
silence in the body-rub provision indicates a more permissive stance since it was 
obviously contemplated in the creation of the health enhancement provision.130  
The licensing fees also indicate preferential treatment for some adult businesses 
over others. Lowman asserts: “that if any doubt remains that the City Council overseeing 
these by-laws knows that it is licensing prostitution, consider the fees the City charges for 
126 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 7 at 36. 
127 Ibid; Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 as amended by by-law 4957 (23 March 1976); 
Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 as amended by by-law 6373 (14 July 1988). 
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different categories of businesses”.131  The annual fee for a dating service in Vancouver is 
$159 compared to an escort service that costs $1180.132 The cost for a license to operate a 
body-rub parlour in Vancouver is $9987, and among the most expensive licenses the city 
offers.133 The cost has risen significantly since Lowman’s submissions to the 
subcommittee on Solicitation laws were written, when the cost of a license to operate a 
body-rub parlour was $6527.134 
While sex workers who operate from massage parlours or escort agencies have 
always had to do so covertly, the new criminal provisions could have serious implications 
for municipally licensed adult service providers. As mentioned in Chapter 1, working 
within a “commercial enterprise” is now an aggravating factor that increases the penalty 
for anyone providing services to a sex worker.135 Restrictions on advertising “sexual 
services” in s. 286.4 could also impact municipally licensed adult service providers.136  
Owners and operators of massage parlours and escort agencies will undoubtedly come 
under increased scrutiny as new research shows that 25% of sex sellers are working in 
these types of venues.137 The terms “commercial enterprise” and “sexual services” are not 
131 Lowman submissions, supra note 9 at 14.  
132 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 5 at Schedule A, Year 2014 Business License Fees.  
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36_brief_Cecilia_Benoit_et_al_E.pdf> accessed 30 October 2015. 
fully defined and the provisions have not yet been tested in court so the ramifications 
remain unknown.138  
 The repeal of the criminal provisions would allow cities to provide better 
information to workers who are granted licenses both to operate and to work in adult 
service businesses. Instead of using the criminal law to condemn sex work, allowing 
brothels to be licensed by municipalities provides an opportunity to furnish workers with 
information that will enhance their health and safety, and let them know about support 
and services that are available to them.  
The full impact of the new criminal regime remains to be seen, but it has already 
had a chilling effect. Toronto’s largest escort agency recently announced that escorts 
would no longer be providing sexual services.139 Not wanting to be caught by the vague 
‘commercial enterprise’ prohibitions, the agency’s owner has replaced the scantily 
dressed escort photos with ones featuring escorts in cocktail dresses and employees have 
signed contracts indicating they will not provide sexual services.140 While escort services 
in Toronto are not subject to municipal licensing, Vancouver and other cities do require 
licenses. The change in the criminal law could compound the difficulties of workers who 
are trying to ascertain what is permitted and what is not under the new law.  
 While Cupid’s is just one agency, it could be a sign of what is to come. Cupid’s 
owner has public stated she will no longer be providing condoms to her escorts. Even 
138 Canadian Bar Association, National Criminal Justice Section and Municipal Law Section, Bill C-36, 
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before the change in the criminal law, workers in adult service businesses were not 
necessarily provided with safe sex supplies or information from their employers. Like 
municipal staff, owners and managers of adult service businesses cannot openly 
acknowledge that sex occurs. This hampers efforts to ensure safe sex supplies are used 
and to connect workers with services that could provide free supplies.  
 The confusion over how cities could profit from licensing while the criminal 
provision prohibiting living on the avails of prostitution was in effect has been settled as 
that provision is no longer part of the Criminal Code. The new provision enacted in the 
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act will bring new confusion. Not 
only could it be criminal for cities to profit from licensing fees but employees within 
licensed adult service providers could also be at risk. The wording of the new provision 
allows sex workers to pay for security, reception and other services but the service 
providers must also furnish the same service to the public. This could mean that instead 
of hiring drivers dedicated to chauffeuring workers to and from appointments, escort 
agencies may be limited to using taxis and driver services that are also available to the 
public. Instead of hiring or contracting security guards, agencies will have to ensure they 
use security services with multiple clients. There are many potential problems with this 
change in the law. A taxi driver would be unable to wait for an escort during her date, or 
to provide security. The cost of hiring drivers could increase by paying multiple 
individuals instead of salaried employees or contracted individuals. There is also the 
potential that drivers (or security guards) who are not employees of the agency may not 
exercise the same discretion to maintain the privacy of workers who do not wish their 
occupation to become public. Until the courts test the new provisions, speculation looms.     
The environment surrounding municipally licensed adult service businesses is 
caught in a state of uncertainty. The prohibitions on purchasing sexual services have 
already made it difficult for sex workers to confirm the identity of their clients, which has 
been a longstanding method of screening.141 Valerie Scott, one of the litigants in Bedford, 
stated the new law “isolates sex workers and makes them more vulnerable”.142 The 
enhanced safety of working indoors is threatened by unclear criminal laws that could see 
the closure of many adult service businesses – either because of being deemed 
‘commercial enterprises’ under the material benefit clause, clients’ fears of being caught 
in a sting or a raid, or because attracting business is too difficult because of the new 
advertising prohibitions. With so many questions about the new law left unanswered, it 
will be for the courts to determine how to interpret the provisions.  This thesis seeks to 
illuminate some of the hardships that workers endure by being governed by regimes that 
are permissive on one hand and prohibitive on the other. Although this discussion is 
largely based on the experiences of sex workers under the former laws, it appears that the 
new ones will create equal, if not more difficulties for workers. 
LICENSED BUT STILL ILLEGAL – THE PRECARIOUS SITUATION FOR ADULT 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 Having established that municipalities are already, knowingly, licensing sex work, 
it is important to appreciate how that affects those who work in licensed massage 
parlours, body-rub parlours and escort services. While they have paid the fees to the 
municipality to obtain a license, the services they provide remain prohibited by the 
141 Antonella Artuso, “Sex Workers urge Premiers not to enforce new Prostitution Law” Toronto Sun (17 
December 2014) Online: <http://www.torontosun.com/2014/12/17/sex-workers-says-bill-c-36-leaves-them-
vulnerable>. 
criminal law. The juxtaposition of these two regimes creates confusion and jeopardizes 
the health and safety of sex workers.143  
 Adult service providers, licensed by cities, describe the conflict with the criminal 
law as a lack of information about the law; an inability to benefit from health and safety 
measures; confusion over the proceeds of licensing; and fragile relationships with those 
tasked with bylaw enforcement.144  
In many cases, the removal of the federal criminal provisions could help improve 
working conditions for municipally licensed workers by allowing municipalities to 
provide information without condoning sex work, to make health and safety a priority 
and to foster better relationships with enforcement officers simply by acknowledging that 
sex work is occurring.    
NEED FOR INFORMATION      
 For municipally licensed adult workers, clear and accurate information on the law 
can be difficult to obtain. As one worker stated: “[t]he City knows what escorting is but 
they just brush it under the carpet, so they don’t have to give us any protection or 
information”.145 It appears that because of the federal prohibitions and municipal 
restrictions of certain actions, neither level of government is willing to clearly detail how 
to work and remain compliant with the laws. Lewis and Maticka-Tyndale found: 
“[i]nterviewees complained that when the license was purchased they were not offered 
any information about what is legal and what was not under the terms and conditions of 
142 Ibid 
143 Safety, Security & Well Being, supra note 11 at 20; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 7 at 441-445; 
Laing, supra note 7 at 7. 
144 Laing, supra note 7 at 7. 
their license by the police or bylaw authorities”.146 While most applicants appreciate the 
nature of the work in massage parlours, rarely is it expressed in explicit terms.147 If it 
were, it would be clear that cities are already licensing sex work. 
 Owners and workers in licensed adult industries are responsible for knowing what 
laws apply to their business and how to conduct themselves within the law.148 Being 
governed by both federal and municipal law complicates their ability to find the answers 
they need. Lewis and Maticka-Tyndale interviewed one municipal employee who 
indicated that the criminal law hindered the city’s ability to provide information or 
services and suggested: “the assumption is that the provision of services and information 
encourages individuals to participate in the exchange of sex for money.”149 This means 
that instead of municipalities providing literature, or even offering to facilitate 
information sessions (which for the privacy of workers, could also be internet-based), 
owners and workers need to source the information on their own because cities fear that 
providing guidance could be mistaken for condoning sex work.150  
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A MATTER OF HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
 Not being permitted to acknowledge that sex is for sale in municipally licensed 
adult businesses means that information on safe sex education programs for workers and 
the rights of employees in these businesses (for example, the right to refuse a client), are 
also not being addressed. Workers who sell sex must not only do so covertly, but also 
accept the responsibility for obtaining their own safe sex supplies, as their employer 
cannot be expected to provide it or advocate for its use. This applies equally to employees 
and clients, as neither can benefit from safe sex education. The problem created by the 
two sets of laws means that promoting safe sex within the industry cannot be done 
openly. This was affirmed by a study which found:“[b]ylaws restrict labour-management 
practices, including safety measures and provision of occupational safety and safety 
information and supplies since owner operators have to pretend there is no sex work 
involved.”151 Without the criminal provisions, municipalities could mandate that safe sex 
supplies be available. The current challenge is that while municipalities know that sex is 
for sale, the federal law prohibits them from taking action to encourage safe sex.  
PROFITING FROM THE AVAILS 
 
The Bedford case was successful in having s. 212 (1)(j) of the Criminal Code, 
which prohibited receiving a financial benefit from the prostitution of others, overturned. 
However, the new criminal provisions have to a large degree reinstated it and explicitly 
151 Safety, Security & Well Being, supra note 11 at 20. 
criminalized receiving a “material benefit” through a “commercial enterprise”.152 While 
cities turn a blind eye to how profits are made, licensees pointed to the obvious 
contradiction: 
Owners were confused about how they could be 
charged with “living off the avails”, but the city, which 
makes money through licensing the agencies and 
workers, and Revenue Canada, which makes money 
through taxing the industry, could not be similarly 
charged.153   
 
Confusion over what is caught by the criminal provision of living on the avails, 
led to changes in how Calgary licenses escorts. In 2006, a city firefighter was convicted 
of keeping a common bawdy-house, two counts of living on the avails of prostitution, and 
use of a cell phone while prohibited, all in relation to an escort service he was 
managing.154 He was successful in having the convictions for living on the avails stayed 
by arguing “officially induced error”.155 The trial judge found that his belief that: “the 
license to escort superseded any Criminal Code provisions around prostitution, and that 
the women providing sexual services were therefore working legally” was reasonable.156  
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In December 2006, Calgary enacted a new Dating and Escort Service Bylaw with 
reduced fees for licensing.157 The cost of obtaining a license to operate an escort agency 
or to work as an escort within an agency is $170 for the initial application and $130 to 
renew a license.158 This brought the licensing fees for escorts in line with the fees for 
other businesses or service providers so that if the city was indeed profiting from licensed 
sex work, it was doing so at a rate that was identical to every other licensed business.159 




 The other major conflict between municipally licensed adult businesses and the 
federal law is the enforcement of bylaws. Having already established that workers are 
unsure of their rights, bylaw enforcement, either by city officials or police, creates 
additional tension. Both police and city officials have acknowledged their awareness that 
sex is for sale and this creates tenuous relationships between licensees (owners and 
workers alike) and those tasked with inspections.  
Workers found: “[i]nspections and enforcement related to sex work are conducted 
disproportionately to other forms of licensed work.”160 As mentioned, inspections and 
157 Calgary Escort Bylaw, supra note 5. The City of Calgary asked the government for more clarification 
on the definition of “sexual services” prior to the passing of Bill C-36.  While supporting a legislative 
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Brief at note 138.  
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DA%2fDBA%2fDocuments%2flicence%2fbusiness_licence_bylaw.pdf&noredirect=1&sf=1> accessed 30 
January 2014. 
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investigations are typically driven by complaints so it is natural that an escort agency or 
massage parlour may be the target of more frequent inspections than a hair salon, which 
does not face the same stigma as an adult services business. The nature of adult work also 
puts these businesses at an increased risk of being part of a sting operation when police 
attempt to ascertain if any of the Criminal Code provisions on sex work are being broken. 
Visits from bylaw enforcement officers can be stressful as “[t]he limited knowledge sex 
workers have of bylaws and penalties for bylaw infractions make it difficult for them to 
defend or affirm their rights”.161 This has an effect on relationships between businesses 
and enforcement. As Laing noted: “relationships with officers were fragile and dependent 
on the wider political climate of the municipality”.162 The power imbalance between 
enforcement and licensed workers only adds to the tension of the relationship. 
 Being forced to pretend sex is not for sale creates significant hardships for 
workers. Workers turn over their personal information to be licensed but in return receive 
little information on how to work legally, enhance their safety or assert their rights. They 
are also left wondering why it is permissible for cities to profit from licensing fees, all the 
while knowing that sex work is occurring. Instead of making adult service providers feel 
confident about working in a licensed industry, enforcement is seen as intimidating. The 
imposition of both the federal and municipal laws needlessly add frustration, health risks 
and stress to an already demanding occupation.   
Bylaw enforcement is a significant stressor for municipally licensed adult 
workers. While they have the relative safety of an indoor location, by selling sex, they 
remain at risk of being caught and losing their license. The vicious circle that is created 
161 Ibid. 
162 Laing, supra note 7 at 15. 
means that losing a license, or being charged with prostitution offences under the 
Criminal Code can mean turning to other forms of sex work where there is less security, 
for example street based work.163 Without the federal prohibitions, the relationship 
between enforcement officers and workers could facilitate better working conditions, and 
better rules for health and safety, and help to establish relationships of trust so that 
exploitation can be exposed. As it stands, workers are unsure of their rights and 
suspicious of the motives of enforcement officers.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 The courts have gradually allowed for more purposive interpretation of municipal 
enactments, as municipal lawmakers are democratically elected and responsible to the 
communities that they serve. Municipalities must only legislate within the realm of the 
authority delegated to them by the provinces, or risk having their bylaws struck down. 
This also means that encroaching on powers assigned to the Federal Government is 
forbidden. While the courts have designated moral issues as the domain of the Federal 
Government, within the confines of a licensing regime, provisions that might otherwise 
be deemed issues of morality have been accepted as permissible so long as they were 
enacted for the purpose of regulating business.  
The licensing bylaws for Vancouver’s social escorts and Toronto’s body rub 
practitioners provide examples of how adult service providers are licensed in two of 
Canada’s largest cities. The conditions are strict and the licensing fees are high, which is 
indicative of the cities’ desire to control the industries, while collecting the profits.  As 
163 Safety, Security and Well-Being, supra note 11 at 20. 
between cities there is no uniformity between what is licensed and how; bylaws are 
localized responses. In one city a license may be required for escorting, while in another 
a license may not be necessary as no regulation exists. The same could be said for body 
rub parlours, massage parlours, health enhancement centres and other businesses that 
offer adult services. Each city must address adult services in a manner that is both within 
their authority and reflects local needs. While the repeal of the criminal law will not quell 
the desire of cities to profit from licensing, it would facilitate a means for the 
acknowledgement that sexual services are in fact being licensed and allow for open 
conversations with workers to develop more appropriate licensing regimes.      
Although it is common knowledge that sex is for sale in municipally licensed 
adult businesses, the federal law forces cities to turn a blind eye. Cities have limited 
means of raising revenue but licensing fees are allowable.164 In the case of adult service 
providers, those fees are high. The implications of the new criminal regime on 
municipally licensed adult service providers are still unknown but early analysis indicates 
that it could have serious repercussions.165 Municipalities may be forced to reconsider 
licensing bylaws, which could drastically alter the ability of these businesses to 
operate.166  
Adult service providers are caught between municipal licensing regimes that seek 
to make their work lawful and the federal criminal law that seeks to condemn them. 
While licensing adds “legitimacy”, it also “appears to increase police presence” and 
“disempower escorts and their employers from taking action to enhance their own health 
164 NS Municipal Act, supra note 18, s 72.  
165 CBA Brief, supra note 138; Calgary Brief, supra note 138. 
166 Calgary Brief, supra note 138.  
and safety”.167 City officials accept payments and hand over licenses but are reluctant to 
provide information that would help workers understand the legal parameters of their 
work. Workers are responsible for discerning how to work legally, or how to work within 
a licensed environment and avoid raising the suspicions of enforcement officials.  
The imposition of the two regimes also has repercussions for health and safety. 
Operators of adult services cannot promote safe sex – to employees or clients – because 
they must not acknowledge that sex is occurring. While Federal prohibitions remain in 
place, municipal licensing cannot be used as effectively as a tool to address health and 
safety concerns. Allowing municipalities to license brothels outright would not only 
allow for the creation of better, more tailored licensing regimes, but it would provide 
added protection for workers. 
Allowing municipalities to use their business licensing authority to regulate 
brothels is far more preferable to additional criminal prohibitions that leave workers 
caught in limbo between licensed adult services and the criminal law. The confusion 
created comes at the expense of the health, safety and security of workers. Bedford 
resolved any mystery that remained about how to sell sex in a safer manner. Allowing 
workers more control over their businesses, by acknowledging that sex is being 
exchanged for money, also can aid municipalities in developing better licensing regimes. 
The new criminal provisions will only ensure that confusion over what is legal and what 
is not persists.  
While licensing has been presented as a better alternative to the criminal law, in 
the case of regulating sex work, it is by no means beyond critique. In addition to the 
complications for workers addressed in this chapter, there are provisions within the 
167 Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 7 at 445.  
licensing bylaws that raise concerns for workers. There are also many positive aspects of 
licensing. Having presented representative provisions from Vancouver and Toronto, and 
explored the difficulties of complying with both municipal and Federal law, chapter three 
will expand on the licensing regimes and analyze the benefits and drawbacks of the 
systems that are in place.      
CHAPTER 3 - BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF LICENSING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While cities license massage parlours and escort services, it should not be 
assumed that this permission equates with approval. The previous chapter established that 
municipalities are the proper authority for business licensing, which has enabled them to 
create licensing regimes for adult service providers. The Federal criminal law control of 
prostitution requires cities to tread carefully to avoid having their bylaws struck down as 
ultra vires.1 While the federal and municipal regimes attempt to co-exist, sex workers are 
left in a precarious position: they are required to obtain a license to work legally but their 
actual work leaves them vulnerable to criminal charges. For these workers, the high fees 
paid for a license still preclude them from many of the health and safety benefits that a 
licensing regime can enhance and relationships with police and other enforcement 
officials remain strained.  This chapter highlights the experiences of workers within these 
license regimes and how they are impacted, for better or for worse. 
While street-based sex work is often the focus of media reports, the majority of 
commercial sex transactions take place in other venues.2 Massage parlours and escort 
services are among the top choices of those who purchase sexual services.3 With sex 
work already occurring in municipally licensed adult businesses, workers are already in a 
position to speak to the benefits and drawbacks of licensing regimes, even if the 
1 Westendorp v the Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 43, 144 DLR (3d) 259.  
2 Cecilia Benoit et al, A working paper prepared as background to Building on the Evidence: An 
International Symposium on the Sex Industry in Canada, (Victoria: University of Victoria, 2014) online: 
<http://communications.uvic.ca/releases/tip.php?date=19092014> at 5 [Benoit et al].  
effectiveness of the regimes are currently hampered by criminalization. The views of sex 
workers offer insight into what aspects of licensing regimes are good for them as 
workers, and what hardships are caused for workers beyond the imposition of the 
criminal law.  
The type of licensing regime a city enacts also influences the benefits and 
drawbacks to licensing. Crofts and Summerfield argue that the effectiveness of licensing 
regimes depends on “the underlying principles and processes”, and the extent to which 
sex work remains criminalized.4 The underlying goals of a licensing regime can enhance 
or undermine the efficacy of licensing.5 When considered as a continuum, a licensing 
regime that proscribes different conditions on sex industry businesses and takes a 
“negative moral stance to sex work” is deemed one of “social control”.6 This echoes the 
assertion of Dr. John Lowman, noted in the previous chapter, that cities are trying to 
control where sex is sold by imposing different conditions on different venues.7  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is a neutral licensing regime that “licenses the sex industry 
in a similar way to other areas of business”.8 New Zealand is representative of the 
neutral-model and will be compared in the following chapter. The underlying goal of a 
licensing regime has a significant impact on how workers feel about licensing, working 
3 Ibid. The most frequent venue or type of sexual service provider visited by sex buyers during the previous 
12 months: Massage Parlours (2nd) at 55%, Escort Agencies (4th) at 31%. 
4 Thomas Crofts & Tracey Summerfield, “The Licensing of Sex Work in Australia and New Zealand” 




7 John Lowman, Submission to the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws of the Standing Committee on 
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Ottawa: John Lowman, undated) 
<http://184.70.147.70/lowman_prostitution/HTML/SCJHPE/Submission_to_the%20Subcommittee_on_Sol
icitation%20Laws_Brief.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2015 at Appendix A, page 14 [Lowman Submissions]. 
8 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 4 at 270. 
conditions and the participation in the regime.9 The contrast between the social control 
model and the neutral model makes it evident that the policy influencing the bylaws can 
be as impactful as the words that are used.  
Any regulatory scheme, regardless of intent, has benefits and drawbacks. Sex 
workers operating out of massage parlours and escort services are simultaneously 
criminalized and controlled by licensing regimes. Despite those burdens, municipal 
licensing has brought a measure of legitimacy to the adult services industry and has also 
allowed for better risk management practices for workers. The improvements, although 
tempered by efforts to discourage and control the industry, show ways in which licensing 
has great potential to benefit workers.  
Current licensing regimes, beyond the hardships imposed by criminal law, also 
raise significant concerns for workers. Adult service providers cite a lack of privacy and 
cost as the biggest drawbacks to licensing regimes controlling massage parlours and 
escort services. These factors are the result of a social control licensing regime. This 
illuminates the need for a change in the policy behind licensing, in addition to changes to 
the criminal law, if licensing regimes are to benefit workers and encourage their 
participation in the regime.  
The conversation about decriminalized brothels began with Bedford but it does 
not end there. The Supreme Court was clear that the law should not exacerbate the 
vulnerabilities of sex workers.10 In response, the Federal government drafted Bill C-36 
which aims to: 
reduce the demand for prostitution by targeting the 
consumer, the pimps and the johns who are the 
9 Ibid. 
10 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at 60, 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].  
enablers; making prostitution itself illegal, which is a 
move away from simply criminalizing certain aspects 
or parts of the practice; and discouraging entry into 
prostitution itself.11 
      
Opponents of the bill have been clear that bolstering the Criminal Code with new 
provisions does not enhance the safety of sex workers. Speaking before the House of 
Commons Justice Committee, Jean McDonald, Executive Director of Maggie’s in 
Toronto explained: “[c]riminalization breeds isolation and isolation, in turn, breeds 
vulnerability to violence, exploitation and abuse”12 These are the very things the Bedford 
Court held were an affront to the guarantee of security of the person under s. 7 of the 
Charter.13 The provisions in Bill C-36 became law on December 6, 2014. While they 
may be law, they may not withstand constitutional scrutiny by the Courts.14 This suggests 
that the conversation about how to regulate sex work in Canada is still a long way from 
concluding.  
This chapter builds on the understanding of Canadian municipal licensing regimes 
established in Chapter 2 by highlighting the perspective of the workers.  It demonstrates 
that the benefits of licensing are closely tied to the intent of the licensing regime and 
how, particularly with continued criminalization, the benefits will be virtually cancelled 
11 Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd 
Sess, No 15 (9 September 2014) (Hon Peter MacKay), online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/15ev-51557-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11>; Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons 
Act, SC 2014, c 25 [C-36]  
12 Justin Ling, “A Law with New Purpose”, CBA National Magazine (14 July 2014) online: 
<http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/July-2014-Web/A-law-with-new-purpose.aspx>.   
13 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 at s 7.  
14 Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd 
Sess, No 16 (17 September 2014) (Alan Young): “The communication provisions are so clearly 
unconstitutional. Just read the decision; you can’t simply replace the same verb and say it’s constitutional. 
That could be challenged immediately and should go to the Supreme Court. But the other stuff is more 
complicated, and the evidentiary foundation that is before the Supreme Court in Bedford – the 88 volumes, 
27,000 pages – helps but the focus has shifted…Some homework has to be done.”  
by the drawbacks of participating in the licensing regime. The views of workers are 
instructive for drafting licensing bylaws for decriminalized brothels. In expressing both 
the benefits and the drawbacks of licensing, sex workers emphasize fairness and the need 
for a policy shift in the goals of licensing.  
In this chapter the opinions of workers on licensing show what aspects of 
licensing are beneficial and what aspects should be reconsidered when designing 
regulations tailored to brothels. It will also underscore how policies of social control 
hinder the advantages that licensing can foster. For the sake of simplicity, the two 
systems will be examined side by side instead of co-mingling the provisions and their 
effects. This chapter will focus on Canadian sex workers who currently operate in a 
system that is reminiscent to that of New Zealand prior to decriminalization.15  This 
discussion of the pros and cons of municipal licensing as practiced in Canada under a 
criminalized regime will be juxtaposed, in the following chapter, with an exploration of 
licensing in New Zealand  - a jurisdiction where, as mentioned previously, the sex trade 
was decriminalized in 2003.16 
BENEFITS  
 
 Current municipal licensing schemes were not explicitly designed to regulate the 
selling of sex because that would be an intrusion into the Federal criminal law powers. 
Despite that, massage parlours and escort services are among the top choices for those 
seeking out sexual services. Even in the face of the onerous conditions described in the 
previous chapter, workers in municipally licensed adult service businesses have 
15 Massage Parlours Act 1978 (NZ), 1978/13.  
16 Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/28 [PRA]. 
expressed some positive aspects of licensing, even while it was not designed to meet their 
needs. Although these benefits could be more fully harnessed without the imposition of 
the criminal law, they indicate where licensing can potentially improve working 
conditions for sex workers. The main benefits that sex workers operating within the 
municipally licensed regime express are: improved legitimacy and a better capability to 
manage the risks of the profession.17 It would be wholly unfair to suggest that there is 
nothing beneficial about licensing and then to assert that cities should issue licenses for 
brothels. Bedford co-applicant, Valerie Scott, had hoped the case would pave the way for 
“fair business regulations” and as Mariana Valverde points out, “Canadian cities are not 
starting from zero”.18 Part of determining the best practices for licensing brothels is to 
examine what works and what does not work about the system that is already in place for 
other adult businesses. The first step should not be to try and reinvent the wheel.  
LICENSED LEGITIMACY  
 
There is a well-entrenched stigma attached to working in the sex trade.19 In fact, 
the stigmatization from being a sex worker “is one of the strongest societal stigmas an 
individual may ever face”.20 Even though sex workers earn a living, “social discredit” 
means they are often precluded from many of the benefits that those working in straight 
17 Jacqueline Lewis & Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale, “Licensing Sex Work: Public Policy and Women’s Lives” 
(2000) 26 Can Pub Pol 439 at 440 [Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale]; Patrice Corriveau, “Regulating Sex Work: 
Between Victimization and Freedom to Choose” in Colette Parent et al, eds, Sex Work: Rethinking the Job, 
Respecting the Workers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 42 [Corriveau].  
18 Mariana Valverde, “A New Sin Tax for Municipal Coffers”, Toronto Star (22 Nov 2010) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2010/11/22/a_new_sin_tax_for_ 
municipal_coffers.html> [Valverde]. 
19 New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of 
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2008) online: 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-law-
review-committee/publications/plrc-report> accessed 30 January 2014 at 152 [PLRC Report] 
20 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 9. 
jobs take for granted.21 While stigma has many sources, criminal laws that govern sex 
work rooted in notions of “nuisance”, “neighbourhood disruption” and “protection”22 
make it difficult for sex work to be viewed as a rightful profession. While the 
decriminalization of sex work has shown promise in reducing stigma23, having municipal 
regulations that license adult service providers is also a step towards combatting the 
negative stigma faced by sex workers. Even while the criminal law prohibits adult 
businesses from acknowledging that sexual services may be offered behind closed doors, 
requiring such businesses to be licensed allows the workers the benefit of recognized 
work.       
For some workers, holding a municipal license offers a sense of legitimacy that 
counters some of the negative effects of stigmatization.24 Workers are more self-assured 
because the license represents “the privilege to operate a sex business”.25 Although far 
from perfect, it is a step in the right direction for changing attitudes towards sex 
businesses:“[m]unicipal licensing provides a semblance of legitimacy for the occupation, 
potentially combatting the negative emotional and social effects of stigmatization”.26  
21 Chris Bruckert & Stacy Hannem, “Rethinking the Prostitution Debates: Transcending Structural Stigma 
in Systemic Responses to Sex Work” (2013) 28 CJLS 43 at 49 [Bruckert & Hannem]. 
22 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c) [Criminal Code]; The legislative intent of 
each provision is detailed in: Bedford, supra note 10. The intent of the Bawdy-house provision is at para 
131; the intent of the living on the Avails provision is at para 137; The intent of the communicating 
provision is at para 146.  
22 C-36, supra note 11 at Preamble. 
23 Gillian Abel & Lisa Fitzgerald, “Decriminalisation and Stigma” in Gillian Abel et al, eds, Taking the 
Crime out of Sex Work: New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 
2010) 239 at 241 [Decriminalisation & Stigma]. For more on how sex workers deal with stigma see Gillian 
Abel, “Different stage, different performance: The protective strategy of role play on emotional health in 
sex work” (2011) 72 Social Science & Medicine 1177. 
24 Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 440. 
25 Emily van der Meulen & Mariana Valverde, “Beyond the Criminal Code: Municipal Licensing and 
Zoning Bylaws” in Emily van der Meulen, Elya M. Durisin & Victoria Love, eds, Selling Sex: Experience, 
Advocacy and Research on Sex Work in Canada (Toronto: UBC Press, 2013) 314 at 320 [van der Meulen 
& Valverde]. 
26 Lewis & Matrika-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 445. 
The work position, as detailed in Chapter 1, demands that sex work be treated as a 
profession. Corriveau hypothesizes that the key to improving the lives of sex workers is 
the legitimization of the industry. She states: “[p]rohibiting the professionalization of sex 
work will not make it possible to control abusers and swindlers and to improve female 
sex workers’ working conditions, living conditions and safety”.27 A license to operate or 
work in the adult services industry serves as a recognition of labour. It offers the 
opportunity to capitalize on the benefits that come with being a worker, including the 
ability to contribute to programs provided through taxation, access credit and other 
banking services, and to rent accommodations.28  
 Some licensed workers found a sense of confidence by having their work 
recognized as permissible employment. One worker expressed her views on licensing by 
highlighting the independence it provided her:  
A lot of people are still going to be prejudiced against 
us, but now that we have our license, we’re self-
employed. It shows we are legally working …So, if I 
want to lease a car, I can say, I’m an escort, here’s my 
license. It’s easier that way because before…there was 
no proof that you were doing it”.29 
 
The benefit for this worker was both in her confidence and her ability to provide for 
herself. Another worker found that licensing was a benefit for clients. While their own 
legitimacy was increased, the license also put their clients more at ease. One worker 
described it as follows: “ [A] lot of guys like the license because well they know I’m 
27 Corriveau, supra note 17 at 42. 
28 Bruckert & Hannem, supra note 21 at 54.  
29 Lewis & Matrika-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 440 
legal and don’t have a criminal record”.30 The legitimacy that workers feel also helps 
shift the power to them. Adult service providers expressed more confidence because the 
work they do is recognized and allows them more control over their environment: 
The bottom line is, it’s licensed, it’s legal, it’s a 
business that people have to treat as such. So, before 
we were licensed anybody that was working got ripped 
off all the time – customers stole everything, customers 
got ripped off, the girls got beat up, there was nothing 
you could do about it”.31  
 
This escort’s description shows how the balance of power has shifted in favour of the 
workers because they are not just providing adult services; they are licensed and running 
a business where it becomes easier to demand payment for services, enforce rules and 
assert control over services and clients. While there will always be customers who 
attempt to garner more services or who request discounts, municipally licensed facilities 
are in a better position to refuse to provide services.32 Sex workers are frequently cast as 
victims, but when asked whether the seller or the buyer is ultimately in control of the 
transaction, a strong majority of sex workers responded that it is the seller who is in 
control; the clients echoed that finding.33  
Licensing allows qualified persons in, but also keeps unlicensed workers out of 
the market.34 This is both a benefit and a drawback. A hierarchy is created in the market 
place because some workers are ineligible for a license, often because of a criminal 
record involving past charges for prostitution or because of their residency status. 
30 M. Laing, “Regulating adult work in Canada: the role of criminal and municipal code”, in Johnson, P. 
and Dalton, D, eds, Policing Sex (London: Routledge, 2012) 166-184, online <http://www.academic-
freedom.ca/regulating_sex/docs/Regulating_adult_work_in_Canada.pdf> at 10, pagination to online 
version [Laing]. 
31 Lewis & Matrika-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 440 
32 Stephanie Dubois, “Massaging the Law”, Metro (15 April 2014) at 12. 
33 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 15. 
34 Laing, supra note 30 at 13. 
Workers in licensed adult businesses may have more power to control the transactions 
that they enter into, whereas a worker who is unable to obtain a license may be forced to 
accept whatever business they can attract.35  The disparity between licensed and 
unlicensed workers can result in unsafe conditions for unlicensed workers. This needs to 
be taken into consideration when creating licensing regimes for decriminalized sex work 
so that the bylaws do not needlessly exacerbate this situation. How to precisely do this 
will be examined further in chapter five. However, the need for a better understanding of 
how the sex trade operates is necessary to ensure that bylaws do not create more harm 
than good.  
While even decriminalization cannot instantly erase the long-held stigma attached 
to the sex trade, perhaps time and the legitimizing of sex professions can.36 Allowing sex 
workers to operate under municipally licensed regimes provides them with the benefit of 
work, and also the ability to participate in other facets of society that those in straight 
professions take for granted. Being able to obtain a mortgage, lease a vehicle, or know 
that savings can be accrued in bank accounts without the fear they will be confiscated as 
the proceeds of crime, all contribute to the financial freedom that sex workers are seeking 
to attain.37 While people enter the sex trade for a variety of reasons, the bottom line for 
most is: “it’s the money, honey”.38 This is also supported by new research that found 
35 Pivot Legal Society, Beyond Decriminalization: Sex Work, Human Rights and a New Framework for 
Law Reform (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 2006) online: 
<http://www.pivotlegal.org/beyond_decriminalization> at 51 [Beyond Decriminalization]. 
36 PLRC Report, supra note 19 at 7.12.1; Corriveau, supra note 17 at 42; Leslie Ann Jeffery & Gayle 
MacDonald, Sex Workers in the Maritimes Talk Back  (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 20 [Jeffery & 
MacDonald].  
37 Lewis & Matrika-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 440. 
38 Jeffery & MacDonald, supra note 36 at 18. 
“potential income and the freedom to be independent” were key factors in one’s decision 
to sell sex.39        
RISK MANAGEMENT  
 Workers in municipally licensed adult businesses have not only the benefit of 
increased legitimacy, but also an increased ability to practice risk management strategies. 
Municipalities use licensing as a means to control adult service businesses by limiting 
their locations, hours and making licenses expensive. However, indoor venues still 
provide safer workplaces for those who provide sexual services, when compared to other 
places sex workers operate.40 Working from a fixed location also enhances the safety of 
adult service providers because it “shifts the power” to the worker.41  
There is wisdom in the phrase safety in numbers. It holds especially true for sex 
workers. While criminal provisions largely prevent street-based workers from working 
together, working in a municipally licensed adult service business allows, and in some 
cases requires, working with others.42 Many cities have developed licensing regimes that 
make it difficult, or impossible to work as an independent.43   For example, in Vancouver, 
the licensing requirements for escorts dictate that an employee must be present during 
business hours.44 This means that someone is present at the agency while the escorts are 
39 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 5.  
40 van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note 25 at 317, Lewis & Matrika-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 440  
41 Sex Trade Advocacy and Research, Safety, Security and the Well-Being of Sex Workers: A Report 
Submitted to the House of Commons Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws (SSLR) (Ottawa: Sex Trade 
Advocacy and Research, 2005) online: 
<http://web2.uwindsor.ca/courses/sociology/maticka/star/pdfs/safety_and_security_report_final_version.pd
f> at 24 [Safety, Security and Well-Being]. 
42 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 22.  
43 City of Vancouver, by-law No 4450, License By-Law (23 September 1969) as amended by by-law No 
6373 (14 July 1988) s. 24(5) [Vancouver Licensing Bylaw]. 
44 Ibid. 
working, and aware of which escorts are out on dates and with whom. Managers of sex 
businesses reported that in 90% of transactions, there is either someone nearby as a safety 
mechanism or a call is placed to “check-in” with a worker who is on an out-call.45 
The Bedford case repeatedly cited the importance of screening clients for a 
propensity of violence as being paramount to the safety of workers.46 Not only are 
transactions occurring within municipally licensed businesses likely to be less rushed, the 
ability to mitigate risk is much greater. The latest Canadian research indicates that for sex 
workers and managers of sex businesses, access to phones, screening, obtaining payment 
prior to services and remaining sober while working, remain their key safety strategies.47 
Managers reported using these tools with virtually every transaction.48 Sex workers 
working for third parties were also more likely to employ the services of a driver, as 
opposed to those who worked independently.49 These safety measures are vital for the 
health and safety of sex workers. Within the more structured setting of a massage parlour 
or escort service, these risk management strategies have a greater chance of becoming 
part of the normal operating procedures.  
Licensing allows for minimum standards of light, cleanliness and facilities.50 For 
sex workers operating from municipally licensed businesses, having regulations that 
dictate what constitutes an acceptable working environment means better conditions in 
which to work. While selling sex remains covert, the environment in which they operate 
is significantly improved. For example, Toronto’s licensing for body rub parlours 
45 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 13. 
46 Bedford, supra note 10 at paras 6, 18. 
47 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 City of Toronto, by-law No 514-2002, Chapter 545, Licensing (20 June 2002) at 545-345. 
prohibits facilities from having locking doors in rooms where body rubs are provided51, 
thus allowing immediate access if a worker is faced with a violent or uncontrollable 
client. While violent clients are not the norm, conflict can arise in a situation where one 
person in the transaction does not have the ability to seek recourse and is not limited to 
sex work.52   
 Not every workplace is equal and the risk management strategies of some may be 
better than others. Sex workers are also not a homogenous group and individual opinions 
can vary. The rules that are put in place by licensing regimes are unlikely to ever win 
unanimous support but they show considerable promise in enhancing the safety of sex 
workers.   
 That sex workers benefit from greater legitimacy and better risk management 
practices should also not come as a surprise. These are also factors that were advanced by 
the Canadian Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes (CORP, the precursor 
organization to Sex Professionals of Canada) during the Fraser committee hearings.53 
CORP advocated for decriminalization stating that the ability to work indoors would 
offer women “increased security for the prostitutes by reducing the potential for 
51 Ibid at 545-343. 
52 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 18.: “Most sex workers do not feel exploited and most sex buyers are not 
oppressors. Over-simplifications do not contribute to meaningful discussion or to effective policy. While 
there are a small number of people who prey on the vulnerable in the sex industry, just as there are in 
almost any other industry, most of the buyers we surveyed are simply individuals seeking to purchase a 
service they feel they need. The evidence is clear that most do not see themselves, nor are they perceived 
by those they pay, as exploiters or even as enjoying a position of power in the transaction. The evidence 
also suggests that many workers engage in sex work because it provides a level of freedom and self-
determination not available to them in other available occupational settings”. 
53 Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, 
Volume 2 (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985) at 360 [Fraser Report]. 
exploitation by customer, police and pimp” and “a sense of dignity and self worth”.54 
Even with imperfect licensing regimes, these are the benefits that sex workers articulated.  
DRAWBACKS 
 
The current situation of Canadian sex workers plying their trade in licensed adult 
businesses is not unlike the situation that sex workers in New Zealand were in prior to 
decriminalization of the sex trade in that country. New Zealand’s Massage Parlours Act 
1978 allowed for the licensing of massage parlours, but frequent police inspections and 
record keeping made the situation tenuous for sex workers.55 The criminal laws 
prohibited prostitution, so those who worked covertly behind the doors of massage 
parlours were under the control of massage parlour owners.56 Just as in Canada, the 
juxtaposition of the criminal and municipal law prevented sex workers from exercising 
their agency and being in control of their own labour.  
Criminalization and a regulatory framework that discourages the adult services 
industry from flourishing diminish the benefits of licensing. Even repealing the criminal 
laws surrounding sex work does not mean that the current bylaws that regulate adult 
service businesses could be re-issued and applied to decriminalized brothels because 
these regimes are still based on the social control model. Crofts and Summerfield state 
that “complex, intrusive and administratively opaque licensing systems” may cause 
harms to sex workers that are akin to criminalization.57     
54 Ibid. 
55 Catherine Healy, Calum Bennachie & Anna Reed, “History of the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective” 
in Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Catherine Healy, eds, Taking the Crime out of Sex Work: New Zealand 
Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2010) at 45 [Healy et al]. 
56 Ibid at 46. 
57 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 4 at 271 
This section will highlight two of the major drawbacks to municipal licensing that 
sex workers have expressed: privacy and the cost of licensing.58 Municipally licensed sex 
industry businesses are treated differently than other businesses as a means of controlling 
them. Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of privacy and cost: current 
licensing bylaws for massage parlour and escort agencies are inadequate for regulating 
brothels if sex work is decriminalized and “cumbersome” regulation only frustrates 
compliance.59  
PRIVACY 
 Privacy for sex workers is multi-faceted. Some do not disclose their work to 
family or friends.60 Others worry that their work in the sex trade will become a bar to 
future opportunity.61 Personal privacy and the ability to separate work and home lives is 
also crucial to sex workers.62  These are all valid reasons, given that the stigma attached 
to sex work is so pervasive.63 A licensing regime should take these factors into 
consideration and be designed to respect the privacy concerns of sex workers. 
58 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 57; van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note 25 at 318-319.  
59 Valverde, supra note 18 
60 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 57. 
61 Miriam Weeks (aka Belle Knox) is a Duke University student who works in the adult film industry to 
pay her tuition. She was outed by a classmate. She wrote this article describing her experiences. Belle 
Knox, “I'm The Duke University Freshman Porn Star And For The First Time I'm Telling The Story In My 
Words”, xoJane (21 Feb 2014) online: <http://www.xojane.com/sex/duke-university-freshman-porn-star> ; 
An intimacy coach in this article describes the services she provides but asks not to be named because of 
concern for losing her other job: Emily Lazatin, “Vancouver Service Helps People With Disabilities Have 
Better Sex Lives”, The Huffington Post (30 October 2014), online: 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/10/30/sex-disabled-people-escort-
vancouver_n_6077972.html?1414700636&utm_hp_ref=canada-british-columbia>.  
62 Decriminalisation and Stigma, supra note 23 at 248. 
63 Ingrid Peritz, “Montreal teacher, 73, loses job over film nudity more than 40 years ago”, Globe and Mail 
(20 October 2014) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/montreal-teacher-73-loses-job-
over-film-nudity-more-than-40-years-ago/article21183669/>. 
The current Canadian licensing regimes require individual workers to be licensed. 
While sex workers could agree to the licensing of businesses under certain conditions, 
they do not agree with licenses for individual escorts because they find that it would be 
“impractical and would reduce the autonomy of independent workers”.64 Licensing 
creates a paper trail that workers fear will have future consequences.65 Given the 
transitory nature of sex work, adult service providers often use the work as a means of 
financing education or as a temporary means of earning an income.66 For workers, once 
licensed, the lingering evidence of having worked for a massage parlour or escort agency 
means that the stigma could have consequences if they are subjected to background 
checks.67 Many workers maintain strict boundaries between their job and their home life 
that licensing could compromise.68 As one worker stated: “I don’t want my name 
associated with this”.69 Not all adult service providers are able to be open about their 
profession because of the stigma, which makes the current municipal provisions 
problematic. Requiring each individual worker to have a license means that even if they 
work in the industry temporarily, doing so legally means a record has been created.  
From providing for families to financing education, there are a plethora of reasons 
why people work in the adult service industry. Municipal licensing raises privacy 
concerns for workers because government departments could access the paper trail of 
64 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 50. 
65 Ibid at 56. 
66 Ibid at 52. 
67 Lewis & Matricka-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 441. 
68 Decriminalisation and Stigma, supra note 23 at 248. 
69 Laing, supra note 30 at 8 
their employment.70 For example, in Vancouver, the bylaw still requires social escorts to 
provide the names of employees and customers to police on demand.71 
While this is less of a concern for those who are diligent about reporting their 
income for tax purposes, the records “may be subpoenaed in legal proceedings, such as 
child custody and criminal cases”.72 Workers fear that working as an adult service 
provider will taint their reputations and put them at risk of charges or losing custody or 
access to their children. While these represent potentially the most serious consequences, 
there is also the possibility that they will be denied other employment or opportunities. 
Workers are usually uncertain of when their former employment will show up in 
background checks:   
So whenever an employer says they are going to do a 
background check, now I always ask them what kind, 
and it’s a little frustrating because you don’t know what 
they are looking for, and you don’t know where it’s 
posted.73      
 
This fear could lead some workers to resist working in licensed businesses or prevent 
them from leaving licensed work.  
Many street-based workers acknowledge that they would rather work from an 
indoor location because massage parlours and escort services provide an indoor 
environment that is not only safer but also keeps them out of public view.74 Licensing 
means that adult service providers have a slightly different privacy concern. Instead of 
being worried about being spotted by someone who could out him or her, they fear that 
70 Lewis & Matricka-Tyndale, supra note 17 at 441. 
71 City of Vancouver, by-law No 4450, License By-Law (23 September 1969) 
72 Ibid. 
73 Laing, supra note 30 at 8. 
74 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 19. 
their employment history could be used against them.75 These privacy concerns are very 
real and workers have advised that: “regardless of any social or legal reforms, there will 
always be a street-level industry because of the anonymity and convenience for some 
workers”.76 The fact that workers would choose to remain street-based instead of 
applying for a municipal license represents not only a drawback to the current licensing 
regimes, but also highlights an issue that must be addressed in licensing regimes designed 
for decriminalized brothels.  
Even with legal reform that makes sex work permissible, the stigma does not 
disappear with the criminal provisions.  Privacy will remain a concern for sex workers.77 
It has been demonstrated that stigma is the reason many adult service providers and sex 
workers guard the nature of their professions with vigilant secrecy. Crofts and 
Summerfield, while not directly addressing privacy, do note that “the right to privacy is 
severely jeopardised by the power of some bodies to require any information they see 
fit”.78 To accommodate licensing for decriminalized brothels,  
municipalities will need to find a way to address these privacy concerns.  
COST 
Licensing schemes can be effective and beneficial to both workers and 
municipalities, but only if workers can afford the cost of a license. John Lowman’s 
critique of the cost structure for licensing in Vancouver, detailed in Chapter 2, highlights 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid; Valverde, supra note 18.  
77 Decriminalisation & Stigma, supra note 23 at 239. 
78 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 4 at 272, New Zealand spelling. 
the price differential between the various businesses that are licensed.79 A license for a 
body rub parlour is the third most expensive license offered by the city. Lowman also 
contends that the difference between the cost of operating a dating service and an escort 
service “is to clarify which business is involved in commercial sex”.80 The inflated prices 
for licensing can only be explained as an instrument of control.  The requirement for each 
worker to obtain a license is not only an invasion of privacy but it compounds the amount 
of money that a city can make through licensing.  
Workers express concerns over the cost of licensing in three main ways: the cost 
is higher in comparison to other licenses;81 the cost is prohibitive to the point of being 
exclusionary;82 the cost restricts their mobility83. Workers are willing to participate in 
licensing schemes but the current costs for licensing adult service providers can increase 
the vulnerability of sex workers. Under a criminalized regime, adult service providers 
who are required to be licensed will continue to be excluded from most of the benefits 
licensing could provide, while being forced to pay licensing fees that amount to little 
more than a sin tax.84 The Supreme Court was clear in Bedford that laws are arbitrary 
when there is no link between the object of the law and its effect.85 Bylaws which purport 
79 Vancouver Licensing Bylaw, supra note 71 at Schedule A, Year 2014 Business License Fees; Lowman 
Submissions, supra note 7 at 14. The only licensing fees that are higher than that of a Body Rub in 
Vancouver are The Pacific National Exhibition ($16,011), a casino - class 2, Horse or Motorcycle racing 
(all at $11,433). 
80 Lowman Submissions, supra note 7 at 14. 
81 van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note 25 at 318. 
82 Ibid at 319. 
83 Ibid. 
84A Sin tax is when a higher fee is levied upon a product or service to discourage its use. For more on sin 
taxes see generally: Adam J. Hoffer, “Sin Tax Costs Outweigh Benefits” Economic Intelligence (5 
February 2013), online: US News <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-
intelligence/2013/02/05/sin-tax-costs-outweigh-benefits>. 
85 Bedford, supra note 10 at para 98. 
to license while increasing the vulnerabilities of sex workers may not only be at risk of 
being challenged but should not be replicated to license decriminalized brothels.  
HIGHER COST COMPARED TO OTHER LICENSES 
 
Some adult service providers do not dispute paying for licenses so much as they 
find it unfair that licenses to work as adult service providers are disproportionately higher 
than the costs for licensing in other industries.86 The disproportionately high fees have 
been the subject of court challenges but none have been successful in having the license 
fees quashed or re-evaluated.87  
In Re Try-San International Ltd.88 fees, among other provisions, were challenged 
as being prohibitive, discriminatory, and ultra vires of council’s authority in its attempt to 
legislate morality.89 The appellants were unsuccessful in their bid to have the bylaw 
struck down as the court deemed the bylaw to be regulatory.90 Taggart JA did not close 
the door to future challenges. Instead, he clarified what evidence that may assist the court 
in reaching a determination that a bylaw is overreaching and should be struck down. He 
stated that more evidence pertaining to the “economic effects” of the bylaw on body rub 
parlours generally would be necessary to advance the argument that the fees are 
prohibitory.91  
86 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 45. 
87 International Escort Services Inc v Vancouver (City), [1988] 55 DLR (4th) 194, 33 BCLR (2d) 202 
(BCSC); Re Try-San International Ltd and Vancouver, (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 236 (BCCA), [1978] B.C.J. 
No. 1188(QL) (sub nom. Re Vancouver License By-law 4957) [Try-San]  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid at para 22. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid at 15. 
PROHIBITIVE COSTS 
 
 The cost of licensing for adult service providers also keeps many from seeking a 
license in the first place. The cost of licensing has become a barrier for many who would 
move off the street to the relative safety of indoor work.92 As one worker stated: “what 
would compel a person to go indoors at those prices?”93 For those who use sex work as a 
means of survival, to top up social assistance earnings, or who work in the trade from 
time to time, licensing not only creates a record of their employment in adult services but 
the cost can prevent them from opting for the safety of indoor locations.94 Many find the 
cost of licensing puts them between a rock and a hard place:  
The escort license is prohibitive…$1500 for an 
independent escort license…which is really out of 
reach for a lot of girls out there, a lot of them are single 
parents and we are doing this part time. So I mean it’s 
either get a license or they are back out on the street.95 
 
There are many reasons workers choose sex work over traditional jobs and the need for 
better pay, flexible hours and not wanting to resort to social assistance are unchanged, 
regardless of how onerous it is to obtain a license.96 If a person chooses to enter into sex 
work and prefers working for a third-party over independent work and the responsibility 
of finding their own clients, that choice should not be negated by the high cost of 
licensing. Ideally, all sex workers who want to move into safer work environments 
should not be hindered by criminal law or cost. 
92 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 25.  
93 Ibid at 45.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid at 51. 
96 Jeffery & MacDonald, supra note 36 at 19. 
The high costs of licensing do not only affect the cost of doing business for sex 
workers, it also affects their mobility. Many escorts travel to different cities to meet 
clients because it allows for increased anonymity. Working outside of the city where they 
reside is not uncommon: “42% of sex workers said that more than 20% of their past-year 
sexual transactions took place in an area outside of their current municipality”.97 While 
the new advertising prohibitions threaten to have a chilling effect that will have the 
greatest impact on those who travel for work98, the cost of obtaining a license to remain 
compliant with municipal bylaws is also prohibitive. 
This business model becomes especially expensive when a license is required for each 
location, even though an escort’s presence in that location is temporary.99  “If a female 
escort wanted to tour five Canadian cities, crossing municipal boundaries, and at all times 
be operating ‘legally’ under a license, the fees could top $10,000”.100 Imposing fees in 
each city where an escort works makes the work more onerous because of the continuous 
need to maintain licenses, which may be denied because the escort is not a resident, or 
because she works independently. This denial of mobility means that a worker who 
travels for work may remain outside of the licensing regime.  
Thus the cost remains one of the main drawbacks to licensing. This issue could be 
solved if the fees for adult service providers were comparable to that of other businesses 
and the requirement for individual workers to hold licenses was re-evaluated. Sex 
workers take the position that: “the number and type of restrictions, and the licensing fees 
97 Benoit et al, supra note 2 at 5. 
98C-36, supra note 11 s 286.4. 
99 van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note 25 at 319. 
100 Laing, supra note 30 at 11. 
for sex industry businesses should be equivalent to those for other businesses”.101 
Licensing fees for escorts in Calgary were lowered in 2006, proving that it is feasible for 
cities to license adult services at rates comparable to other businesses.102 One of the 
features of a social control licensing regime is that “many workers will not be able or 
willing to participate in the framework” making licensing less effective.103  
CONCLUSION 
  
 By all indications, the adult services industry is one that municipalities love to 
hate. Through licensing cities can control these types of businesses while maintaining the 
position that they are unsavory. The businesses are left to pay high fees in hopes that 
maintaining a valid license convinces enforcement officials to look the other way. Any 
benefits that sex workers garner from working in a municipally licensed sex business are 
subsequently quashed by the drawbacks of obtaining a license. The use of the social 
control model is evident in Canadian licensing regimes. In combination with continued 
criminalization, the situation is unlikely to improve. With the passing of Bill C-36, the 
situation of sex workers working within municipally licensed businesses could become 
much worse as police begin targeting their clients. 
 Sex workers have been clear in their desire to be treated like any other business 
owner or service provider. They are not asking for an absence of rules, but instead they 
want a set of rules that is both fair and addresses their concerns over cost and privacy, 
which are often interconnected. “[T]hose sex workers who felt that such businesses 
101 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 45; van der Meulen & Valverde, supra note 25 at 317. 
102 City of Calgary, by-law 48M2006, Dating and Escort Service Bylaw (17 October 2006). 
should be licensed felt that licensing provisions should match those of non-sex industry 
businesses in terms of the types of requirements and level of restrictiveness; sex industry 
businesses should not be subject to more restrictive licensing requirements or levels of 
enforcement than other businesses”.104 The result of imposing more restrictive conditions 
is to suppress the positive benefits that licensing regimes can provide and encourage 
workers to remain outside the licensed industry. “Workers who cannot work within the 
confines of the legalized regime or do not want to do so are criminalized and subject to 
the same repression imposed by a criminalized system”.105  
 A municipal license helps sex workers prove their employment, which affords 
them a greater ability to participate in financial arrangements that are usually difficult for 
those unable to document their work. The ability to rent an apartment or finance a car are 
among the things that can easily be taken for granted. The professionalization of adult 
services through licensing also improves their risk management strategies. The ability to 
access safer working conditions was why the Bedford case was launched and informed 
the Supreme Court decision to strike down the criminal provisions that made sex work 
more dangerous. The dignity and freedom from exploitation that were envisioned in 
CORP’s recommendations to the Fraser committee have tenuously occurred in 
municipally licensed businesses but the benefits remain offset by the invasion of privacy 
and expense of licensing.     
103 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 4 at 270. 
104 Beyond Decriminalization, supra note 35 at 50 
105 Bruckert & Hannem, supra note 21 at 57. The authors cite those who cannot meet the criteria for a 
license, those with criminal records or those without citizenship as persons who are shut out of licensing 
regimes. Those who prefer to work independently, or do not want the stigma of having a license for the 
adult industry on their file are examples of those who do not want to be licensed.     
 Municipal licensing requires sex workers to provide personal information that will 
connect them to the adult services industry but without being able to know who can 
access it and under what conditions it may be accessed. Stigma causes sex workers to be 
vigilant about their privacy, often keeping their work secret from even those closest to 
them. The stigma of having a record of employment in adult service could have an 
unfavourable impact on future goals.  
 Licensing adult services is a windfall for cities but it comes from those who can 
least afford it. In virtually all Canadian cities, the cost of licensing for a massage parlour 
or an escort service ranks among the highest of the licenses offered. Further enhancing 
licensing’s moneymaking potential for cities, is the requirement of individual employees 
to be licensed. The cost is prohibitively high for some who would prefer to work in a 
managed environment. The requirement for individual licenses also limits the ability of 
travelling escorts to work legally in each city they visit. Most cities prohibit adult service 
industry employees from working for more than one sex industry business and the cost of 
obtaining a license for each city costs thousands per year. The drawbacks continue to 
outweigh the benefits because of criminalization and an underlying policy to discourage 
adult service businesses.  
 Exploring the benefits and drawbacks from the perspective of sex workers shows 
immediately the compounding effect of federal and municipal policies and 
pronouncements that seek to suppress the adult services industry and the sex workers 
who ply their trade covertly within it. Criminalization coupled with goals of social 
control do not allow licensing to benefit workers. To more fully respect the personal 
autonomy of sex workers, their needs must be taken into consideration.  Sex work has 
continued even as the criminal law as become more onerous. Valverde reminds us that 
we should learn from mistakes instead of repeating them: 
One thing that the long history of temperance 
movements teaches us is that governments can 
encourage healthy behaviour but cannot use coercive 
law to ban behaviours that many do not like but that 
have always been with us. Criminalizing smoking 
would just not work, for example.106   
     
This is why the criminal law is not the best tool for regulating the sex trade. In a similar 
vein, municipalities that treat sex industry businesses as undesirable and attempt to 
discourage them with high-priced licenses also won’t succeed in suppressing the industry. 
It merely leaves workers vulnerable as they are forced to work outside of the legalized 
regime. Cohesion in policy from all levels of government is the only feasible solution, 
and that policy must put the health and safety of sex workers ahead of a desire to 
eliminate vices.  
While the parliamentary debates over Bill C-36 still resonate, it almost seems 
hard to consider that less law could effectively regulate decriminalized sex work. More so 
that such law reform could address privacy concerns, allow sex workers more control 
over their business, improve health and safety and not require an expensive license. 
These are the hallmarks of a neutral licensing regime where sex work is decriminalized. 
In the next chapter, New Zealand’s experience with decriminalization and licensing will 
held up in contrast to the Canadian regime. While licensing offers little benefit under 
current conditions in Canada, the New Zealand regime shows how a move to neutral 
licensing under decriminalization can foster the exact benefits that Bedford sought to 
achieve.    
106 Valverde, supra note 18. 
CHAPTER 4 – LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2003, New Zealand became the first country in the world to decriminalize 
voluntary adult sex work in all venues.1 Prior to the passing of the Prostitution Reform 
Act (PRA), selling sex was not illegal but “soliciting, brothel keeping, living on the 
earnings of prostitution and procuring” were all prohibited.2 Sex workers operating out of 
massage parlours in New Zealand faced similar hardships to the ones currently being 
experienced by Canadian sex workers because “most female sex workers worked 
disguised as masseuses”.3 While Canada is moving towards tougher criminal provisions 
to control the sex trade through Bill C-36, the PRA took New Zealand in the opposite 
direction. Repealing the criminal provisions has resulted in praise from multiple UN 
bodies who advocate that other countries consider recognizing sex work as work and 
providing those in the industry with the same occupational health and safety protections 
1 Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/28 [PRA].  
2 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) 1961/43 ss 147-149; Summary Offences Act 1981 (NZ) 1981/113 s 26. 
Gillian Abel & Lisa Fitzgerald, “Introduction” in Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Catherine Healy, eds, 
Taking the Crime out of Sex Work: New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 2010) at 1. 
3 Catherine Healy, Calum Bennachie & Anna Reed, “History of the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective” 
in Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Catherine Healy, eds, Taking the Crime out of Sex Work: New Zealand 
sex workers’ fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2010) at 45 [Healy et al]. Massage 
Parlours Act 1978 (NZ), 1978/13. The passing of the PRA repealed this Act.  
as other workers.4 New Zealand’s experience with law reform holds valuable lessons 
from which Canada could learn.  
While many of the activities that allow a person to make a living from sex work 
remain criminalized in Canada, New Zealand has taken the position that a brothel is a 
business and should be treated accordingly. Having established in chapter two that 
Canadian municipalities would be the appropriate authorities for licensing decriminalized 
brothels, this chapter details the experience of decriminalization in New Zealand in order 
to develop guiding principles that could assist Canadian cities in developing effective 
licensing regimes. As chapter three demonstrated, the licensing bylaws for massage 
parlours and escort services should not be replicated and applied to decriminalized 
brothels because they fail to address the privacy needs of sex workers and cause undue 
financial hardship. New Zealand’s simple but well-reasoned approach allows sex workers 
and their communities to coexist. In comparison to the Canadian municipal bylaws that 
license massage parlours and escort agencies, the New Zealand legislation, at both 
national and local levels, is concise, less onerous and easy to understand.5 The cost of 
licensing is also much lower.6 While it would not be possible to replicate New Zealand’s 
decriminalization legislation in its entirety, owing to different government structures, 
4 Global Commission on HIV, HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights & Health (New York: UNDP, HIV/AIDS 
Group, 2012) online: <http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report> at 43 [HIV & the Law]; UN 
Development Programme, Sex Work and the Law in Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok, UN Development 
Programme, 2012), online: < http://asia-
pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/hiv_aids/rbap-hhd-2013-sex-
work-and-the-law-in-asia-and-the-pacific-web.pdf>; International Labour Organization, Recommendation 
Concerning HIV and AIDS and the World of Work (No. 200) (Geneva, International Labour Organization, 
2010), online: <http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
ilo_aids/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_194088.pdf>; “UN Praises NZ’s Prostitution Laws”, 3 
News (24 October 2012), online: <http://www.3news.co.nz/nznews/un-praises-nzs-prostitution-laws-
2012102409>. 
5 PRA, supra note 1, ss 34-41. 
municipalities could easily adopt the framework of the New Zealand licensing regime to 
regulate brothels in Canada. This chapter details the relevant sections of the Prostitution 
Reform Act and advances the proposition that a similar regime would be appropriate for 
enactment by Canadian municipalities. New Zealand has a simple regulatory regime that 
allows sex workers greater control over their work environments while protecting their 
privacy. This chapter will demonstrate not only why such a system is well reasoned but 
also why it is precisely the type of system that Canada should consider.   
PUSHING FOR THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK IN NEW ZEALAND  
 New Zealand’s decriminalization movement began as an informal gathering of 
sex workers in 1987.7 They were frustrated by the conditions in massage parlours where 
they worked covertly, not unlike the current situation of Canadian sex workers. The 
Massage Parlours Act 1978 authorized police to apply for a court order to have any 
masseuse’s employment terminated for committing an act of prostitution so that sex 
workers working in massage parlour were forced to operate in a clandestine manner.8 
Under the Act, employees of massage parlours could not have past convictions for drug 
or prostitution offenses and police frequently checked staff listings to ensure 
compliance.9 Despite having the enhanced safety of an indoor location, the power 
imbalance created between the owners and the workers became untenable. With growing 
concerns over the spread of AIDS, the police use of condoms as evidence to support 
prostitution charges and an inability to exercise control over their work environment, the 
6 New Zealand, Auckland Council, Licenses and Registration Fees online:  
<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/licencesregulations/healthlicencefees/Pages/home.aspx> 
accessed 9 February 2015 [Auckland Licensing Fees] accessed 9 February 2015. 
7 Healy et al, supra note 3 at 46-47. 
New Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC) began to organize to lobby for law reform.10 
The NZPC, from its humble beginnings would grow to become the driving force behind 
decriminalization.  
 The NZPC remained largely informal because of the laws that criminalized sex 
work, however the Ministry of Health saw them as a potential asset in delivering specific 
health care initiatives for sex workers.11  For sex workers, the Ministry of Health 
represented a potential ally: “a more benign government agency than the ones sex 
workers were used to, that is, the police and justice system”.12 The NZPC was able to 
present the issues that sex workers faced in a non-confrontational manner and the 
Ministry of Health saw the NZPC as an organization that sex workers could trust. The 
mutual benefits led to the NZPC becoming a publically funded organization to develop 
an HIV prevention strategy tailored to the sex industry. For the government, it was an 
opportunity to reach a vulnerable population. For the NZPC, it was an opportunity for sex 
workers to take the lead on HIV prevention and ensure that “programs remained relevant 
and sex-worker driven”.13 This unlikely alliance would provide sex workers with the 
necessary leverage not only to improve their health, but also their working conditions.  
 Beginning in 1988, the NZPC received an annual grant of $50,000 NZD14 to 
establish drop-in centres for sex workers, publish a magazine and distribute safe sex 
supplies.15 The government funding offered considerable legitimacy to the NZPC and 
8 Massage Parlours Act 1978 (NZ), 1978/13, s 32 (1)(a).  
9 Healy et al, supra note 3 at 45. 
10 Ibid at 46. 
11 Ibid at 47. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid. 
14 This amount converts to slightly more than $40,000 Canadian dollars at present day exchange rates, as of 
9 February 2015. 
15 Healy et al, supra note 3 at 48. 
strengthened their ability to demand legal reform to improve the health and well being of 
sex workers. The funding to pursue HIV prevention initiatives was a positive first step, 
but their efforts were being hindered by the criminal law. The NZPC was instrumental in 
dispensing condoms and information to sex workers but police were confiscating these 
items and using them as evidence to arrest and charge sex workers.16 It meant that sex 
workers were still reluctant to carry the one item that could protect them against HIV 
infection. Criminalization also limited the number of sex workers who would otherwise 
“step forward and act as peer educators and leaders in safe-sex programmes”.17  
With the law defeating their mandate to facilitate HIV prevention, the NZPC 
began the campaign that would eventually change the criminal law surrounding sex work. 
The Ministry of Health was presented with an ultimatum – the NZPC would return the 
funding that sustained HIV prevention programs unless an intergovernmental committee 
was struck to examine the impact of the provisions criminalizing sex work.18 In an 
affirmation of the important work that the NZPC was accomplishing, the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, the police, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice came 
together to produce a report. This collaboration brought all the stakeholders to the table 
and the result was that “the decriminalisation of sex work was going to be taken 
seriously”19, although law reform was still over a decade away. It also established a 
relationship between the NZPC and the police that ended police collection of condoms as 
16 Ibid at 52. 
17 Ibid at 53. 
18 Ibid at 53. 
19 Ibid at 53. 
evidence of prostitution.20 Coming full circle from its initial attempt to curtail venereal 
disease, New Zealand accepted the presence of sex work and made safe sex the law.21    
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE PRA 
It is not the liberal nature of the PRA that makes it effective; it is the ease with 
which people can understand the law and what is required to comply with it. In the 
following section, three key principles of the legal regime are explored in detail. They 
are: simplicity, privacy and cost. All of these principles are multi-faceted because 
efficacy depends on the underlying purpose of a legal regime. Simplicity becomes moot 
when the purpose of a law continues to moralize the sex industry instead of recognizing it 
as work. Privacy is compromised when lawmakers fail to recognize the realities of the 
stigma that sex workers face. Finally, cost can prevent sex workers from accessing safer 
working conditions even when they are available.  
New Zealand has struck a careful balance that Canadian lawmakers should take 
note of because the law is designed to regulate sex work, not to condone it. Generations 
of Canadian lawmakers have stuck to abolitionist rhetoric because they are befuddled 
over how to regulate sex work without condoning it.22  The PRA denotes explicitly in its 
20 Ibid at 53; Gillian Abel & Lisa Fitzgerald, “Risk Management in sex work post-Prostitution Reform Act” 
in Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerlald & Catherine Healy, eds, Taking the Crime Out of Sex Work: New Zealand 
Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: Policy Press, 2010) 217 at 219. 
21 New Zealand, Parliamentary Library, Prostitution Law Reform in New Zealand (July 2012) online: 
<http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/B1D8651B-D929-4620-836B-
DDFF4D5ACEDF/246410/RP201205ProstitutionLawReforminNewZealand3.pdf> at 1 [NZ Parliamentary 
Library].  
22 John Lowman, Submission to the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws of the Standing Committee on 
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, (Ottawa: John Lowman, undated) 
online: 
<http://184.70.147.70/lowman_prostitution/HTML/SCJHPE/Submission_to_the%20Subcommittee_on_Sol
icitation%20Laws_Brief.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2015 at Appendix A, page 1 [Lowman Submission].  
purpose that the intent of the Act is not to endorse or moralize.23 The PRA is an Act about 
health and allowing sex workers to access the same scheme of occupational and human 
rights as all other workers.24  
While Canada’s political structure is different from New Zealand’s, the simplicity 
of the PRA, the protection of privacy and setting fees that are on par with other 
businesses, are all considerations that would enhance not only compliance with a regime 
decriminalizing sex work in Canada, but also address the main concerns that sex workers, 
currently working out of municipally licensed adult service businesses have raised. This 
discussion will now broadly discuss how the New Zealand legislation and bylaws have 
taken these concerns into consideration before moving to the more narrow discussion of 
the provisions and how they are applied. While a ‘made in Canada’ approach to 
decriminalization could become reality should the provisions of Bill C36 be found 
unconstitutional, adopting these three notions from New Zealand’s experience can foster 
a smoother transition into a new legal regime.   
SIMPLICITY 
 Although there was considerable debate before the passing of the PRA, the 
simplicity of New Zealand’s Brothel Operator’s certification under the Act was 
deliberate, as it was intended to “encourage compliance”.25 The certification program was 
not initially part of the Act but was developed by the Justice and Electoral Reform 
Committee out of concern that decriminalization alone would not facilitate improved 
23 PRA, supra note 1 at s 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of 
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2008) online: 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-law-
review-committee/publications/plrc-report> at 6.1.1 [PLRC Report].  
conditions for sex workers. Ultimately, the Committee did not propose an amendment to 
the Bill but they reported their concerns, and suggested that a licensing regime would 
help prevent power imbalances in the employer-employee relationship and would 
discourage organized crime from infiltrating the industry.26 Although the committee only 
included their conclusions on licensing, the Minister of Justice, Phil Goff, proposed an 
amendment to the bill that added the requirement of the operator’s certificate.27 The 
Brothel Operator’s Certificate became part of the Act when it was passed in June 2003.28   
 The Brothel Operator’s Certificate is not linked to any additional business 
licensing requirements. This was deliberate.  However, the Prostitution Law Reform 
Committee did consider the desirability of linking the Brothel Operator’s Certificate with 
municipal licensing. While a majority of the committee found that this would allow for 
crosschecking those who hold certificates and business licenses, some members of the 
committee felt that it would disadvantage operators of smaller enterprises.29 The 
committee found that any measures taken to create a register of brothels could jeopardize 
compliance with the certificate requirement and were, therefore, undesirable. The 
majority view, however, was that the list of certificate holders should be accessible to 
other government departments to allow for inspections.30  
 The Prostitution Law Reform Committee made only three other 
recommendations, in addition to the one noted above. They found that requiring a 
certificate to be renewed annually was inefficient, and suggested that certificates be valid 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 PRA, supra note 1 at s 34. 
29 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 6.4.4. 
30 Ibid at 6.4.4, 6.7. 
for a period of three years.31 It also recommended that more information should be 
provided to operators when a certificate is issued.32 Having considered the feedback from 
certificate holders, the Committee saw that while certificate holders would welcome a 
knowledge-based requirement to obtain a certificate, the preferred option of the 
committee was to endorse information packs that would accompany an Operator’s 
Certificate.33 The Committee found that a test may be more onerous and that providing 
information about the law and an operator’s obligations was more feasible and would not 
discourage applicants.34 They likened the information package to the ones already 
provided to those obtaining a license to sell alcohol.35 The distribution of resources to 
certificate holders does increase the costs but the Committee recommended that these 
costs not be used as justification for increasing the fee; instead it should be borne by the 
Department of Labour.36 The final recommendation was that inspections should be a 
condition of issuing a certificate.37 This suggestion was largely in response to those who 
were required to obtain a certificate but indicated that no checks were ever done to ensure 
they had one.38 The Committee saw the Ministry of Labour as the appropriate body to 
conduct inspections to ensure compliance. As with the information packages, the 
Committee found that the cost should not be passed on to certificate holders.39    
The recommendations of the Committee indicate that the main priorities with 
operator’s certificates are improving administrative efficiency and providing better 
31 Ibid at 6.7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid at 6.6.3. 
35 Ibid at 6.6.3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at 6.7. 
38 Ibid at 6.4.4. 
39 Ibid 6.6.7. 
resources for sex workers. These are not indicative of problems with the system but 
enhancements that can be made to improve the efficiency of the system.  
 Licensing at the local level has been more piecemeal, as not every territorial 
authority has felt compelled to enact bylaws to regulate sex work. For some, it is simply 
not an issue.40 For others, bylaws were passed in the event that regulating sex work 
becomes necessary.41 Larger centres have adopted more robust regimes, some of which 
include licensing, but have used broad and accessible criteria similar to the licensing 
requirements for other businesses.42 There are no limits on the number of available 
licenses so long as the proposed business complies with district plans, fees are paid and 
any necessary inspections are passed. Once these conditions are met a business license 
will be issued. The cost of additional licenses, beyond the operator’s certificate, has 
discouraged some from entering the brothel business – or at least in an official capacity. 
The PLRC reported that health and hygiene bylaws and the cost of a license, particularly 
in Auckland, “has led some to remain massage parlours”.43 While this shows that 
onerous regulation deters participation, the call for more rigorous monitoring of the PRA 
and the bylaws of the territorial authorities came from participants in the certification and 
licensing regimes.44 The lack of enforcement is largely owing to a “complaint driven” 
system facilitated by multiple authorities.45  
40 Ibid at 9.4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid at 9.5.5. Emphasis in original. 
44 Elaine Mossman, “Brothel operators’ and support agencies’ experiences of decriminalisation" in Gillian 
Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Catherine Healy, eds, Taking the Crime Out of Sex Work: New Zealand Sex 
Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: Policy Press, 2010) at 137 [Mossman] 
45 Ibid at 137-138; Officials from Police, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, Department of Labour and 
Immigration, Inland Revenue and Territorial Authorities all play a role in regulation and could inspect 
brothels for compliance with the rules under their corresponding jurisdiction.  
 The New Zealand system attempts to strike the delicate balance between allowing 
only those certified to operate brothels and not dissuading potential operators from 
opening legal brothels by imposing too-rigorous conditions. One study found that 
credentials are rarely checked, and operators would be agreeable to a more onerous set of 
conditions.46 The New Zealand Prostitutes Collective does not endorse adding conditions 
to obtain an operator’s certificate because “making the system too onerous may result in 
fewer operators applying for certification”.47 Should other countries seek to adopt a 
similar system, New Zealand’s experience indicates that streamlining enforcement and 
inspection is preferable. This would ensure that inspections are conducted more regularly, 
and that sex industry businesses know which authority they will be dealing with.   
Any government can create a licensing regime but for it to be successful the goals 
must align with the needs of those it seeks to regulate. In New Zealand, the goal was to 
enhance the health and safety of sex workers and the licensing system that was created is 
“neutral”, in that it “licenses the sex industry in a similar way to other areas of 
business”.48  
The alternative “social control” method of licensing is embodied in licensing of 
massage parlours and escort services in Canada and for the regulation of brothels in parts 
of Australia.49 Indeed, the success of New Zealand’s “neutral” stance on licensing can be 
best highlighted when compared to the “social control” model used in Queensland, 
Australia. Brothels in Queensland were legalized by the Prostitution Act 1999.50 While 
46 Mossman, supra note 44 at 131. 
47 Ibid. 
48 PRA, supra note 1 at s 3; Thomas Crofts & Tracey Summerfield, “The Licensing of Sex Work in 
Australia and New Zealand” (2007) Murdoch University eLaw Journal 269, online: 
<http://apo.org.au/node/2539> at 270 [Crofts & Summerfield]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Prostitution Act 1999 (Qld).  
New Zealand’s licensing regime is premised upon protecting and improving the health 
and safety of sex workers, Queensland has taken the approach of controlling and 
ultimately hoping to discourage brothels by making it difficult for them to obtain a 
license.51 When the Queensland law was reviewed in 2004, there was great concern over 
the two-tier system that had emerged.52 Illegal, unlicensed brothels were more prevalent 
than licensed, legal brothels.53 Obtaining a license was an onerous process, and local 
councils made securing planning approval so difficult that a majority of sex workers 
remained outside the licensing regime.54 It was estimated that 75% of the sexual services 
being provided in Queensland were illegal, owing largely to difficulty in obtaining a 
license from the Prostitution Licensing Authority.55 Crofts and Summerfield found that 
the Queensland system, being “administratively complex, intrusive and open to morality-
based decision making, as indicated by their lack of adherence to established protocols 
for fair decision-making”, replicated the impacts of criminalization.56 While brothels had 
the ability to operate as licensed businesses, the difficulty in achieving that status made it 
less attractive. The aim to control commercial sex businesses in Queensland thus failed, 
as they continued to operate illegally rather than engage with the complex network of 
regulations.   
51 New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Central Government Aims and Local Government Responses: The 
Prostitution Reform Act 2003 by Elaine Mossman & Pat Mayhew, (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007) 
at 25 [Mossman & Mayhew].  
52 Ibid at 25, 9.  
53 Ibid at 25. 
54 Ibid at 26. 
55 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 48 at 271; Queensland, Crime and Misconduct Commission, 
Regulating Prostitution: An Evaluation of the Prostitution Act 1999 (Qld) (Brisbane: Crime and 
Misconduct Commission, 2004) <http://www.ccc.qld.gov.au/research-and-publications/browse-by-topic-
1/legislation-reviews/2011-review-of-the-prostitution-act-1999-qld-1/2011-review-of-the-prostitution-act-
1999-qld> at 80.  
56 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 48 at 271. 
Queensland passed the Prostitution Amendment Act57 in 2001. Included were the 
recommendations of the Crime and Misconduct Committee, who had assessed the prior 
Act, and determined the legislation should be simplified.58 The amendment also sought to 
prevent local councils from making morality-based decisions, as those decisions limited 
the ability of commercial sex businesses to obtain the planning permissions required to 
operate legally.59  
The comparison of the two regimes clearly indicates that onerous regulation 
discourages businesses from operating lawfully, even where they are permitted to do so.  
Many who argue that licensing cannot be effective, fail to consider that the principles 
used to develop the licensing regime can have a drastic impact on its effectiveness. While 
the New Zealand licensing system remains simple, this is not an indication that it is not a 
well-considered plan. In reality, the simplicity of the system is a result of considering all 
the possible options and implications of making licensing more expensive and more 
onerous, and rejecting them in favour of a system that is easy to participate in.  
 Anyone could read the PRA and understand with relative ease and precision what 
is expected to comply with the law. While it is not above judicial scrutiny, and there is 
certainly plenty about the changes created by the Act that the Courts can consider, the 
language and organization of the PRA is designed to be accessible. Councils have created 
licensing bylaws for businesses generally rather than singling out brothels for differential 
treatment. The change in legal regime was supported with an occupational health and 
57 Provisions are incorporated into the Prostitution Act 1999 (Qld). 
58 Mossman & Mayhew, supra note 51 at 26. 
59 Crofts & Summerfield, supra note 48 at 271. 
safety guide written for sex workers.60 The guide was a collaborative effort between the 
Department of Labour and the NZPC, and a majority of sex workers surveyed indicated 
that they had read it.61 New Zealand’s combination of plain language legislation and easy 
to follow process had shaped the decriminalization of sex work in a way that other 
counties should note. Not only is it simplistic, it works. 
PRIVACY 
 
Owing to the continued stigma attached to working in the sex trade, sex workers 
are cautious about creating a paper trail that could later connect them to employment in 
the sex industry. A licensing regime that considers the needs of sex workers is preferable 
to one that treats them differently from other workers. The PRA protects the privacy of 
sex workers in three ways: Small Owner-Operated Brothels are exempt from the 
requirement to hold an operator’s certificate. The records for certificate holders, 
applicants, and applicants for waivers of disqualification are only accessible by the 
Registrar, police and the applicant.62 At the local level, not all territorial authorities 
require an additional business license, none of which require licenses or registration of 
individual workers.  
As noted earlier, the PRA created two distinct classifications for brothels: the 
Small Owner-Operated Brothel (SOOBs) which allows up to 4 sex workers to work 
60 New Zealand, Department of Labour, Occupational Safety and Health Service, A Guide to Occupational 
Health and Safety in the New Zealand Sex Industry (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2004) online: 
<http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/information-guidance/all-guidance-items/sex-industry-a-guide-to-
occupational-health-and-safety-in-the-new-zealand/sexindustry.pdf> [Occupational Health & Safety]. 
61 Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald, & Cheryl Brunton, The Impact of the Prostitution Reform Act on the Health 
and Safety Practices of Sex Workers (Christchurch: University of Otago, 2007) online: 
<http://www.otago.ac.nz/christchurch/otago018607.pdf> [Abel, Fitzgerald & Brunton].  
62  PRA, supra note 1 at s 41(1). 
together out of a residence so long as each worker retains the money they make from 
selling sexual services, and the commercial brothels which require operator’s certificates 
and in some cases, a business license. While the SOOBs have created contentious zoning 
issues63, more often, they operate in a manner that goes unnoticed by the community 
around them.64 SOOBs give sex workers more control over their work by allowing them 
autonomy over their work. SOOBs provide the enhanced safety of working collectively 
but sex workers still retain their earnings, and set the times and terms of their 
transactions. By not requiring the SOOBs to be licensed or hold certificates, workers can 
remain anonymous, work without fear that a record of their work in the sex trade will 
scuttle future employment or educational pursuits, and they can exit the industry 
whenever they choose. The removal of criminal law prohibitions on the sex trade is a 
considerable help to those who wish to preserve their privacy. This is further enhanced by 
New Zealand’s decision to classify smaller brothels as distinct from larger, commercial 
operations.   
While concern from the community was generally expressed in terms of moral 
objection to the sex trade or the establishment of brothels, the picture that is painted of 
dens of sin, red lights and associated behaviours has not been the reality under 
decriminalization. Of the 53 territorial authorities that responded to the questionnaire sent 
out by the PLRC, 30 admitted that no complaints had been received about brothels and 
only 5 had received more than 10 complaints.65 A 2012 survey conducted in Australia 
63 For more on zoning sex work in New Zealand see generally, Dean Knight, “Brothels, bylaws, prostitutes 
and proportionality” (2005) NZLJ 423; Dean Knight, “The (continuing) regulation of prostitution by local 
authorities” in Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Catherine Healy, eds, Taking the Crime out of Sex Work: 
New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2010) at 141. 
64 Felicity Boyd, “SOOBs in Christchurch: Go or Whoa?” (2010) Lincoln Planning Review 2 at 20.   
65 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 9.4. 
also showed that brothels do not necessarily make bad neighbours. The results found that 
“44% of those surveyed were unaware that they lived near a brothel” and more than half 
“stated that the business had no impact (positive or negative) upon the local area”.66   
With the requirement to hold an operator’s certificate limited to only those who 
are in positions of power in commercial brothels, sex workers are exempt from providing 
their personal information in this regard as well. What information is gathered from 
applicants for an Operator’s Certificate is tightly controlled. There are strict conditions 
under which the records of applicants and certificate holders can be accessed. Police 
powers to search the register are limited to the investigation of crimes.67 Other than 
general information for statistical purposes about the industry broadly, it is an offense to 
obtain or use the information contained in the applications.68 The penalty is a fine of up 
to $2000.69 The New Zealand government has taken great care to ensure that sex workers 
are able to have confidence in the security of the system if they choose to participate in 
management activities. This is far preferable to the conditions that prevailed prior to 
decriminalization where police “kept a record of those working in the industry”.70     
COST 
 
 Unlike the massage parlours and escort services in Canada, New Zealand does not 
require individual licenses for those who work in brothels. A brothel is legal so long as 
management acquires the requisite certificates, and a business license where required. 
66 Penny Crofts, “Not in my Backyard: who wants a brothel as a neighour?”, The Conversation (25 Dec 
2013) online: < http://theconversation.com/not-in-my-backyard-who-wants-a-brothel-as-a-neighbour-
21034>. 
67 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 6.2.5. 
68  PRA, supra note 1 at s 41 (2). 
69 Ibid at s 41 (3). 
While this allows anyone (over the age of 18) to engage in sex work, as previously noted, 
it has not led to an explosion in the number of sex workers.71 Sex workers are also free to 
leave the industry at any time. Not having to pay for a license means that no sex worker 
feels compelled to work until the expiration of a license because of the cost incurred to 
obtain it. The goal of the PRA was to protect the health and safety of workers, not to 
condone the sex trade. By keeping fees low, the best interest of workers continues to be 
the focus of efforts to regulate the trade.   
 The cost of an operator’s certificate is also not set prohibitively high. Keeping the 
price affordable for those who require a certificate, and a municipal license, allows sex 
workers the freedom to be entrepreneurs if they so choose. This also serves to help 
prevent organized crime from infiltrating the industry, which can occur when licensing 
costs are set prohibitively high.72  
While the cost of a business license in Auckland is among the more expensive 
licenses offered by the city, it remains well below the cost of comparable licenses in 
Canada, such as those for massage parlours and escort services.73 For Canadian sex 
workers who operate out of massage parlours and escort services, the requirement for a 
license can also limit mobility. To work legally, a license is required in most cities. The 
cost of the license, coupled with the conditions that require sex workers to work 
exclusively for one employer, mean that travelling from city to city for work is virtually 
impossible to do legally in Canada. In contrast, New Zealand, by not licensing individual 
workers, permits them the freedom of mobility not only to work from various locations, 
70 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 5.3. 
71 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 13, Executive Summary. 
72 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 6.1.1.  
73 Auckland Licensing Fees, supra note 6; For Canadian licensing comparisons see page 41.  
but also the freedom to work in multiple locations. A New Zealand sex worker could 
easily work from a commercial brothel while continuing to see clients independently, 
because there are no rules that prevent this.  
 While money often plays a role in a person’s decision to work in the sex 
industry,74 this should not make the cost more onerous than other professions. New 
Zealand has adopted a system that takes cost into consideration. By assessing the effects 
of the high cost of licensing, New Zealand has determined that it is preferable for sex 
workers, the state and communities to have participation in a licensing regime, rather risk 
having a two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels.  
New Zealand’s simplistic scheme – one that respects the privacy of sex workers 
and governs brothels akin to all other businesses  - addresses the key concerns raised by 
Canadian sex workers who work in municipally licensed adult businesses. This broad 
discussion offers principles that could easily be adopted by Canadian lawmakers. These 
three principles will be further illuminated in the section that follows, which will offer a 
more detailed look at the licensing functions in both the PRA and through Auckland 
Council’s local bylaws.  
BROTHELS & LICENSING UNDER THE PRA  
 
The PRA lays out a majority of the rules for how sex work is permitted to occur 
under a decriminalized regime. While some predicted an explosion in the number of sex 
workers post-decriminalization, this assertion cannot be supported by research conducted 
74 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 5.4.1; Leslie Ann Jeffery & Gayle MacDonald, Sex Workers in the 
Maritimes Talk Back, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2006) at 19. 
after the enactment of the law.75 In fact, the conclusions of the Prostitution Law Reform 
Committee, which was created by s. 43 of the PRA to study the effects of 
decriminalization, found that decriminalization had improved working conditions, 
facilitated better relationships with police and better protects the rights of sex workers.76 
From human rights, to labour, to health, sex workers in New Zealand now operate within 
the same framework as workers in other sectors.77  
The positive impacts of the New Zealand legislation are not only encouraging, but 
should also prompt any country attempting sex work law reform to consider adopting a 
similar model, as well as the reasoning behind it. As Brock asserts: 
[h]aving a labour rights framework in place means 
that, should decriminalization actually occur, there 
is already an existing mechanism for organizing sex 
work, thereby making sex workers less unprepared 
for and vulnerable to new forms of legal 
regulation.78 
 
New Zealand’s choice to focus more on work, rather than sex, has actually facilitated 
greater compliance with the reforms enacted by the PRA. 
Under the PRA, a brothel is defined as a place customarily used for prostitution. 
However, this exempts “premises at which accommodation is normally provided on a 
commercial basis if the prostitution occurs under an arrangement initiated elsewhere”.79 
This effectively ensures that hotels are not classified as being in the business of 
prostitution and exempts them from the regulations required of commercial brothels. 
75 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 13, Executive Summary.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Max Harris, “Sex Workers Equally Protected from Sexual Harassment as Other Workers – Says New 
Zealand Case” Oxford Human Rights Hub (5 April 2014) Online: < http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/sex-workers-
equally-protected-from-sexual-harassment-as-other-workers-says-new-zealand-case/>; see also 
Occupational Health & Safety, supra note 60; Abel, Fitzgerald & Brunton, supra note 61. 
78 Deborah R. Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: The Social Regulation of Sexual Labour (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 154. 
The PRA also divides brothels into two distinct categories, the main differences 
being size and licensing requirements. Small owner-operated brothels allow for up to four 
sex workers to work together in one location, usually a private residence, so long as each 
sex worker retains the money received for sexual services rendered.80 Small Owner-
Operated Brothels (SOOBs) are not required to have an operator’s certificate because 
none of the workers is considered an operator.81 Larger, commercial brothels are 
managed venues where more than 5 sex workers can be employed. The operators of 
commercial brothels are required to be licensed by obtaining an operator’s certificate. 
However, there are no licensing requirements for individual workers.82  
When compared to some of the municipal licensing regimes adopted by Canadian 
cities to regulate massage parlours and escort services, New Zealand’s system of 
operator’s certification is quite simple. Under the PRA, anyone who “operates, controls 
or manages” a commercial sex business must apply for a certificate.  This includes 
anyone with the authority to determine: “when or where a sex worker works, the 
conditions under which they work and remuneration for their work”.83  Applicants for 
operator’s certificates must apply to the Registrar of the District Court with the 
prescribed form, fee, a photocopy of their identification, and a photo for the certificate.84 
So long as the aforementioned items are presented, and the applicant is over 18 and not 
disqualified under the conditions in s. 36 of the PRA, the Registrar is obliged to issue the 
operator’s certificate.85 An operator’s certificate can be denied only where the applicant 
79 PRA, supra note 1 at s 4(1). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid at s 5 (2). 
82 Ibid at s 5 (1). 
83 Ibid at s 5(1)(a)-(c). 
84 Ibid at s 35 (3). 
85 Ibid at s 35(5). 
has been convicted of one or more of the criminal offenses listed in s. 36.86 The crimes 
that could lead to a denial are primarily related to violence, organized crime, drugs, and 
money laundering, which carry sentences of imprisonment of more than 2 years.87 Those 
who do not qualify because of past crimes can apply for a waiver of disqualification, 
which will be issued at the discretion of a District Court Judge and the Commissioner of 
Police upon review of the application.88  
 An operator’s certificate is subject to annual renewal.89 The cost and application 
process remains the same as the initial application.90 For a renewal that is delayed or 
otherwise does not arrive before the expiration of the previous certificate, the previous 
certificate remains valid until the renewal is processed.91 Those who are required to hold 
certificates must be able to produce them upon request of the Police, be it immediately, or 
within 24 hours.92 Failure to show a license can result in a fine of up to $2000.93 The fine 
for operating a brothel without a certificate can be as high as $10,000. Operators have 
largely complied with the certification requirement. The Prostitution Law Reform 
Committee noted that only three charges had been laid, one of which resulted in a 
conviction while the other two were withdrawn.94 
86 Ibid at s 36 (1)-(2). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid at s 37. 
89 Ibid s 38. 
90 Ibid s 38 (1)(2). 
91 Ibid s 38(3). 
92 Ibid s 40(1). 
93 Ibid s 40(2). 
94 PLRC Report, supra note 35 at 6.2.4. 
 
TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY LICENSING BYLAWS 
 New Zealand has a “unitary system of government” which delegates powers to 
local governments through legislation.95 While this arrangement may seem 
straightforward, the structure of local authority varies throughout the country. There are 
78 local authorities that consist of “eleven regional councils, twelve city councils, 54 
district councils and the Auckland Council”.96 To complicate matters further, they do not 
all have the same authority. Only the Auckland Council, the City Councils and the 
District Councils are considered territorial authorities.97 Of the 67 territorial authorities, 
six also hold regional council authority, which means that legislation must be specific in 
delegating powers to the correct source.98 The territorial authorities derive a majority of 
their powers from the Local Government Act 2002.99 Other acts, such as the Prostitution 
Reform Act 2003, contain sections that also delegate specific matters to be dealt with at a 
local level.100  
In addition to obtaining an operator’s certificate, seven of New Zealand’s 
territorial authorities have enacted bylaws that require brothels to acquire a business 
license.101 The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), which repealed many of the 
provisions of the predecessor Act of 1974, holds public participation in local democracy 
95 Mossman & Mayhew, supra note 51 at 5. 
96 Government of New Zealand, Department of Internal Affairs, About Local Government, online: 




99 Local Government Act 2002/84 (NZ). 
100 PRA, supra note 1 ss 14-16. 
101 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 6.2.6. 
as one of its core values.102 Bylaws cannot be made without “extensive consultations with 
its community and other affected parties”.103 In addition, all bylaws enacted are required 
to be reviewed after five years.104 The Prostitution Law Reform Committee (PLRC) 
found that even though the PRA delegated the specific responsibilities of regulating the 
location and permissible signage for brothels to local authorities, much of the debate that 
occurred “revolved around questions of morality, and was often expressed in terms of 
strong emotion”.105 Despite the public outcry, “seven territorial authorities have 
established a licensing regime for brothels by way of bylaws under the LGA and the 
Health Act 1956”.106  
 Auckland Council is the largest regional council, and governs a population of 
1,415,550 people.107 The council consists of “two complementary decision making 
parts”.108 The mayor (elected at large) is the head of the governing body, which also 
includes a complement of members elected from twenty wards.109 There are also 21 local 
boards, each with five to nine elected representatives.110 The governing body focuses on 
“big picture” issues and decisions affecting the region, while the local boards handle 
issues in their respective communities.111 Auckland Council is currently reviewing 
bylaws for brothels and commercial sex premises and some local boards have passed 
102 Ibid at 9.2.1. 
103 Ibid at 9.2.1. 
104 PRA, supra note 1 s 42(1)(b). 
105 PLRC Report, supra note 25 at 9.2.1. 
106 Ibid at 9.5.1 
107 New Zealand, Auckland Council, Census in Auckland, online: 
<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/planspoliciesprojects/reports/Pages/censusinaucklandhome.aspx
> accessed 9 February 2015. Auckland now represents 33.4 per cent of New Zealand’s population and was 
the fastest growing region in New Zealand. 
108 New Zealand, Auckland Council, Auckland Council Explained, online: 
<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/AboutCouncil/HowCouncilWorks/auckland_council_explained/
Pages/Home.aspx> accessed 9 February 2015. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
licensing bylaws, which means the rules for operating a brothel legally are closely tied to 
location.112 Under the umbrella of Auckland Council, local boards in the North Shore, 
Manukau, Auckland City and Rodney have bylaws requiring brothels to obtain a 
license.113  
 Those seeking to operate a brothel require an Operator’s Certificate from the 
Ministry of Justice, as detailed above. Auckland Council requires that all potential 
businesses consult with a planning officer to ensure that the proposed business falls 
within a permitted zone and to ascertain the “operating requirements in the area, 
including parking and lighting”.114 If a new building is to be constructed, or an existing 
one altered, building consent is also required.115 These steps are required of all 
businesses. They are not specific to brothels. Additional licenses are required for serving 
food or alcohol, but Auckland Council no longer requires brothel operators to obtain a 
“health protection” license.116  
 With the correct forms and required fees, Auckland City has made the process of 
licensing a brothel akin to opening any other business. The cost of a brothel license is a 
one-time application fee of $181 and an annual fee of $708.117 Auckland City also 
permits the transfer of an existing brothel license for a fee of $99.118 Auckland’s Brothel 
and Commercial sex premises bylaw indicates that a license will be granted upon 
satisfaction of the application and payment of the fee so long as the conditions of the 
111 Ibid. 
112 New Zealand, Auckland Council, Brothel and Commercial Sex Premises Licenses, online: 
<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/LICENCESREGULATIONS/HEALTHLICENCES/Pages/broth




116 Ibid. Health Protection licenses are not required as of July 1, 2014.  
117 Auckland Licensing Fees, supra note 6. Prices quoted in New Zealand Dollars.  
bylaw are met.119 There is no proscribed limit on the number of brothel licenses that can 
be issued. Before a new license is issued, or an existing license is transferred or renewed, 
an inspection must be completed by an “authorised officer” to ensure compliance with 
city bylaws, as well as “the Health Act 1956120, the Building Act 1991121 and the Building 
Regulations 1992”.122 
 Auckland’s brothel bylaw also sets out the rules for signage123 and operational 
health and safety.124 Signage was delegated to the territorial authorities by the PRA.125 In 
addition to the specific signage rules for brothels in the brothel bylaw, they must also 
comply with the rules about signage in Part 27 of Auckland’s signage bylaw that applies 
to all signs in the city.126 The health and safety requirements in the bylaw compel brothel 
owners to provide clean, safe working environments for sex workers and their clients. To 
be in compliance with the bylaw (echoing the PRA), operators must make an effort to 
provide health information and safe sex supplies for workers and clients.127  
 Auckland’s brothel bylaw, like the PRA, is primarily concerned with ensuring that 
the operation of brothels is undertaken in a safe, unobtrusive manner. Local governments 
do not have the authority to prohibit brothels or sex work because they are not permitted 
118 Ibid. 
119 City of Auckland, by-law No 30, Brothels and Commercial Sex Premises Bylaw (2003) at 30.6.4 
[Auckland Brothel Bylaw]. 
120 Health Act 1956 (NZ) 1956/65. 
121 Building Act 1991 (NZ) 1991/150. 
122 Building Regulations 1992/150, Schedule 1; Auckland Brothel Bylaw, supra note 119 at 30.6.5. 
123 Ibid at 30.5. 
124 Ibid at 30.7. 
125 PRA, supra note 1 s 12. 
126 City of Auckland, by-law No 27, Auckland City Signage Bylaw (2007). 
127 Auckland Brothel Bylaw, supra note 119, 30.7.1 (a)-(g) 
to enact bylaws that contravene the intention of the PRA to make sex work safer.128 The 
policies and bylaws are currently undergoing review in an attempt to create a more 
unified strategy for regulating brothels throughout Auckland Council’s jurisdiction.129 
The dynamics of the sex trade are complicated. The regulation does not have to 
be. More than a decade of decriminalization in New Zealand has shown that simple rules, 
that consider the privacy concerns and fees that are not punitive in nature, can 
successfully encourage compliance with the law, while advancing the rights of sex 
workers. The certification regime has allowed brothels to open legally without setting 
strict conditions. Exempting SOOBs from licensing provides anonymity from the state 
and autonomy for sex workers. The registry of who holds and applies for an Operator’s 
Certificates is protected from being easily accessed and the requirement to hold a 
business license varies by location, with some not requiring one at all. This is instructive 
to lawmakers elsewhere. Sex work can be decriminalized and regulated at the local level 
to provide individualized solutions for communities without creating a hierarchy of legal 
and illegal enterprises.    
CONCLUSION 
 
When it comes to regulating decriminalized brothels, New Zealand has proven 
that less is more. The PRA’s carefully considered structure for the decriminalization of 
sex work has resulted in better conditions for sex workers because the Act puts the rights 
128 PRA, supra note 1; New Zealand, Auckland Council, Proposed policy for Auckland’s Commercial Sex 
industry, online: 
<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/planspoliciesprojects/councilpolicies/commercialsexindustrypoli
cy/Pages/home.aspx> accessed 9 February 2015. 
129 Ibid.  
of sex workers at the forefront of its intent.130 The doomsday scenarios that were 
predicted by those who opposed decriminalizing the sex trade have not come to 
fruition.131 Much of the success of the PRA comes from what it does not do. The PRA 
does not condone or encourage sex work, but nor does it prohibit it. The PRA does not 
make sex work more dangerous; it does not create a system so complex or expensive that 
workers are unable to comply with its requirements; it does not jeopardize future 
endeavors by linking sex workers to a paper trail indicating employment in the sex trade; 
and it does not treat sex work differently from other forms of employment or business. 
By taking a “neutral” position in licensing, instead of the “social control” stance, New 
Zealand has created a regime that encourages brothels to operate legally and avoids the 
pitfalls that allow a two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels to flourish as has 
occurred elsewhere.       
This chapter shows that New Zealand has managed to address the concerns that 
sex workers in Canada have about their work. It has done so through both the 
decriminalization of sex work and the carefully constructed rules that now govern the 
industry. The principles of the New Zealand licensing regime, including both the 
operator’s certification and local licensing requirements, have used simple and accessible 
rules to engage sex workers while respecting their privacy, and not using them as a means 
to raise revenue to fill municipal coffers. The recommendations of the Prostitution Law 
130 Abel, Fitzgerald & Brunton, supra note 61 at 139; Tracey Tyler, “Legalized Brothels Fantastic for New 
Zealand, Prostitutes Say”, Toronto Star (29 Sept 2010) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2010/09/29/legalized_brothels_fantastic_for_new_zealand_prostitutes_s
ay.html>.  
131 Dave Crampton, “New Zealand: Christians Divide Over Sex-Worker Law”, Christianity Today (3 Sept 
2001) online: < http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/september3/29.39.html>. 
Reform Committee indicating that more resources should be provided but without 
passing on the additional costs should be instructive to lawmakers elsewhere.     
The different systems of government that New Zealand and Canada have mean 
that it would be difficult to simply copy the provisions of the PRA for Canada. What is 
clear, is that the system that New Zealand has created under the PRA and the bylaws of 
the territorial authorities is functional, encourages compliance and improves conditions in 
the sex trade. The principles of the system should not be overlooked by Canadian 






CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The contrast between the regulatory regimes in Canada and New Zealand 
highlights the disparities in working conditions for sex workers. In Canada, 
municipalities are “eager to control the indoor sex trade through a myriad of zoning and 
licensing requirements aimed at being prohibitive in one sense and restrictive in 
another”.1 New Zealand’s experience with legal reform shows that professionalizing the 
sex industry and permitting brothels to operate can bring about more positive results than 
attempts to control and suppress the sex trade. Canada’s struggle to regulate the sex trade, 
both overtly at the federal level and covertly at the municipal level, has been debated by 
committees, courts and parliament, but has led to little meaningful change. That sex 
workers and their advocates were largely ignored in the creation of the new criminal 
provisions means that we have not yet reached a satisfactory solution. As Cheryl Auger 
wrote: “Bill C-36 treats anyone involved in sex work as though they are a social problem 
and ignores sex workers' right to security of person”.2  
The answer to protecting rights, community cohesion and ensuring health and 
safety standards begins with treating sex work as work. In Hrabchak3, Devine J. pointed 
to the language used in by-laws as being “laboured”, as if using the language of work 
1 Steven A. Kohm & John Selwood, “Sex Work and City Planning: Winnipeg’s Red Light District 
Committee and the Regulation of Prostitution” (2004) University of Winnipeg, Institute of Urban Studies at 
1. 
2 Cheryl Auger, “Bill C-36: No safety or security for sex workers”, rabble.ca (17 October 2014) online: 
<http://rabble.ca/news/2014/10/bill-c-36-no-safety-or-security-sex-workers>. 
3 R v Hrabchak [1999] MJ. No 554 (QL).  
could distinguish adult services from the criminal prohibitions on prostitution.4 In that 
case, the owner of an unlicensed escort agency successfully argued that offers of sexual 
services were not within the ambit of the bylaw regulating businesses providing 
companionship, and therefore he could not be convicted of running a dating and escort 
service without a license.5 The short decision details the limits of municipal authority but 
points to the “Alice-in-wonderland state of the law”.6 To avoid venturing further down 
this rabbit hole, reform at the federal level is necessary to allow municipalities the ability 
to license (and zone) brothels.   
The Bedford Court was clear that the laws should not put sex workers at greater 
risk and this must be taken into account by municipal lawmakers. Adopting new 
regulations should always involve those most affected: “[s]ex workers have a unique 
insight and expertise regarding their industry, the role it plays in Canadian society, and 
the ways in which regulatory regimes will impact their business”.7 The process of 
creating new bylaws aimed at regulating brothels should involve sex workers, in the same 
way that legal reform around any other issue would consult with those most affected. The 
labour of sex workers should not be devalued as an excuse for excluding their voices. 
Municipal lawmakers need to move beyond morality and address the labour that is really 
at stake.  
 These five recommendations are drawn from the research showing that 
municipalities are capable of creating licensing regimes which, when devised in 
4 Ibid at para 19. 
5 Ibid at para 14. 
6 Ibid at para 19. 
7 Pivot Legal Society, Beyond Decriminalization: Sex Work, Human Rights and a New Framework for Law 
Reform (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 2006) online: 
<http://www.pivotlegal.org/beyond_decriminalization> at 9. 
conjunction with workers, facilitate compliance and protect the rights affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Bedford. These recommendations offer guidance on how to strike the 
careful and necessary balance between sex workers and the communities in which they 
live. Sex workers and their communities will benefit from licensing regimes that set 
reasonable fees, allow specific exemptions from licensing, protect privacy, deal with past 
criminal history of license applicants and consult with sex workers throughout the 
process. Creating regulations that sex workers can abide by not only makes their work 
safer, but also avoids discord in the community.  
 In evaluating Canada’s criminal laws on sex work, the Fraser Committee weighed 
all possible options to determine the advantages and disadvantages. The following 
statement was made in relation to decriminalization coupled with municipal licensing:  
Among the advantages seen in this approach 
were the relative ease of enforcement; the 
acceptance of prostitution as a business and 
an improved self-image of prostitutes 
operating such enterprises; an attendant 
reduction of the reliance of pimps and other 
exploiters; better maintenance of public 
health; and increased revenue to municipal 
governments from license fees.8  
 
While recognizing that leaving the design of such regulations solely to municipalities 
would result in piecemeal regulation, with adequate consultation this is not an 
insurmountable challenge. New Zealand’s experience demonstrates that it is possible to 
achieve effective regulation even if it is inconsistent across jurisdictions.   
8 Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, 




In setting the cost of a license, municipalities need to be cognizant of the delicate 
balance that needs to be struck. Fees that are too high discourage or impede those who 
would otherwise participate in the licensing regime. As Bedford applicant Valerie Scott 
explained following the Ontario Court of Appeal decision: “[m]unicipalities need to 
ensure that licenses are a reasonable fee. If they charge thousands of dollars per year, sex 
workers will not be able to afford a license but organized crime will”.9 As demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, high licensing fees for the adult service sector are very much a reality in 
Canada.10 Using the same philosophy to set fees for brothels would be a mistake, as 
shown by the development of the two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels that 
occurred in Queensland, Australia. When fees are too high, the prevalence of illegal 
brothels will flourish. This is an undesirable outcome of licensing that can be avoided.    
The sex trade will continue to exist under a licensing regime designed for social 
control. The fact that sexual services are being provided in licensed massage parlours is 
evidence of this. While municipalities have profited from the licensing fees for adult 
service businesses and their individual workers, at the same time they impose harsher 
conditions on these same businesses. Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre, has been vocal in 
his opposition to crackdown on massage parlours, while Toronto amended their bylaw to 
9 Chris Hannay, “What will Ontario's legalized brothels be like? Your questions answered”, The Globe and 
Mail (27 March 2012) online: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/what-will-ontarios-
legalized-brothels-be-like-your-questions-answered/article4096161/>.  
10 See Chapter 2 at page 41 for the costs of Canadian licenses. 
restrict the number of licenses issued.11  Charging these businesses higher licensing fees 
has not stopped them from opening, but it has created hardships for those who work in 
the industry. Adopting a neutral standpoint for licensing and encouraging participation 
yields better results for both workers and the community.  
Licensing fees should be set at a level that is comparable to other businesses of a 
similar size.12 We have seen that sexual service providers continue to persist even when 
fees are set punitively high and despite the denial of health and safety regulation. The 
ability of municipalities to raise revenues is severely constrained.13 While this can be 
appreciated, it is also concerning that municipalities have used social control methods to 
regulate adult services so that the most marginalized are seen as a source of profit.  
EXEMPTIONS FROM LICENSING  
 
 The desire to exert control over the adult services industry is evident in Canadian 
municipal bylaws. By limiting the number of available licenses, and requiring each 
individual employee to also be licensed, it is clear that cities want to discourage the 
growth of the adult services industry. For example, Toronto limits the number of licenses 
available to owners of body-rub parlours to 25.14 In contrast, New Zealand has taken a 
neutral stance to licensing adult businesses and has opted for less restrictive regulations. 
11 Giuseppe Valiante, “Hundreds of erotic massage ‘brothels’ flourishing in Montreal despite federal anti-
prostitution law”, National Post (1 March 2015), online: 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/03/01/hundres-of-erotic-massage-brothels-flourishing-in-montreal-
despite-federal-anti-prostitution-law/>; Toronto Municipal Code, C 545, Licensing, § 545-361 [Toronto 
Licensing Bylaw]. 
12 Frances Shaver, “Prostitution: A Critical Analysis of Three Policy Approaches” (1985) 11 Can Pub Pol 
493 at 497. 
13 Don Richmond, Puppets on a Shoestring: The Effects on Municipal Government of Canada’s System of 
Public Finance,(Unpublished: 1976) online: 
<http://www.chba.ca/uploads/Policy%20Archive/1997/Puppets%20on%20a%20Shoestring%20-
%20Effects%20on%20Municipal%20Government%20of%20Canadas%20System%20of%20Public%20Fin
ance%201976.pdf> accessed 9 February 2015.. 
The permissive attitude focuses on health and safety, and sets no limits on the number of 
sex industry businesses, including brothels.15 The distinction between Commercial 
brothels and Small Owner-Operated Brothels (SOOBs) allows for regulations that are 
better tailored to the actual nature of the business. While an unlimited number of 
available licenses could lead to a proliferation of brothels, this has not been the case. In 
fact, many commercial brothels have closed because they were unable to compete for 
business.16  
 To create a municipal licensing regime for brothels that sex workers can and will 
participate in, there need to be reasonable exemptions from licensing. While it may sound 
counter-intuitive to have less stringent regulation, the New Zealand system shows how it 
can function effectively. All of New Zealand’s commercial brothels require an Operator’s 
Certificate, however, there are no license requirements for individual sex workers in their 
employ or for SOOBs. The territorial authority where the brothel seeks to operate 
determines business licensing requirements for brothels; and in some cases, the territorial 
authorities have not felt the need to enact licensing regimes for brothels.  
 The primary exemption for licensing should be for individual workers.17 
Regardless of the location in which they work, individual licenses are costly and provide 
14 Toronto Licensing Bylaw, supra note 11 at s 361. 
15 Gillian Abel et al, “The Prostitution Reform Act” in Gillian Abel et al, eds, Taking the Crime out of Sex 
Work: New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2010) 75 at 81.  
16 Elaine Mossman, “Brothel operators’ and support agencies’ experiences of decriminalization” in Gillian 
Abel et al, eds, Taking the Crime out of Sex Work: New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation 
(Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2010) 119 at 124 [Mossman]. 
17 Frances Shaver, Recommendations for Sex Work Policy: An Integrated Approach, (Ottawa: Presentation 
at the SSLR Roundtable, 2005) online: 
<http://web2.uwindsor.ca/courses/sociology/maticka/star/presentations/sslr-presentation-text-may30.html> 
at 2 [Shaver].  
little value to workers in return.18 Not requiring individual workers to obtain a license 
also addresses many of the privacy concerns sex workers have by providing them with 
the anonymity to work in the industry without the paper trail. Individual workers in New 
Zealand are not required to obtain a license and the PRA carefully considered multiple 
options with the input of workers. It was preferable to have safe, regulated brothels than 
to control and monitor individuals who may choose to sell sex.    
PRIVACY PROTECTION 
 
Municipal licensing should strive to protect the privacy of each person, regardless 
of the reason for providing personal information. For sex workers, the stakes are often 
higher. The stigma associated with sex work, which does not automatically disappear 
under decriminalization, means that workers have more nuanced reasons for secrecy 
around their profession. Not requiring that individual workers be licensed to work in 
brothels dramatically improves their privacy. 
 For those required to obtain licenses to operate commercial brothels, personal 
information should be subject to strict requirements. Sex workers should know up front 
who can access their application and for what reasons. The PRA carefully lays out 
guidelines on personal information and this should be replicated within a municipal 
licensing regime so that anyone applying for a license has confidence in the integrity of 
the system. Having all this information in advance is the only fair way to ask a person to 
submit personal information that will associate them with having worked in the sex trade.  
18 Cheryl Auger, After Bedford v. Canada: What Next? Panel Discussion (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law, 2014) online: 
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/media/AFTER%20BEDFORD%20V.%20CANADA%20PAN
EL%20JAN%2024%202014%20transcription.pdf > at 8 [After Bedford Transcript]. 
DEALING WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 
 
 Opportunities for workers to move from street-based work to the better security of 
an indoor venue should not be thwarted for past prostitution convictions. In addition to 
not requiring licenses for individual workers, sex workers who wish to operate their own 
sex industry businesses should not be barred from doing so. This requires careful 
consideration of which Criminal Code offenses should prevent a business license from 
being issued. Both police and sex workers should play a role in determining what 
offences should disqualify a person. These two groups should also advise on how to 
create a process for appeals or for having a personalized assessment in the case of past 
convictions.  
The current practice of licensing body rub parlours in Toronto appoints the Chief 
of Police as a decision maker on all license applications.19 There are no indications of 
what kind of criminal record would preclude a successful license application or how 
discretion is exercised. This means each applicant must be scrutinized instead of allowing 
them the benefit of a list of disqualifying offences that would indicate grounds on which 
their application will be refused.   
New Zealand developed a list of criminal convictions that make a person 
ineligible for a Brothel Operator’s Certificate.20 The crimes that can disqualify an 
applicant mainly pertain to offences of violence, drugs and fraud.21 By providing a 
detailed list with section numbers, applicants are able to know in advance if they may be 
19 Toronto Licensing Bylaw, supra note 11 at s 334. 
20 New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of 
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2008) online: 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-law-
review-committee/publications/plrc-report> at s 6.2.2 [PLRC Report]. 
21 Ibid; Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/28 at s 37: Waivers of disqualification can be obtained 
under certain circumstances by applying to the Registrar of the Auckland District Court.  
refused. The system provides clarity for applicants and is more administratively efficient 
because applicants are better informed about whether or not they will qualify for a 
certificate or not. New Zealand may have devised an effective solution, or perhaps sex 
workers and police could suggest improvements. Regardless, both groups need to be 
involved and the assessment criteria should be laid out in full for applicants, before they 
apply.  
CONSULTATION WITH THE INDUSTRY  
 
 It would be unimaginable for a government to create regulations for an industry 
without consulting with those who work within it. Failing to acknowledge sex work as 
work has meant years of criminal laws that have only made the sex trade more dangerous.  
 The voices of sex workers were largely ignored in the creation of the Protection of 
Communities and Exploited Persons Act.22 By failing to listen to sex workers, the enacted 
law fails to acknowledge the realities of the sex trade.   
The benefit of municipal law is that it can be crafted to reflect the unique needs of 
the community. While the risk is of piecemeal policy that varies from city to city, the 
creation of brothel licensing bylaws represents an opportunity to craft individual 
solutions in conjunction with community stakeholders and sex workers. Effective brothel 
licensing regimes cannot be created without the input of sex workers and the 
22 Kerry Porth, “Justice Committee on Bill C-36 ignored sex workers”, Pivot (14 July 2014) online: 
<http://www.pivotlegal.org/justice_committee_ignored_sex_workers>; Katrina Pacey, “Canadian 
politicians ignoring sex workers”, Pivot (27 August 2014) online: 
<http://www.pivotlegal.org/canadian_politicians_ignoring_sex_workers>; Kady O’Malley, “Peter 
MacKay's justice roundtables didn't set a place for sex workers”, CBC News (27 August 2014) online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/peter-mackay-s-justice-roundtables-didn-t-set-a-place-for-sex-workers-
1.2747403>; Luke Simcoe, “Ottawa ‘ignored’ research when crafting new prostitution laws, say 
academics”, Metro (5 June 2014) online: <http://metronews.ca/news/victoria/1055340/ottawa-ignored-
research-when-crafting-new-prostitution-laws-say-academics/>.  
organizations that advocate for their rights. The goal is to create a licensing regime that 
sex workers can and will participate in, so they should have a say in the creation of the 
regulations so that regulation reflects the reality of the industry. This means not only 
allowing sex workers to have a voice in the conversation but also that their voices be 
heard. It is vital that they be consulted: “[s]ex workers must be at the centre of planning 
and decision-making about the criminal law, as well as zoning and licensing issues, 
employment law and other regulatory issues that will impact their work and their lives”.23 
It is not enough to merely consult, but to consult effectively.  
Sex workers deserve an opportunity to express their views to municipal 
lawmakers and consideration should be given to their unique needs for privacy. 
Municipalities should schedule consultations with sex workers and their advocacy 
organizations that are closed to the public. This will facilitate both participation and frank 
discussion. This will also provide municipalities to acquire first-hand knowledge of how 
the sex trade operates within the community and ask for solutions from those most 
affected. Sex workers should be able to attend such meetings without fear of judgment or 
reprisal, and without having to give their names. Consultations that are open to the public 
may draw some members of the sex work community but they may choose not to identify 
themselves or to speak up because of the stigma that is attached to their work.  
Public consultation is also necessary and vital to balancing the concerns of the 
community with the needs of sex workers. Municipalities should involve sex workers 
who are comfortable speaking publicly as well as ally organizations to address 
community concerns. Misconceptions about the sex trade may be at the heart of 
23 Sex Workers United Against Violence et al, My Work Should not Cost Me my Life (Vancouver: Pivot, 
2014) online: <http://www.pivotlegal.org/my_work> at 18 accessed 15 February 2015.  
resident’s concerns and having those concerns addressed by those with extensive 
knowledge of the sex trade and research on the industry could foster better policy and 
community cohesiveness. While it is critical that “[s] ex workers, sex worker advocacy 
groups, and other community organizations providing services to sex workers are 
consulted in formulating legal and policy changes that affect sex workers”, they can also 
serve as valuable liaisons to the community.24 Introducing decriminalized, municipally 
licensed brothels into a community, as New Zealand has shown us, can be done without 
disrupting neighbourhood cohesion.  
 Criminalizing sex work is easy. Building inclusive communities that involve sex 
workers in the policy-making that affects them requires effort. While New Zealand offers 
a simple and successful example of how the decriminalization of sex work can be 
enacted, it is because much time and consideration went into crafting the laws, 
regulations and bylaws that now govern the sex trade. Given the constitutionally 
questionable criminal regime that was recently enacted in Canada, municipalities should 
prepare themselves for how they will engage with sex workers should the new law have a 
short tenure. It is certainly possible that an even stricter form of criminalization could be 
enacted, however, the evidence clearly indicates that the regulation of sex work, 
beginning at the municipal level, could have the most positive impact on the lives of sex 
workers. 
 If the current criminal regime is rejected and sex work is decriminalized in 
Canada, not all the work will be done at the municipal level. While it falls outside of the 
scope of this thesis, it is important to acknowledge that provincial governments will also 
have a role to play. The groundwork that needs to be done by municipalities around to 
24 Shaver, supra note 17 at 1. 
develop licensing and zoning regulations is merely the beginning.  As Cheryl Auger of 
Maggie’s points out: “licenses do not replace labor laws”.25 Labour, health and safety 
regulations all fall within provincial jurisdiction so co-operation will be necessary to 
create a cohesive, easy to navigate system that protects the rights of sex workers.  
 There is little reason that consultation and the lowering of fees could not be 
contemplated now. Building relationships between city counsels and the sex work 
community will take an effort on the part of both parties. There is little reason why this 
dialogue should not commence sooner rather than later. It serves to put municipalities in 
a better position to create bylaws with a clear, local perspective. It also allows sex 
workers to provide their municipalities with input as to their needs and concerns. Keeping 
high licensing fees in place cannot be justified, particularly in cities which restrict the 
number of licenses they grant. It reinforces the stigma that adult service businesses are 
undesirable, cause nuisance and require strict controls. It is undeniable that it is easier to 
do a lot of work over time instead of trying to manage an abundance of work in a short 
period. If cities undertake to foster relations and lower fees now, they will be more 
successful at balancing the concerns of the community with needs of sex workers if the 
legal landscape changes again.     
CONCLUSION  
 
Even with the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act now 
included in the Criminal Code, now is the time for planning the municipal regulation of 
decriminalized brothels. With such “grave concerns” over the new law it is precisely the 
25 After Bedford Transcript, supra note 18 at 9. 
right time to have discussions about how to improve sex work policy in Canada.26 This 
thesis has established why municipal regulation of decriminalized brothels is the most 
effective way forward; how current licensing regimes for adult service providers are 
insufficient and would need to adapt; and how New Zealand changed their legal regime 
and analysis of the decriminalized system. From this, we can draw guiding principles to 
assist municipalities in creating local licensing solutions that are tailored to the specific 
needs of each community. With the proper regulation at both the municipal and 
provincial levels, sex workers can benefit from legislation that treats sex work as work 
and affords the benefits of recognized employment. In the meantime, municipalities 
could start by consulting with sex workers and those in the adult service industry to 
improve the current licensing bylaws based on these same principles.      
Allowing the professionalization of the industry, treating it the same as other 
industries garners more compliance and a less disruptive way for the sex trade to operate. 
For this to occur, this thesis has promoted two closely linked principles: the recognition 
of labour as it applies to sex work, and neutral licensing regimes that treat sex work akin 
to other industries. If Canada is to achieve the success of New Zealand in decriminalizing 
sex work, decriminalization must be coupled with a neutral stance in regulation. This will 
allow for the same strong perception of rights that empowers workers in New Zealand.27 
Although it is a dramatic shift from the status quo, “a galvanizing force in support of 
labour legitimacy could effect lasting social change”.28  
26 Statement of Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne in Andrea Houston, “Premier Wynne Blasts New Federal 
Anti-Prostitution Law”, NOW Toronto (7 December 2014) online: <https://nowtoronto.com/news/premier-
wynne-blasts-bill-c36/> accessed 9 December 2015 [Wynne Statement].  
27 PLRC Report, supra note 20 at s 3.1.2: 92% of workers believed they had employment rights; 93.8% 
perceived their Occupational Health and safety rights; 95.6% of workers believed they have legal rights.   
28 Emily van der Meulen, “When Sex is Work: Organizing for Labour Rights and Protections” (2012) 69 
Labour/Le Travail 147 at 167. 
The situation in New Zealand was similar prior to decriminalization. In interviews 
with community agencies following the change in legal regime a church leader described 
the New Zealand situation in a manner that accurately reflects the current situation in 
Canada: 
The public morality and public discourse had 
previously been a double standard. On the one 
hand, this was saying this [sex work] is illegal and 
they [sex workers] are criminals. On the other hand, 
everyone knew and almost accepted it was going on 
behind closed doors. I think it is better for it to be 
honestly recognised as happening, whether people 
like it or not.29  
 
New Zealand managed to strike the proper balances without the benefit of example. 
Canada only benefits from the experiences of this legal change.
It is also abundantly clear that the current bylaws regulating adult service 
businesses are creating hardships that can be alleviated by providing better information to 
workers, particularly given the potential implications of the new criminal provisions. The 
issues of cost and privacy should also be addressed. This provides municipalities the 
opportunity to open communication within the industry that can foster better 
understanding and better working relationships.  
Stigma is an issue that will not disappear with decriminalization and that is why it 
is important to ensure both adult service providers and sex workers are assured privacy 
protections. Municipal licensing creates a paper trail linking a person with their 
employment in the sex industry. Workers fear that this will have consequences that will 
impact future goals. Careful attention to privacy concerns is key to creating a licensing 
regime that sex workers will participate in. Clear guidelines that establish who can access 
29 Mossman, supra note 16 at 124. 
the information, under what circumstances and the penalty for inappropriate access would 
also allow workers to be better informed.  
 A licensing regime can only be effective if there is participation. Current 
municipal licensing fees for both the owners/operators of adult service businesses and for 
individual employees are disproportionate to the fees charged to other businesses. While 
the discussion has highlighted that this is a hallmark of a social control licensing regime, 
it creates significant hardships for those working in the adult industry. First, the costs are 
higher than other industries. Second, the cost of a license is simply too expensive for 
some. Third, the cost and structure of licensing regimes can restrict the mobility of those 
who travel for work.  
 The experiences of New Zealand provide a roadmap of how sex work can be 
decriminalized and regulated without the situation dissolving into chaos or leading to 
significant growth of the sex industry. While the courts have weighed in over matters of 
zoning, the licensing regime, administered through the Ministry of Justice and at the local 
level, has been successful in creating better work environments, facilitating the rights of 
workers and respecting the autonomy of those who sell sex for a living.  
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
 The comparison of how Canada and New Zealand regulate sex work shows the 
stark contrast of the situations endured by workers. While the removal of criminal 
sanctions is primary, the introduction of neutral municipal licensing is equally important. 
The current social control licensing regime used for body rub parlours and escort services 
would continue to replicate the conditions of criminalization even if the criminal 
provisions were removed. Striking the right balance means not just decriminalizing the 
sex trade, but allowing it to professionalize and operate just like any other business. 
Canada has significant challenges to face if this is to occur but New Zealand can serve as 
a touchstone, not just for decriminalization but for the carefully constructed regulations 
that were put in place to govern the sex trade.   
 By contrasting the two regimes, five guiding principles can be drawn that will 
assist Canadian municipalities in developing licensing regimes for brothels should 
decriminalization occur. The creation of an effective licensing regime will provide for: 
reasonable fees; exemptions from licensing; privacy protections; does not exclude 
workers based on past prostitution charges; and extensive consultation with sex workers.   
 More law is not the answer. The nuances of the sex industry, which are discussed 
throughout this thesis, indicate that too much regulation will not lead to an effective 
solution. If the desire to place strict parameters on the sex trade informs the creation of 
licensing bylaws, they will be doomed to fail. At the very heart of what can be learned 
from New Zealand is that neutral licensing regimes have proven more effective. If 
municipalities commit to treating sex work akin to other businesses, then the principles 
that follow should lead them to the development of a licensing regime that sex workers 
will participate in and will not cause undue community discord.  
Setting reasonable fees is critical. As Lowman warns: “The unintended 
consequence is a pattern of law enforcement that allows the municipalities and the 
entrepreneurs who pay their license fees to corner the sex trade market, and exact higher 
prices”.30 Keeping the cost of a license for a brothel consistent with the pricing for other 
30 John Lowman, Submission to the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws of the Standing Committee on 
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Ottawa: John Lowman, undated) 
<http://184.70.147.70/lowman_prostitution/HTML/SCJHPE/Submission_to_the%20Subcommittee_on_Sol
icitation%20Laws_Brief.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2015 at 15. 
licenses allows sex workers to be in control of their industry. It allows them to participate 
without the need for a third party to finance them.  
Allowing exemptions from licensing protects privacy and autonomy for workers 
who wish to work in smaller, informal venues, while not excluding them from the safety 
measures such as working with others. To further protect the privacy of workers, 
municipalities should not institute a requirement for individual licenses. As workers 
indicate that licenses are poor value and they receive little in return for their fee and 
furnishing their personal information. This is indicative of an area where municipalities 
can improve immediately and instead of waiting to adopt new policies for brothels. Since 
municipalities have no need to identify who is employed in the sex trade, there should be 
no requirement for an individual license, which satisfies the concerns of workers over the 
cost of licensing and their personal information being collected.  
For sex workers, it is imperative that previous convictions for sex work not 
become barriers to licensing a brothel under decriminalization. While some criminal 
offenses should preclude a person from operating a brothel, there must be a clear 
indication of which offences will disqualify an applicant. There should also be a clear 
process for appeal or obtaining special permission to obtain a license when a person has a 
past conviction. A criminal record check is permissible for someone who seeks a license 
to operate a brothel, however only predetermined offenses should have no bearing on 
whether or not a person qualifies to work in a brothel. Perhaps most critically, sex 
workers should be involved in the creation of the rules that will be imposed on them.  
The guidance that sex workers can provide about their industry and how it 
operates needs to inform municipal lawmakers so that the licensing regime that is created, 
reflects the reality of the industry. Sex workers are very experienced in working under a 
set of rules that are not designed for them. They are in the best position to “define how 
their trade should be supervised”.31 Municipalities would be best served to consider this 
in light of current bylaws for body rub parlours and escort services. Instead of one side 
holding the power and the other holding the knowledge, cities and workers need to 
cooperate to find the right solutions.   
 These principles reflect recommendations made by previous studies, concerns of 
sex workers about municipal regulation and lessons from New Zealand’s experience of 
decriminalization. If municipalities can approach the licensing of brothels with an open 
mind to the experiences of workers and the guidance from lawmakers in New Zealand, 
there is no reason why municipalities could not enact licensing regimes that respect both 
workers and the communities in which they live.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Even before Bill C-36 was introduced, it was clear that any attempt to replicate 
the Swedish law criminalizing the clients of sex workers was going to be met with 
resistance. Brenda Cossman criticized the notion in the month following the Bedford 
decision: “[t]he idea that the Nordic model is some fantastic alternative, that it's going to 
uphold and protect the rights of prostitutes while going after their evil clients and pimps 
is a fallacy”.32 This is the exact fallacy that the Federal Government has enacted. The 
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act is now part of the Criminal Code 
31 Patrice Corriveau, “Regulating Sex Work: Between Victimization and Freedom to Choose” in Colette 
Parent et al, eds, Sex Work: Rethinking the Job, Respecting the Workers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 
45.  
but the provisions it adds remain contentious and the passing of the bill into law does not 
appear to have quelled the debate. The newly sworn-in Toronto city council wasted no 
time in speaking out against the Federal Government’s new criminal provisions. On their 
first day in office, 25 Councilors, representing all areas of the city and a wide array of 
political views, signed a letter urging Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne to refer the 
legislation to the Ontario Court of Appeal to determine if it passes constitutional 
muster.33  
The Premier responded with a statement indicating she was also concerned about 
the new criminal laws.34 The Premier wrote: “I am left with grave concern that the so-
called Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act will protect neither 
exploited persons nor communities”.35 While stopping short of referring the legislation to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal, Wynne has instructed Attorney General, Madeleine 
Meilleur to provide advice “on the constitutional validity of this legislation, in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Bedford case, and our options as a government in the 
event that the legislation's constitutionality is in question”.36 Political columnist John 
Ivison has interpreted this to means that if the law is deemed to be constitutionally 
suspect, the Ontario government will refuse to enforce it.37 A letter from members of the 
32 Brenda Cossman, After Bedford Transcript, supra note 18 at 16. 
33 Kristyn Wong-Tam, Letter to Premier Kathleen Wynne from Toronto City Councilors (Toronto: Wong-
Tam, 2014), online < http://www.scribd.com/doc/249162927/Letter-from-Councillors-to-Kathleen-Wynne-
re-Bill-C-36>; Jessica Cross Smith, “Behind the Scenes of Toronto City Councilors’ Opposition to 
Prostitution Law”, Metro (8 December 2014) online: <http://metronews.ca/news/toronto/1234074/behind-
the-scenes-of-toronto-city-councillors-opposition-to-prostitution-law/>.  
34 Wynne Statement, supra note 26. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 John Ivison, “Provinces Could Kill New Prostitution Law by Refusing to Enforce it”, National Post (8 
December 2014) online: <http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/12/08/john-ivison-provinces-could-
kill-new-prostitution-law-by-refusing-to-enforce-it/>. 
legal profession urged precisely that, however the Premier has indicated that the law will 
be enforced for the time being.38   
All that is clear is that the conversation on how sex work is regulated in Canada is 
far from over. This thesis has provided a possible way forward and a means to structure a 
vital discussion that needs to occur at the municipal level. As Lowman, and others have 
stated: “The Canadian political solution to the problems created by prostitution has been 
to say one thing and do another”.39 It is time for the political solution to be the 
acknowledgement of the labour in the sex trade and to regulate it in accordance with the 
rights sex workers so justly deserve. At the heart of the Bedford decision was the 
instruction that “Parliament has the power to regulate against nuisances, but not at the 
cost of the health, safety and lives of prostitutes”40, and evidence amply supports that 




38 Keith Leslie, “Ontario will follow prostitution law despite concerns, says Kathleen Wynne”, Toronto 
Star (19 December 2014) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/12/19/ontario_will_follow_prostitution_law_despite_concerns
_says_kathleen_wynne.html>. 
39 John Lowman, “Prostitution Law Reform in Canada” in Nihon Hikakuhō Kenkyūjo ed, Toward 
Comparative Law in the 21st Century, (Tokyo: Chuo University Press,1998) at 2.  
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